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Abstract: The thesis problematized and critiqued Educational Psychologist-Client 
relations in order to understand and explore the processes by which Educational 
Psychologists (EPs) constructed themselves as ethical professionals.  This was 
both a personal and professional journey because the thesis critically examined 
EPs’ professional identities while being an exercise in personal professional 
identity work. The author was therefore both researcher and researched.   
  
The methodology adopted a post-structuralist bricolage approach that 
appropriated aspects of Self-Study (S-S), Action Research (AR), and 
Autoethnography with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis.  This was a 
strategic move intended to disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology. 
The four research cycles included: (1)  an analysis of the write-up of a meeting 
with a 14 year old pupil (hereafter M), (2) a textual analysis of the Health Care 
Professions Council’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics  (HPC-
SCPE, 2008),  (3) an analysis of a Focus Group (FG) discussion with nine EPs 
working within an Educational Psychology Service (EPS) and (4) a synthesis of 
the findings from the first and third cycles of research. Only the results of the 
fourth cycle were presented in the main body of the thesis.   
  
Three discursive themes with relevant subthemes were identified: (1) the 
problematic ethical relationship with the client, (2) the appropriation of ethical 
rhetoric and (3) the strategic presentation of the Educational Psychologist. The 
results suggested that ethics was a useful tool to examine EP-Client relationships 
and that the trials and dilemmas experienced during these encounters spoke to 
the discursive formation in which EPs worked.  A wide range of ethical traditions 
and theories were employed rhetorically by EPs to warrant and legitimize 
positions and practice. The thesis radically challenged both the discourses of 
choice and the EP as the sole source of ethics in everyday micro-ethical 
encounters. EPs’ identities were argued to result from micro-processes in 
Education Psychology practice which entangled standards and ethics in EP-
Client relationships. Finally, problematizing the author’s practice opened up a 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Specifying the problem 
 
The thesis was partly prompted by a meeting with a client (referred to as “M”). M 
was a 14 year old male pupil at a local high school. Before meeting M I 
encountered him as a set of descriptors provided by school staff, some of which 






















The adequacy of the above as descriptions of M did not survive the first meeting 
with him. Meeting M made me question the processes by which clients were 
 
• Persistent poor attender/school refuser:  M’s attendance was just below 
50%. When in school M was only attending a small percentage of his 
lessons and spending the rest of time in the school Learning Support 
Centre (LSC).  
• Having hygiene problems: M was described as having dirty fingernails 
and hair with persistent knits. M had dirty cloths. 
• Confrontational and work refuser:  It was claimed that M regularly 
argued with staff and peers, refused to go to lessons and when in 
lessons refused to work.  
• A loner: I was told that M did not have any friends in school. 
• A victim; M’s family had to move to their current house after 
experiencing bullying in the community and M had been bullied in 
primary and secondary school. 
• Attention seeker: I was warned that M would enjoy talking to me as he 
sought adult attention and liked talking about himself. 
• Pupil with Special Educational Needs: M was in the bottom sets in 
school and had significant difficulties with literacy and mathematics. I 
was initially asked to undertake an assessment to establish if M would 
benefit from special examination arrangements. 
• Having Mental Health problems: M had been seen by a Child and 
Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) worker for 8 weeks. They 
met each Monday afternoon but M had not been responsive to the 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). M had also been referred to the 
Community Paediatrician establish if he met the criteria for an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
• Belonging to a dysfunctional family: The school’s Family Support Worker 
had undertaken a visit to school and had reported difficulties with 
hygiene and parenting. M was the youngest of 3 children in a single 
parent household.  
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made visible and the role of Educational Psychology in warranting, regulating 
and fabricating those visibilities. The wager I made was; by analysing my ethical 
trials, dilemmas and challenges I would be able to examine the processes of 
individualisation (identification) in Educational Psychology (Araujo & Martuccelli 
2010).   
 
In writing and reading for the thesis the nature of the problem changed. I started 
by asking questions about my practice and ended up asking questions about my 
professional identity.  The original question was; “what can I say about the other 
that would not be excluding/limiting/reductive?” This ethical question arose from 
an anxiety about the power relations between Educational Psychologists and 
clients and the role that Educational Psychologists have in labelling, categorizing 
and measuring (e.g. Billington 2002; Billington & Pomerantz 2004). As the thesis 
progressed the question moved to; “what was it about Educational Psychology1 
(Its condition of possibility2) that made the relationship with clients problematic?  
 
1.2 Justification for Researching Professional Ethics 
 
There were three possible justifications for researching professional ethics.  
Firstly, it will be argued that there was a long and establish history between 
applied psychology and ethics. Secondly, that ethical practice was required to 
achieve good outcomes. Thirdly, it will be argued that applying ethics to EP-
Client relations acted as a useful lens to analyse educational psychology 
practice.   
 
Firstly, Brinkmann & Kvale (2008) noted that the social sciences developed out of 
moral philosophy where students of social science were expected to develop 
                                                 
1
 This question would have been easier to formulate if there was an adjective form of educational 
psychology. This question could then be stated as; what was it about the Educational Psychologyness of 
Educational Psychology that made the relationship with clients problematic?  
2
 The condition of possibility referred to the creative tensions in the multiplicity of discourses that were 
present in Educational Psychology that articulated and regulated/warranted the possible ways of being  an 
Educational Psychologist and practicing Educational Psychology .   
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moral sensibilities as part of their curriculum. Support for this declined because 
as positivistic attitudes to research “based on experiments tests and 
questionnaires” increased (Ibid, page, 264).  The exclusion of ethics correlated 
with the desire to become value neutral, an impartial observer and disembodied 
only to return in the form of concerns about neutrality, impartiality, consent and 
confidentiality. Research on ethics could therefore be argued to be a continuation 
of the dialogue between qualitative approaches and Educational Psychology. 
 
Secondly, Allan (1999) argued that inclusion was dependant on Educational 
Psychologists (EPs) undertaking “ethical work” on themselves and therefore 
should be the subject of research. Without ethical work EPs could become 
complicit in the processes that promoted exclusion. For Allan (1999), ethical work 
involved challenging and questioning the evidence that underpinned our practice, 
disrupting our everyday professional habits, ways of thinking, praxis, beliefs and 
adopting a problematising and critical attitude towards the institutions we worked. 
Ethical work also opened up a critical space between the professional and their 
practice. Allan (1999) suggested that a critical space could be achieved through 
problematising professional rhetoric. Finally, Allan (1999) claimed that the largest 
barrier to working ethically was the professional’s “passion for ignorance” (Ibid, 
page, 118). The passion for ignorance was described as a desire to ignore or fail 
to acknowledge the implication of one’s own role in exclusion. This was not the 
result of a lack of compassion on behalf of the professional. Rather it was a 
product of the discourses that constructed Special Educational Needs (SEN). For 
example, the discourse that professionals always acted in the best interests of 
their clients. Ethical work for professional therefore included “subverting” their 
“ideology of expertism” (Ibid, page, 119). This was achieved by recognising that 
they had Professional Thought Disorder (PDT), which included: 
• Compulsion to analyse and categorise the experience of others 
• Disordered cognition (rigidly held beliefs, delusions of grandeur) 
• Negative transfer and projection (not able to distinguish their beliefs and 
wishes from those they are helping) 
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This thesis was my attempt to undertake ethical work and could be viewed as a 
response to Allan (1999).    
 
The third argument was that ethics provided a framework to critically examine 
practice, i.e. a tool to think with rather than as a set of theories and rules 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008). Using ethics as a frame to examine Educational 
Psychology practice was a means to surface practices and discourses that posed 
problems for Educational Psychology.  Including an ethical dimension could 
therefore enable critical reflection on existing models and frameworks. Hoeyer 
(2006) identified three categories of studies of ethics: 
• Category (A) included studies which explored ethics as a subject in its 
own right 
• Category (B) described studies in which ethics was only a device to study 
something else.  
• Category (C) encompassed studies that examined ethics as a technology 
of power and tended to belong to the discursive tradition.   
 
This thesis included aspects of both Category B and C because ethics was used 
as a tool to critically examine EP practice and understood as a technology of 
power.   
 
Therefore, research on ethical practice was relevant because: 
• It was part of a (re)turn to an ethically engaged social science. 
• Ethical practice was dependant on individuals undertaking ethical work on 
themselves. 
• Using an ethical lens could produce an interestingly critical account of 
Educational Psychology practice.  
 
1.3 Positional/Theoretical Framework 
This section delineated the three ways in which positionality was considered:  
1. Position as either insider or outsider researcher 
2. Ontological or epistemological position 







The most obvious position would be as an insider researcher. I was an EP 
researching practice in the Service where I worked. However, the terms ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ were not mutually exclusive and were continent on roles and 
actions (Labaree, 2002). For example, when interviewing M, I was a traditional 
outsider collecting data on others.  However, when discussing with my EP 
colleagues I was both an insider and an outsider. The insider status was derived 
from being a member of the team and outsider status because of the need to 
make the familiar strange, the ordinary extraordinary and to (re)consider the 
taken-for–granted in my Service.   The insider/outsider position occasioned the 
ever present potential for role confusion by being a work colleague, while 
providing a service to M and being a researcher.  Being both insider and outsider 
could therefore produce a type of diaspora associated with hybridity3 (Bhabha, 
1990).  
 
Insider research had been criticized because the inherent subjective position 
made it scientifically invalid (Anderson, 2006; Holt, 2003; Salzman, 2002). 
However, being an “insider” might have the potential to produce better research. 
For example, less time needed to establish rapport, participants might be more 
willing to disclose information to an insider and less time required to develop 
understanding of the context (Asselin, 2003; Borbasi, Jackson & Wilkes, 2005). 
However, Dwyer and Buckley (2009) argued that being an insider did not make 
the research better, rather it was just different. Parker (2002), below, identified an 
additional tension present in research with individuals: 
 
“There is a continual tension between “personal reactivity” (the attempt by the 
subject to understand and control research) and “procedural reactivity” (the ways 
in which the demands of the situation limit their room for manoeuvre) when 
psychologists agonize about deception or the depersonalization of those they 
treat like objects, however, they then find themselves faced with the (to them) 
                                                 
3
 I was outsider who was in and an insider who felt outside.  
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unbearable prospect of being open about the hypothesis and giving the game 
away” (Parker, 2002, page 5) 
 
This tension 4was particular important when the participants were colleagues and 
friends.  However, Tillmann-Healy (2003) argued that researching friends 
enabled researchers to adopt attitudes of caring, respect and trust. This 
acknowledged the levels of investment that people in communities made to each 
other. This was the antithesis of the detached, neutral, ambivalent researcher of 
positivistic research (Willig, 2003).  Tillmann-Healy (2003) further argued that 
researching friends was only ethical if researchers also turned the research gaze 
onto themselves. Otherwise the relationship would be too exploitative (one 
sided). The aim of turning the research onto myself was discussed further below.  
 
1.5 Epistemological and Ontological Positions 
 
While researching, I experienced pressure to come out and embrace a category. 
Was I a realist, critical realist, constructionist, constructivist, etc.? I also 
experienced others’ attempts to out me. These outing attempts seemed to stem 
from an essentialist perspective which assumed that the epistemological and 
ontological position said something about me.  However, I wanted a more 
strategic approach to positionality: not to say that I am a Foucauldian inspired 
“post-structuralist” but rather to state that this thesis will take this position. This 
adoption of strategic positionality 5points to the contingent, and partial and 
situated nature of the research.   
 
Although the thesis appeared to be concerned with the “lived experience” of the 
EPs the position would be better described as hermeneutic rather than 
phenomenological because   political, historical and sociological contexts were 
                                                 
4
 The thesis frequently used the term tension instead of conflict. This was because it recognized that binary 
constructs or antagonism could be held in separation without the need to be dialectically resolved. This 
postponed closure and held out the possibility that the tension could be creative.  
 
5
  The idea of contingent positionality had been present in feminist research on identity for some time, for 
example see Brah (2005) pages 148 - 149 
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emphasised over experience (Miller and Crabtree, 1999). This was a move away 
from an ambition to manifest the essence of another’s/researcher’s lived 
experience to analysing the context in which that experience was constructed. 
How people talked about their experiences, trails and challenges was therefore 
perceived to speak to the context in which these experiences occurred.  Hence, I 
was interested in how: 
• The Client was constructed? 
• EPs navigated relations with clients?  
• EPs came to know their practice?  
 
This was a shift from knowing content/things to examining processes.  The aim 
was not only to identify which ethics were employed but also the work that they 
undertook. I was therefore concerned with how practitioners talked about ethics, 
the rationalizations employed, how participants positioned and repositioned 
themselves in a range of different and conflicting discourses.   This was a post-
structuralist discursive approach to epistemology and ontology (Baxter, 2002; 
Billig, 1999). Epistemological because the thesis was interested in what 
practitioners said about others. Ontological because I was interested both in the 
processes of speaking about Others and how Others were theorised. 
 
This thesis was influenced by the “relational turn” in research (Hollway, 2008). 
This suggested that all subjectivity and meaning formation was underpinned by, 
and expressed through, intersubjectivity.   The research was therefore psycho-
social. This meant that the intention was not to reduce interpretation to either the 
level of the individual or the social but as an iterative process (Hollway, 2008).   
 
The thesis also held that there was an entangled relation between power and 
knowledge (Foucault, 1980, Reason, 1994). Power was: 
“... never localised here or there, never in anybodies’ hands, never appropriated 
as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is excised through a net-like 
organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are 
always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and excising this power. 
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They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements 
of its articulation” (Foucault, 1980, page 98). 
 
Power, therefore, not only established relations of dominance and submission 
but also informed how these relations were established, maintained and 
regulated by systems of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). This included what could 
be said about the Client, how the Client was constructed and their Clienthood 
regulated. The focus on relational ethics therefore already included a political and 
knowledge dimension.  
 
Foucault (1997) argued that there was a relationship between power and 
knowledge. Institutional power was achieved through continual examination 
shaped by normalizing judgements and combined with hierarchical observation. 
The institutional examination of the Other combined both “the deployment of 
force and the establishment of truth” (Foucault, 1997, page 184). Examination 
both fabricated the “truth” about those it examined by producing facts and also 
identified their capacities and wellbeing. This knowledge was then used to 
discipline their behaviour by directing the Other to a treatment or pedagogy. The 
examination was also facilitated by locating the other in a “field of 
documentation”, which included collecting case histories, demographic data, and 
reports of assessments and tests (Ibid, page 189). These documents were 
required to be detailed and exhaustive. These processes of individualisation 
enabled the other to be categorised, normalised and transformed into a case 
subject to disciplinary power. The Other was therefore made an example of a 
category and a target for care. Caring thus provided the opportunity for control 
and closure.  This was because the other was made manageable and bounded 
within a category and shaped for treatment or intervention.   
 
However, power was not the central object of Foucault’s analysis; rather power 
was a tool to examine how persons became subjects (Foucault, 1980). Analyzing 
power meant the examination of relations between individuals and individuals 
and institutions. This power was productive rather than oppressive: 
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“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in generative 
terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In 
fact power produces; it produces reality. It produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him belongs 
to this production” (Foucault, 1979, page 194). 
 
If power was understood to encompass both prescriptive and productive 
processes then there was no position external to power (Foucault, 1980). This 
type of power applied itself to the immediate everyday life and: 
 
“Categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to 
his own identity, poses a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others 
have to recognize in him” (Foucault, 1982, page 781). 
 
Power therefore made individuals subjects and objects of knowledge. Foucault 
(1982) meant subjects both as being subject to someone else’s control and being 
fixed to an identity through self-knowledge.  The subject being both autonomous 
and subject to a law or rules was therefore both situated and reflexive (Reason, 
1984; Shotter, 1993).    
 
The immediacy of power required immediate struggles. The aim was not to find a 
chief enemy or eventual liberation (Foucault, 1983). Rather the aim was not to 
“discover who we are but to refuse what we are not” 6 and explore who we could 





                                                 
6
 I preferred Iago’s, in Shakespeare’s Othello, line   “I am not what I am” and hence the subtitle of the 
thesis.   Iago’s statement occurred after two rhetorical moves between lines 41 to 66 chapter 1, scene 1.   
Iago first recognized himself as a servant with duties.  Next, Iago made problematic the constructs of 
service and duty. For example, he talked about servants being unceremoniously dumped after years of 
service.    These moves enabled Iago to rationalize a brake from service and duty while remaining a soldier.  
These were similar to the rhetorical moves I made. First, to recognise/examine the identity of EPs and then 
to make it problematic. The aim was also to enable me to have the possibility of being other than what I 
am, but hopefully without the tragic consequences! 
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1.6 Position on Identity 
 
Critically examining EPs’ perceptions of their role and identity was important 
because it influenced how they practiced and the judgments they made (Ashton 
& Roberts, 2006; Stobie, 2002).   The thesis strived for a non-essentialist 
ontological position on identity which held that identity was contingent, fluid, 
fragmented, reflexively understood and fabricated by the subject in relation to 
and with Others (Butler, 2004; St Pierre, 2000a, 2000b). This included both  the 
other as Other and “me” as Other (Butler, 2004; Derrida, 1999)  Post-
structuralism challenged  the ontological certainty of identity by problematizing 
the foundations of humanism, the transparency of language, the solidity of the 
self, and notions of knowledge and truth (Gannon, 2006; St Pierre, 2000a, 
2000b). St Pierre (2000b) insisted that the self “does not exist ahead of or 
outside language but is a dynamic unstable effect of language/discourse and 
cultural practice” (St Pierre, 2000b, page 502). These  post-structuralist selves 
were produced in a “nexus of contradictory subjectivities” in constantly shifting 
power relations, which enable the speaker to adopt multiple positions (Butler, 
2004; Walkerdine, 1990, page 3) The subject was therefore  not a thing but 
positions maintained within relations of power (Arrisbas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 
2009). 
 
Having self-reflexivity as a core methodology and wanting to hold to a post-
structuralist concept of selfhood produced a tension, crudely characterized as:  
when “I” set out to study myself the use of “I” signalled an internal consistent self. 
However, post-structural approaches simultaneously attempted to destabilise 
that fixed “I” (Hall, 1997, 1996).   This tension only existed when reflexivity was 
seen as an unveiling, unmasking, outing or discovery of truth about the self. 
However, if identity research was an act of becoming (preformation) then the 
tension dissipated.  This acknowledged the difference between problematising 
agency and denying agency (Butler, 2004).  Foucault (1997) argued that his aim 
was not to exclude the subject but to describe the positions they could occupy 
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and show how different subjects in the same discursive practice could speak of 
different objects. Furthermore, because power acted on possible actions the 
potential to act otherwise remained (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009). The 
potential to act otherwise made professional identity work an ethical project.   
An additional solution to the post-structuralist dilemma above was the attempt to 
create some tension in the reader by moving between the first and third person. 
This move was intended to disrupt the presentation of the unified self and put it 
under erasure (Gannon, 2006). For a fuller discussion of the rationale for using 
both the first and third person see appendix 5. 
 
1.7 Researching the Event 
 
The overall approach of the thesis was idiographic7. Ethical relations were 
argued to be complex and not straightforwardly bounded by general law or 
universal principles. These relations can be ambiguous and unpredictable. This 
implied that the research was an examination of an unique event and although 
the examined practice could share characteristics with other EP’s practice the 
research did not necessarily generate knowledge that was easy to generalize.  
 
As suggested above the research was situated at the level of the event.  Events 
differ from objects. Objects exist whereas events occurred (Hacker, 1982). In 
addition, objects were often discussed as having clear spatial and temporal 
boundaries whereas events have woolly spatial and temporal boundaries 
(Hacker, 1982).  Events were also both incorporeal and material. They were 
material because they can have material effects but incorporeal because events 
were not reducible to the facts of what occurred or a property of the situation in 
                                                 
7
 That was an attempt to examine the particular, unique, subjective and contingent phenomena.  
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which they occurred (Foucault, 1997). Events were therefore involved in different 
games of truth. Explicitly, the event of meeting M was different from the fact that I 
met M. The difference was between a single statement that can be judged as 
true or false against the multiple emotional consequences and meanings that 
occurred in relation to the event.  Understanding the encounter with M as an 
event had a synergy with Foucault’s (1978/2003) attempted eventalization of 
history. This was described as “breech of self-evidence” and “making visible 
singularity” (Ibid, page 226). This required establishing the “multiplication or 
pluralisation of causes” that constituted the event (Foucault, 1978/2003, pages 
226-227). Foucault’s (1978/2003) desire to “pose problems in local terms” and to 
ask “particular and limiting questions” also made a Foucauldian approach 
extremely applicable to this thesis (Foucault, 1978/2003, pages 286 and 285).  
This was because this thesis focused on an EP’s particular practice examined at 
the local level of their Educational Psychology Service.  Therefore, the aims to 
examine the discursive world that EP inhabited, to delineate the ways in which 
the professional “I” engaged with those discourses and to enable the possible 
transformation of my practice meant I was a witness, participant and reporter of 
the event (Willig, 2003).  The interpretations were therefore just one possible 
reading of the event (Billig, 1997).  
 
1.8 Saying and Said 
 
Levinas’ (1981) differentiation between ‘said’, ‘saying’ and ‘unsaying’ provided a 
novel way to think about the epistemology and ontology of practice. The said can 
be understood as the literal content of what was being said, whereas saying was 
what was being expressed. An illustration is given in the text box below: 
 
A loving daughter is beside the bed of her terminally ill  mother.  Both mother 
and daughter know that there is not much time left.  The daughter is holding 
her mothers hand and talking about the weather.  
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In this moment what was being expressed (what the daughter was saying) by 
being there was much more then what was being said. Levinas (1981) excluded 
expressive acts from the study of being (ontology).  
 
Levinas (1981) found violence in attempts to make ontology known through 
analysis, categorisation and thematization. Saying resisted and was betrayed by 
attempts to categorize it or make it thematic (Levinas, 1981).  Processes of 
amphibiology and apophansis enabled closure and reduced being to the said. 
Levinas’s (1981) position could be paraphrased as; there was nothing that could 
be said about the other that was better than saying nothing at all. It was possible 
to say what the other was not. The other was unknowable, and the other was not 
me.  However, there was paradox here because not knowing was still to know 
something (I know that I do not know).  
 
1.9 The Preoccupation with Pastoral Modes of Power 
 
Finally, this thesis could also be perceived as a continuation of the postmodern 
preoccupation with Foucault’s (1997) analysis of pastoral modes of power 
(Schutz, 2004). The emphasis on pastoral modes of power had been criticised 
for ignoring the more authoritarian disciplinary modes of power.  Schutz (2004) 
argued that focusing on local acts and performances obscured the impacts 
resulting from the lack of access to social and material goods experienced by 
marginalised groups.  Caughlan (2005) challenged Schutz (2004) and suggested 
that pastoral power was pervasive and particularly “corrosive” in high poverty 
settings.  In addition, pastoral power and macro modes of power were entangled 
and mutually reinforcing (Caughlan, 2005). This was evident in States being 
interested in both populations (reproductive rates, movements, housing, 
education, etc) and in imposed individual discipline and self-regulation (Foucault, 
1983). However,   Foucault (1977) argued that only micro bottom up acts of 
resistance were possible given the individualising and totalising nature of power.  
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This was because macro acts of resistance could leave in place the operation of 
micro processes of power. These included combining pastoral and disciplinary 
regimes to create the discursive space that limited what was allowable or 
thinkable. Foucault (1983) claimed that pastoral power: 
“… cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without 
exploring their soul, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It 
implies knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it” (Ibid, page 214).  
 
The thesis therefore also explored the techniques and processes EPs employed 
to make clients knowable.  
 
1.10 Aims and Research Questions 
 
The aim of the thesis was to trouble and disturb the tradition I worked in by being 
open to the voice of the Other (Todd, 2000). The phrase “to trouble” had been 
chosen carefully to signal that the research was not intended to be a rejection or 
a refutation of Educational Psychology. To trouble Educational Psychology 
meant adopting both a problematising and critiquing attitude. Problematization 
and critique are simultaneously methods of analysis and self-forming activities 
(Foucault, 1984/1986).  
 
Problematization made problematic that which otherwise goes unchallenged in 
practice. Adopting a critical attitude involved showing what appeared to be 
obvious or natural was a historical and social artefact (Foucault 1984/1996). 
Foucault stated that critique was: 
“…at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed 
on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them,” (Foucault, 
1986b, Page 50).  
 
Critique therefore held the possibility of developing my practice by making visible 
the discourses that regulated EPs’ practice. Critique could be a method to 
identify the conditions of possibility under which a field of practice appeared 
(Butler, 1995, 1997). Foucault (19782003), below, was explicit about the aim of 
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his institutional analyses was not to provide advice or instructions but to create a 
dissonance in people who worked in institutions so that: 
“…they "no longer know what to do", so that the acts, gestures, discourses which 
up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, 
dangerous”  (Foucault, 1978/2003, page 235). 
 
Foucault (2003) by placing practitioners in a space where they did not know what 
to do incited an ethical relation. The practitioner was called to ask, ‘how should I 
behave when I cannot fall back on epistemological certainties?’   In the prior 
state, when the practitioner believed that they knew what to do, there was no 
need to think.  In addition, when I am not sure which way to turn at least I am 
looking. Critical analysis therefore did not cause apathy but a “hyper- and 
pessimistic activism” (Foucault, 1978/2003, page 236). Foucault’s (2002) point 
was not that professions like Educational Psychology were bad but that they 
were dangerous. This meant that professionals had therefore to do something to 
mitigate against that danger.  
 
Following Foucault (1977) an analysis of Educational Psychology was at the 
same time an analysis of the EP-Client power relations. The thesis was thus an 
experiment to establish if there was a way out from those power relations.  This 
way out does not mean a complete break but the possibility of doing something 
different (Foucault, 1978/2003).  Foucault (1992, 1984/1986, 2003a) argued that 
the self’s relation to the self was an ethical practice and described these relations 
as the “technologies of the self”. These technologies involved procedures of 
taking care of oneself by enabling: 
 
“Individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 1983/2003a, 
page 146).   
 
Self construction was therefore both an occupation and preoccupation and 
occurred through the self reflecting on its behaviour, actions and thoughts. This 
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reflection had a judicial flavour as the activities of the self were normatively 
examined from a hierarchical perspective. The individual would reflect on what 
had been done and what ought to have done   and weighed it in the balance. 
These processes would not only reflect on who they have been and are but also 
who they wanted to become. The individual was thus woven into a relation of 
power but also retained the power to say no through practicing acts of self 
discipline.   
 
1.11 Possible Traps 
There were at least eight possible traps to be avoided in adopting a reflexive 
approach. Briefly these were: 
1. Normative (attempting to establish a new set of universal rules); 
2. Sanctimonious/Pharisaic (adopting an inappropriate tone);  
3. Instrumental (assuming that  experiences can be unproblematicly, 
codified, categorized and made thematic);  
4. Narcissistic/vainglorious (reflectivity that just said “look at me”); 
5. Monologic (developing knowledge only through self-reflection instead of 
dialogueic interaction with theory and others); 
6. Enabling closure (presuming that there is only one truth and  enabling only 
one reading of the situation); 
7. Warranting insider accounts (privileging the knowledge produced just 
because it has been developed by a practitioner). 
8. Slipping into reflectivity as personal therapy. 
 
How well I avoided each of the above traps was reviewed in the reflections 




The thesis aimed to apply a Foucauldian approach to research that 
problematized and critiqued Educational Psychology practice in order to seek to 
understand and explore the processes by which EPs constructed themselves as 
ethical professionals. There were three axis of the study that was present in both 
the literature review and in the analysis of results. The first axis was to establish 
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how EPs came to recognize themselves as EPs. This required a literature review 
of professional identity in general and EP identity in particular. The analysis of 
results focused on how EPs were constituted as subjects and objects of 
knowledge.  The second axis was the examination of the normative systems that 
regulated Educational Psychology. This was achieved through a critical 
examination of the literature on professional ethics, an analysis of the HPC-
SCPE, an analysis of the focus group discussion and my meeting with M.   The 
third axis was an analysis how of EPs defined their ethical practice in their 
relations with clients. Finally, the thesis was guided by the following two research 
questions:    
 
1. How do EPs position themselves as ethical professionals in the EP-Client 
relationship?  
2. What do the ethical trials experienced by EPs while working with clients 















Chapter 2. Orienteering:  An Overview of the Thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis followed a traditional format of; introduction, literature 
review, methodologies, results, discussion, reflections and conclusions.  This 
section included an overview of the substantive chapters. 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The literature review was in two parts that reflected the two main entangled 
themes of the thesis, professional identity and professional ethics.   The literature 
review explored the means by which professional identity and everyday 
professional practice had been previously researched. The section on 
professionals and professionalism examined the difficulties of definition and the 
conflicting approaches to understanding professionals and professionalism.  The 
different approaches to understanding EPs’ identity were also delineated.  The 
major approaches to professional identity research; individualist/realist/objective 
and social/relativistic/subjective, were critically examined.  Professional identities 
and roles were argued to be established and regulated through institutional talk 
as part of identity work. The perennial questioning of EPs’ identity and role was 
also critically examined as was the constructions of clienthood and asymmetric 
EP-Client relations.  
 
The ethical approaches that have been applied to everyday practice 
(microethics) were critically considered.  This was followed by an examination of 
ethical reasoning and critically contrasted the bioethical and particularist 
approach to ethical thinking. The review then provided a critical outline of 
Foucault’s (1990, 1994, 2003a) approach to ethics as a relation the self had with 
itself. The rhetorical nature of ethics was then examined to argue that ethical talk 
had social functions and challenged the rationalist view of ethics.  This was 
followed by a critical review of the codes of ethics that were intended to inform 
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EP practice. The thesis then introduced the concept of the “ethical demand” 
(Levinas 1981). This challenged the view that professionals were the sole source 
of ethics and acknowledged the intersubjective nature of ethics. The review then 





The methodology section reviewed the possible research designs and argued for 
a bricolage approach to methodology (Steinberg, 2006). This was because the 
thesis appropriated autoethnography, Action Research (AR) and Self-Study (S-S) 
combined with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis.  This strategic move 
was intended to disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology. The 
methodology section justified the inclusion of the different methodologies before 
outlining the four cycles of the research, summarized below: 
• An analysis my write up of a meeting with M. 
• An analysis of the HPC-SCPE.  
• An analysis of a focus group discussion with 9 EPs in the Service. 
• A synthesis of the analysis of the above cycles.   
 
The methodology section included a rationalization for and critical examination of 
Foucauldian approach to data analysis. This section included an extended 
section on the ethics of undertaking participant research where the participant 
was also an object of research.  Finally, this section also provided information on 




The results chapter provided both the results and the analysis of results. The 
results section diagrammatically presented the   three overlapping meta-themes 
and fourteen relevant subthemes. Although the three cycles of research were 
analysed in detail only the synthesis of the first and third cycles will be presented 
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in the main body of the research. This was a strategy to remain within the word 
limit for this thesis and still be able to undertake an extensive piece of research.  
The analysis of results critically examined the results from the first and third 
cycles of research in relation to the relevant reviewed literature.   
 
2.4 Discussion  
 
The discussion, informed by the analysis of results, revisited the research 
questions.  The discussion examined the processes through which EPs 
constructed and regulated the EP-Client relationship. In addition, the discussion 
critically examined how EPs constructed themselves as ethical professionals and 
the extent to which ethics and professionalism was entangled.  The discussion 
also attempted to re-examine the debates and tensions identified in the literature 
review in the light of the analysis of results.  This included the tensions between 
the: 
• Romantic and cynical portrayal of professionalism, 
• Scientific practitioner and the socially embedded, emotionally engaged 
practitioner and  
• Principled and particularist approach to ethics. 
 
2.5 Reflections, Limitations. Implication for Practice and Conclusions 
 
The thesis concluded with sections that reflected on both the experience of 
writing the thesis and the theoretical approaches employed.  Next the 
methodological and epistemological limitations were considered.  The thesis then 
presented the implications for practice with possible suggestions for future 






Chapter 3. Literature review 
 
This first section of the literature reviewed critically examined the nature of 
professionalism, professional identity and identity. This was followed by an 
examination of EP identity. The EP-Client relationship and the construction of 
Clienthood were then critically examined.  
 
3.1 Professional and Professionalism 
 
Despite extensive research professionalism remained a contested and ill-defined 
construct (Morrow et al, 2011).  Morrow et al (2011) suggested that 
professionalism could be understood as set of measurable behaviours, 
competencies and discrete skills that were teachable. Arnold (2002) found that 
the concept of professionalism tended to include: 
• adherence to ethical practice 
• effective interaction with clients and service users 
• effective interactions with staff 
• reliability 
• commitment to improvement 
 
However the above constructs were still very broad. Morrow et al (2011) argued 
that professionalism was both a holistic concept, doing the job well, and a 
“multidimensional multi-faceted construct consisting of professional identity, 
professional attitudes and professional behaviour” (Ibid, page 41).  Morrow et al 
(2011) further suggested that professionalism was “the capacity for judgement” 
(Ibid, page 45). This capacity for judgment was exercised in relation to contexts 
and others (e.g. patient, client service user), which introduces ambiguity, 
specificity, and contingency.  Defining whether behaviour was professional was 
therefore problematic. Morrow et al (2011) argued that professionals needed 
meta-skills of “situational judgement and contextual awareness” (Ibid, page 45). 
Nixon (2004) entangled ethical judgment and professionalism stating that ethical 
judgments were:  
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“…driven by moral considerations: the desire to educate, to heal, to enlighten, to 
encourage, to unburden, to enthuse, etc.” and “without that ethical content our 
various professional occupations become devoid of their professionalism” (Ibid, 
page 31). 
 
Francis (2009) suggested that the minimum “cardinal” requirement for a 
profession were a “body of abstract knowledge” that provided an exclusive 
competence to practice and code of ethics (Ibid, page 9). However, the 
entanglement of ethics and professionalism also added an additional disciplinary 
technology to performance management. Hence, working practices were both 
unsatisfactory and unethical. 
 
Two themes have dominated research into professionalism and professionals 
(MacDonald 1995).  In the first theme, professionals and professionalism were 
idealised and romanticised. Professionals were seen as ethical, rational, elites 
who want only to serve others. For example, Arnold (2002) stated that a 
professional was “a vocation with a body of knowledge and skills put into service 
for the good of others (Arnold, 2002, page 503).  
 
Arnold (2002) therefore attempted to establish professionalism based on a 
practice underpinned by a body of knowledge (evidence based) and ethical 
dimension.  Arnold (2002) further entangled ethics with professionalism through 
using the following adjectives to describe professionalism; “reliability”, 
“responsibility”, “honesty”, “integrity” and  “maturity” (Ibid, pages 503 to 504). 
 
The second theme had a more sceptical attitude towards professionals and was 
concerned both with the power professionals had and their role as instruments of 
power for the state (e.g. Evetts 2003; Freidson 1970b, Rose 1999). This 
approach also questioned the altruism and independence of professionalism 
(Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1970; Krause, 1996; Rose, 1999). Evetts (2003) went as 
far as characterizing professionals as “… powerful, self interested monopolies” 
(Ibid, page 401). This sceptical approach to professionalism was criticised for 
being too ideologically driven (Johnson, 1993).  
 31
 
Coulehan (2005) argued that professionals operating within institutions became 
rule based. Institutions therefore acted as a barrier to traditional professional 
qualities such as compassion, integrity and fidelity. Gillham (1999) suggested 
that these traits were also present in Educational Psychology when EPs were 
“defensive about evaluation and open accountability, jargon-plagued, status-
conscious, and sheltering … behind a barricade of mystiques” (Ibid, page 14). 
Educational Psychologists had also been negatively portrayed as gatekeepers to 
resources too close to the bureaucratic agenda of Local Authorities (Ashton, 
1996; Dessent, 1994; Gillham, 1990, 1999; Miller & Frederickson, 2006). These 
criticisms of EPs were perhaps too hostile and lacked balance.  
 
In Educational Psychology professionalism has been closely associated with the 
“scientist-practitioner model” (Holttum & Goble, 2006; Fallon, Woods, Rooney 
2011; Lane & Corrie, 2006; Stringer & Miller, 2008).  However, Norwich (2000) 
suggested that EPs employed humanistic and pragmatic approaches to practice. 
Fallon, Woods & Rooney (2011), in turn, suggested that Norwich (2000) had 
undervalued the “expert” knowledge underpinning Educational Psychology 
practice.  
 
This section suggested that professionalism was a contested and complex 
construct entangled with ethics. Professional identity was explored further below. 
 
3.2 Professional Identity 
 
Côté (2006) undertook a survey of identity studies and concluded that there were 
two broad theoretical approaches which portrayed identity as either individual or 
social.  Within these two approaches identity can be viewed from a realist 
/objective/individualistic or relativist/subjective/social perspective. This suggested 
that identity studies could use any combination of the above perspectives and 
approaches. Côté (2006) suggested that the dominant method employed in 
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identity studies was a realist/objective approach that focused on the individual.  
In contrast, the thesis had a constructionist (social and subjective) interpretative 
approach to identity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) 
 
Professional identity has been defined in a multiplicity of ways (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000). Connelly and Clandinin (1999) argued that professional identity was an 
indication of membership of a profession rather than a particular knowledge set. 
Membership of a profession was articulated through categorical statements that 
establish roles and speaking rights (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991). These can be 
viewed as identity alignment procedures through the use of role categories. 
These categories can be expressed by reference to a job title (e.g. EP) but can 
also be present in the use of first person plurals we or us8 (Drew & Sorjonen, 
1997). Roles can also be evident in the use of institutional or specialist 
vocabulary (Potter & Hepburn, 2003). In addition, ordinary phrases or questions 
can take on specialist meaning when spoken by an institutional 
representative. Ordinary phrases such as “I am a little concerned” could have 
different significance if spoken by an EP, teacher, child, or parent (Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003, page 197). Institutional talk while appearing neutral can be 
imbibed with additional meaning, e.g. a question about child’s behaviour could be 
perceived as testing by a teacher (questioning the efficacy their practice) rather 
than information gathering. These ways of speaking helped regulate the 
epistemological asymmetry between professionals and Clients by establishing 
who had the right to categorize and whose accounts were warranted (Potter 
2005).   
 
Connelly and Clandinin (1999)  added that professional identity was born out of 
the profession’s response to  challenge   Wenger (1998) more prosaically 
described professional identity as “one’s way of being in the world” (Ibid, page 
                                                 
8
 For example, I noticed that when EPs answered the telephone they would say their name followed by 
“…Educational Psychologist” or their name followed by “…from the Educational Psychology Service”. 
Some EPs would just say their name and then “…Psychology Service”. This was a small example of 
identity alignment that I had not noted before reading for this thesis.  
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151). Professional identity at its most basic level was considered as “an 
individual’s self definition as a member of a profession’ (Chreim, Williams & 
Hinings 2007, page 1517).   Sachs (1999) described professional identity as: “A 
shared set of attributes, values and one that enables the differentiation of one 
group from another.” (Ibid, page 3)  
 
Wenger (1998) also argued for the importance of professionals' constructions of 
their identities in shared practices and learning within work settings. For Wenger 
(1989), identity was “a way of talking about how learning changes who we are in 
the context of our communities,” (Ibid, 1998, page 5). In Wenger's (1989) model 
as professionals move between communities in the work place professionals 
identity was re-negotiated, integrating forms of individuality and competence 
through participation in work activities (Ibid, 1998, pages 158-159). While 
Connelly & Clandinin (1999), Chreim, Williams & Hinings (2007), Scahs (1999) 
and Wenger (1998) all appeared to have a high face validity  and  tended to lack 
any recognition or critique of power. Foucault (2001, page 300) referred to this as 
“Individualising power” that transformed human beings into subjects through 
being incited to or choosing to engage in self-work.   
 
This thesis, informed by Wengner’s (1998) research into institutional talk 
(Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Potter & Hepburn, 2003) took the position that 
professional identities and roles were contingent and emerging and were 
established and regulated through institutional talk and embodied practice.  
 
This section suggested that professional identities had been examined from a 
range of binary theoretical positions (e.g. realist/relativist, individual/social and 
objective/subjective).  It was argued that professional identities were both 
externally and internally contracted. The next section critically examined the 




3.3 Identity Work 
 
Research into professional identity formation has been increasing (e.g.  See 
Alvesson, Aschcraft & Thomas, 2008; Kunda, 1992;  Rose, 1996;  Thomas, 
2009;  Watson, 2008, 2009; Ybema, et al, 2009). Snow and Anderson (1987) 
defined identity work as the:  
 
“Range of activities that individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain 
personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept” 
(Ibid, page 1348). 
 
Identity work could be automatic and tacit or reflexive and intentional (Reynolds 
& Wetherell, 2003; Van Langerhove & Harré, 1999). Identity work was therefore 
interested both in the identities that individuals created and presented and how 
this occurred in contexts that regulated and produced them.  Identities were also 
both social and personal (Taylor, 2006). Identities were social because the 
possible identities available to individuals were “resourced and constrained by 
larger understanding which prevail in the speaker’s social context” (Taylor & 
Littleton, 2006, page 24).  However, identities were also personal as they 
resulted from individualization work undertaken by the self (Araujo & Martuccelli, 
2010).   
 
The complex relationship between the social context   and personal identities 
was evident when members of the same class, social group, generation, gender, 
ethnic group, subculture or profession did not share the same identities.  
Increasingly, individuals were claiming themselves to be more than and other to 
what their social situation dictated (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010).  Araujo & 
Martuccelli (2010) argued that this resulted from   processes of individualisation.  
At the centre of these processes of individualisation was the trial9 which 
                                                 
9
 The word Martucelli (2006) uses was “épreuve” which can also mean test or ordeal. It is derived from the 
French word prouver which means to prove in the sense of establishing by testing. As a verb form 
(éprouver) can mean to undergo a transformation.   
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characterised social life such as school, work relationships (Araujo & Martuccelli, 
2010). Trials provided an opportunity for individuals to challenge measure and 
test themselves through “confirming, informing or reorienting their self identity” 
(Pezé, 2011, page 2).  The institution did not manufacture the trial. Rather trials 
were continual possibilities presented by the inconsistencies and conflicts in an 
institution or professional discourse. In this way a trial spoke to the nature of the 
professional discourse or institution.   This would be a dialogue between the local 
(micro) and the global (macro) (Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993). 
 
The trial was, therefore, a liminal and ambivalent space where “several 
contradictory principles are simultaneously valid” (Pezé, 2011, page 7). Some 
trials were encountered more than once and almost the same questions were 
asked of us. This provided the subject with a second chance (Pezé, (2011). 
Alvesson and Willmott (2002) also argued that purposeful self-identity work 
required   “at least a minimal amount of self-doubt and self-openness” and was 
“typically contingent upon a mix of psychological existential worry and the 
scepticism or inconsistencies faced in encounters with others or with our images 
of them” (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002, page 626).  This typically occurred when 
the professional was prompted to ask “who am I?” Alvesson and Willmott (2002) 
argued that during challenges to professional identity the individual engaged in 
“informing, repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising the constructions that 
are productive of a precarious sense of coherence and distinctiveness.” (Ibid, 
page 626). Ibarra & Petriglieri (2010) introduced the concept of identity play, 
defined as “people's engagement in provisional but active trial of possible future 
selves.” (Ibid page 10). The concept of a creative engagement with professional 
identity was echoed by Foucault (1996) when asked about sexual identity: 
“… The relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity; 
rather they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To 
be the same is really boring.” (Ibid page 385) 
This aspiration linked with Foucault’s (1997) plea to readers not to subject him to 
the tyranny of identity: 
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“Don’t ask who I am, or tell me to stay the same: that is the bureaucratic morality, 
which ensures that our papers are kept in order. It ought to let us be when it 
comes to writing” (Foucault 1997, page) 
 
The goal was, therefore, to experiment, be curious or playful with my professional 
identity. The aim was not to test myself against a “true” or ideal EP identity but to 
open up a space in which my professional identity work was made visible. This, 
in turn, might facilitate an intentional, creative and innovative relation with my 
professional identity. However, this meant tolerating and persisting with the 
experiences of feeling unease with and doubt about my professional identity.  
 
Pezé (2011) argued that there have been two research strategies to examine 
self-doubt10 in organisations: 
 
1. Examining specific employees who have gone through or are going 
through role transformations mainly using interviews. This is referred to as 
“bounded identity work” because it related to specific situations and 
identities (Ibid page 6);    
2. Examining employees who were experiencing more general self-
questioning of their occupational roles which combined interviews with 
participant observations or autobiography. This is referred to as “loose 
identity work” because it based on broad and diffuse situations and 
experiences (Ibid page 6).  
 
Pezé (2011) was concerned that “bounded identity work” could have too specific 
and narrow a focus. However, “loose identity work” could suffer from its inherent 
complexity. Pezé (2011) concluded that rather than examining identity work 
directly, researchers should examine the institutional/organisation “identity 
regulation devices and then look at the identity work they trigger or regulate” 
(Pezé 2011, page 2).  This thesis combined the second of Pezé’s (2011) 
strategies and recommendation to examine regulatory devices.    
 
                                                 
10
 Pezé (2011) use of “self doubt” could be viewed as pejorative; perhaps the term awakening 
could be more useful.  
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As stated above, this thesis hoped for a dialogue between the micro and macro 
processes. Benwell & Stoke (2010) suggested that there was a tension between 
a macro focus on structures, contexts and discourses and micro focus on talk in 
interactions to identity formation research. Schegloff (1992) identified two 
difficulties in assuming an unproblematic traditional approach to interpreting 
macro contexts. The first problem concerned establishing which aspects of the 
context were relevant (e.g. race, genders, social position, status, role, etc). The 
second problem related to difficulties establishing which aspects of the context 
are consequential (e.g. set-up of the room, the nature of the organisation, the 
economic system, etc.). Schegloff (1997) further suggested that because of the 
inherent complexities in contexts, the choice of which context to include/exclude 
or privilege might reflect the researchers’ interests or preoccupations rather than 
those of the participants. Wetherell (1998, 2007), while recognising the possible 
limitation of discursive macro focused approaches, also argued that a micro 
focus had significant limitations: 
 
“If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual 
social interaction, then the problem with conversation analysts is that they rarely 
raise their eyes from the next turn in conversation…” (Wetherell, 1998, page 402) 
 
Accepting Wetherell’s (1998) argument this thesis was interested in the micro 
analysis of talk and attempted to locate it within the wider context of EPs’ 
practice.   
 
This section argued that there was an increased interested in researching 
professional identity and critically examined definitions of identity work.  
Professional identity was argued to result from a combination of automatic, 
reflexive intentional, social and personal processes. The section delineated and 
examined the process of individualization resulting from trials (Araujo & 
Martuccelli, 2010; Pezé, 2011).  Following Pezé (2011) researching professional 
identity was argued to facilitate the critical examination of the context in which EP 
worked.  However, it was recognized that this created a tension between macro 
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and micro explanations.  The next section critically examined aspects of EPs’ 
identity and role confusion. 
 
3.4 Educational Psychology: An Identity in Question? 
 
This section of the thesis examined how EP’s professional identity has been 
questioned from both inside and outside the profession. Issues about 
professional identity were most evident in discussions about role confusion and 
indistinctiveness. The proposed causes for Educational Psychology’s identity 
crises, including; ambiguity about who the client is, competing demands from 
different clients, epistemological variety within Educational Psychology, the gaps 
between theory and practice,  tensions between the statutory and psychology 
functions was examined.  
 
Almost since the inception of Educational Psychology, EPs have had “perennial 
obsession with reflecting on their role” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 71). Boyle 
& Lauchlan (2009) claimed that this resulted from the diversity of Educational 
Psychology practice between countries, within countries, between and within 
Educational Psychology Services and between EPs. Educational Psychologists 
also disagreed about what Educational Psychology was or the epistemology that 
underpinned it (Fox, 2003; Gillham, 1978, 1999; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001; 
Norwich, 2000). Fox (2003) claimed that EPs could even espouse one 
epistemological position, e.g. social constructionist, and then practice using 
another, e.g. positive realist resulting in tensions in their practice.  These debates 
echoed the debates about professional identity discussed previously.  
Loss of identity and a call for a return to psychology were also recurring themes 
(e.g. Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Farrell et al, 2006; Love, 2009; Mackay, 2002). 
Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) also argued that attachment to  the “out-dated” and “ill-
judged” practices such as IQ testing and gate keeping  were undermining the role 
of Educational Psychology (Ibid, page 73).  This was because the professional 
was at risk of “losing sight of psychology” (Ibid, page 73. This argument was 
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premised on the assumption that there was something called psychology that did 
not have a discipline or governing function and  was not  based on normalization 
and measurement (Billington & Pomerantz 2004; Rose 1999). Boyle & Lauchlan 
(2009) emphasized the point that psychology was being lost by supporting the 
call for “a return” to the “discipline of psychology” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 
73).  This could be a desire for a nostalgic past that never was. Billington & 
Pomerantz (2004) argued that Educational Psychology had it origins in the need 
to measure, rank and categorize to assist in the governmental processes of 
identification of the educable and uneducable. In addition, Love’s (2009) survey 
of Educational Psychology from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s suggested 
that EPs had always sought to be other and more than psychometricians and 
gatekeepers11.   
 
MacKay (2002) identified the detrimental effects of prioritizing education over 
psychology in the EP’s role in order to become a “profession of functionaries and 
form fillers” (Ibid, page 247). Guiney (2009) argued that this was because EPs 
lacked the autonomy12 enjoyed by other professionals and that the EP role was 
dominated by bureaucratic administration. This led Guiney (2009), following 
Etizioni, 1969 and Clarke and Newman, 1997, to question whether EPs were 
professionals or just semi-professional or bureaucratic professionals. Mackay 
(2002) further argued that time spent on bureaucracy (Statutory work) was not 
time spent practicing Educational Psychology. Mackay (2002) perhaps, failed to 
consider that, rather than these bureaucratic and governing functions being 
                                                 
11
 I like the fact that we (EPs) constantly resisted the call (interpellation) to be more than psychometricians 
and gatekeepers and makes the point that EPs were both objects and subjects of knowledge/power (both  
instruments of intuitional power and  strugglers for human rights and dignity). It would be very 
disappointing if we gave up this fight. I am not sure that the fight can be won but that is no reason to stop. 
To give up the war of attrition would concede too much ground.   
12
 I am reminded of a traditional Jewish joke that goes; In a synagogue there was a poor man sitting when 
in walked a rich merchant and the Chief Rabbi. The Chief Rabbi threw himself on the floor and said “Lord 
have mercy on me for I am worthless and nothing. The rich merchant then did the same thing.  The poor 
man having seen the spectacle then threw himself on the floor and said “Lord have mercy on me because I 
am worthless and nothing”. On seeing this rich merchant turned to the Chief Rabbi and said indignantly 
“look who says they are worthless and nothing”.  The point of this joke, for me, was a reminder that just 
because someone said that they were powerless did not mean that they were and saying that ‘we are 
powerless’ could just be another way of confirming our power. 
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additional to Educational Psychology they were a core political function 
(Nikander, 2003; Rose, 1996, 1999, 2008).  Mackay (2002) calling for a return to 
Educational Psychology also emphasized evidence based practice. However, 
Fox (2003) argued that there was no unproblematic appeal to an evidence base 
given the epistemological fluidity in Educational Psychology.  
 
In addition, MacKay (2002, page 250),  in claiming that the “present educational 
psychology is what psychologist have made it or have failed to make it” was not 
allowing any role of the Government or State in shaping Educational Psychology 
and the unique statutory functions of EPs. MacKay (2002) was also in danger of 
presenting Educational Psychology as outside structure, society or discourse. 
This did not allow for an analysis of why teachers and local authorities asked for 
IQ scores or why there was a need for gatekeepers. Gersch (2009), locating 
Educational Psychology in discourse,  argued that the role tensions resulted from 
working in an environment that was subject to continual  and radical change.  
Gersch (2009) also suggested that identity anxiety was not an unexpected 
response to these changes. 
 
Boyle & Lauchlan (2009), echoing MacKay (2002), suggested that the numerous 
meetings and copious administration were stopping EPs practicing psychology. 
Again, this is an interesting presentation of Educational Psychology that did not 
require meetings or an administrative demand resulting from the statutory 
function.   
 
The calls for a return to psychology assumed that Psychology was a singularity 
(Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Farrell et al, 2006; Love, 2009 and Mackay, 2002). 
However, Psychology can also be characterized as a multitude of sub-disciplines 
that hold differing and often conflicting political, ontological and epistemology 
positions that resisted simple definition (Fox, 2003; Henriques, 2004: Reber, 
1995). Psychology’s complexity was not unique. Badiou (2005) suggested that all 
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social constructs were inherently unstable13. Following Badiou (2005), this 
multiplicity would not only exist between psychology sub-disciplines and 
traditions but also within a sub-discipline/tradition.  In addition, the elements (e.g. 
assessment, observation, writing reports, therapeutic work, family work, training, 
etc) that EPs employed were also complex and difficult to define. Educational 
Psychology practice could also be considered as a subset of applied psychology, 
which in turn was a subset of caring professions which was in turn a subset of 
professional relationships, which was a subset of human relations, etc. Some of 
the elements of EP practice would also be subsets of the other applied 
Psychologies (e.g. assessment was not unique to Educational Psychology). 
Badiou (2005) also argued that constructs contained voids. The void could be 
understood as the actions, behaviours or practices that EPs undertook but not 
counted as part of their professional practice. The void (things not counted) 
caused ontological insecurity while resisting definition and presentation. The void 
also contained the potential for change when what was not counted (ignored or 
on the peripheral) became the core function or of central importance. The 
inherent ambiguity in Badiou’s (2005) construction of the void made the void 
difficult to theorise. In addition, Badiou (2005) emphasised the positive 
revolutionary potential of the void rather than regulation of the presentation of the 
void in order to maintain the status quo. Professional bodies, for example, can 
function to reduce the amount of excess represented as the void and thus 
increase consistency in the set.  The aim of increased consistency can be seen 
in the quote below where to count-as-one was phrased as the question:  
 
“Hence EPs and commissioners or contractors should in each case scrutinize the 
question: ‘what exactly is the psychological contribution we require from the EP 
and how will that contribution contribute towards better outcomes for the children 
who are the focus of this work?’ In this way, the distinctive contribution of EPs will 
become increasingly transparent” (Farrell et al 2006, page 105).  
 
Farrell, et al (2006), through asking the question; “What exactly is the 
psychological contribution….?” were attempting to establish a truth game where 
                                                 
13
 Badiou (2005) used the analogy of Set Theory to examine epistemology and ontology.  
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EP’s practice could be tested to establish whether the activity/practice was 
psychological.  
 
Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) pointedly asked whether Gillham’s (1999) questioning 
of the methods of Educational Psychology had given “the profession a massive 
insecurity complex and a crisis of confidence…” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 
81). However Gillham (1999) suggested that he was merely reflecting the mood 
of the times. This included confusion about who the Client was and  a 
combination of rapid and prolonged change in the environment in which EPs 
worked. These factors impacted on the nature of EP’s work and their 
professional identity (Gillham, 1999). The uncertainty about who was Educational 
Psychology’s Client has remained (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; MacKay, 2002). 
Mackay (2002) captured this ambiguity in the quote below: 
 
“Educational psychology is a service that one party (children, parents) receive 
(often whether they want it or not), usually requested by a second party (teacher 
or head teachers), but funded by a third party (education authorities) using funds 
that are not their own, but are provided by a fourth party (the taxpayer), to meet 
the statutory requirements imposed by a fifth party (the Department for Education 
and Employment), at the hand of a sixth party (educational psychologist), the 
availability of whom is largely dependant on the organization, interests and 
economies of a seventh party (the universities)” (Mackay 2002, page 246).  
 
The above quote suggested that Educational Psychology was made vulnerable 
by the ambiguity in which it operated and by being buffeted by competing 
demands (Ashton & Roberts, 2006). 
 
Kelly & Gray (2000) argued that role tension was also caused by the differences 
between what the EPs wanted to offer and what the school had requested.  
Ashton & Roberts (2006) survey of twenty-two SENCOs and eight EPs found that 
there was a difference between what the EP and SENCO valued. SENCOs 
tended to value assessment but Educational Psychologist valued consultation.  
However, other research had suggested that SENCOs and other service users 
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valued a range of services provided by EPs including consultation (Farrell et al 
2006)   Farrell et al (2006) added, that schools acknowledged that a significant 
proportion of those functions could be provided by other professionals which 
suggested role indistinctiveness/confusion.14 
 
Role indistinctiveness was frequently cited as the cause of Educational 
Psychology identity anxiety (e.g. Aston and Roberts, 2006; Kelly and Gray, 2000; 
Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 2005). Cameron and Monsen (2005) 
argued that role confusion, in part, resulted from EP’s Local Authority Officer role.  
For example, clients and EPs might be uncertain whether an EP was acting in 
the Clients best interest or to secure the best use of Local Authority resources.  
Cameron and Monsen (2005) also suggested that role indistinctiveness had been 
enhanced by questioning the uniqueness of the EPs role by those outside the 
profession.    Role indistinctiveness could therefore have resulted from a 
attempting to define Educational Psychology by exclusion rather than identifying 
what practitioner psychologists had in common 15(Cameron, 2006).  
 
However, ambiguity or role indistinctiveness in professional identity could 
facilitate role flexibility. Educational Psychologists practiced in environments 
where they were required to do a large range of highly varied tasks (Farrell et al, 
2006).   Role indistinctiveness meant that fewer tasks within the Local Authority 
would be outside the EP’s job description. Role ambiguity and complexity were 
also frequently given as rationalizations for an accountable, autonomous 
practitioner who was able to make rational decisions (e.g. Elman, Illfelder-Kaye & 
Robiner, 2005; Eraut, 1994; Mamede & Schmidt 2005; 2005; Schön, 1983, 1987 
Woolfson et al, 2003). This privileged a positivistic practice that categorised and 
                                                 
14
 Of course some of the EPs’ services could be provided by others, but this was not unique to Educational 
Psychology. A significant proportion of the  services provided by professionals could be and are provided 
by others except when those services were legally restricted. This seemed to be an appeal by Farrell et al. 
(2006) for a purer form of Educational Psychology that provided unique services.  It also appeared to be 
polemic because of the implied suggestion of job insecurity to focus the mind on their preferred alternative.  
15
  Defining anything by exclusion is unsatisfactory, e.g. red would have to be defined as not white, not 
black, not a house, Ad nauseam.  Defining what construct had in common, e.g. their family resemblance 
was more productive.  
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labelled.  Role indistinctiveness could also make Educational Psychology 
vulnerable to external pressures. A possible response would be for the 
profession to constantly strive to make itself relevant to political agendas 
(Guiney, 2009).  It is also possible that the metaphor of role indistinctiveness 
could be employed rhetorically to rationalize and justify preferred Educational 
Psychology epistemologies. It was perhaps no coincidence that claims of role 
indistinctiveness were frequently combined with a call for a (re)turn to psychology 
or for a particular type of practice. (e.g. Aston and Roberts, 2006; Boyle & 
Lauchlan, 2009; Kelly and Gray,  2000; Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 
2005; Farrell et al, 2006; Gillham, 1990; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001; MacKay, 
2002).  
 
The section had critically reviewed the suggested causes for the going debate 
about EP identity and the call for a return to psychology.  The suggested causes 
of the debates about EP identity  included;  the  lack of perceived autonomy of 
EPs,  the gulf between theory and practices;  tension caused by the potentially 
conflicting roles and the complex relationship with clients.  It was argued that 
EPs’ role distinctiveness also resulted from factors both outside Educational 
Psychology and internal epistemological issues.  It was further argued that the 
metaphor role indistinctiveness could be polemical and the call for a (re)turn to 
psychology was critically examined and contested.   The next section will explore 
the EP-Client relationship in more detail. 
 
3.5 Educational Psychologist-Client relations 
 
The hyphen, above,  between EP and Client was central to understanding the 
nature of the relationship. This was because the hyphen set up a series of 
binaries between; disjunction and conjunction, mutuality and asymmetry, 
separation and synergy, recognition and colonization, proximity and distance, 
cooperation and resistance and self and other. The hyphen reminded the reader 
that meaning was co-constructed. Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) stated that 
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mental health professional-clients boundaries issues were at the heart of 
professional ethics.  Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) argued that boundaries can 
be problematic and suggested “safe connections” (Ibid, page 47) as an 
alternative construct.  Safe connection would work to keep clients safe but also 
promote effective practitioner and client relationships.  
 
Boundaries are ways of talking about   the limits and forms by which people 
ought to relate to one another and are presented as classification, categories and 
definition of relations (Emirbayer, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Zur, 2005).  It 
was through these classifications, categories and definitions that relationships 
and identities were established, maintained and governed (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Zur, 2011b). Boundaries both established the space in which professionals 
practice and the limits of authority of that profession. These boundaries were 
sometimes codified.  Butler (2005) argued that norms, expressed as codes while 
simultaneously constructing a collective identity, individualised the subject. This 
was achieved by the professionals being ranked and classified, both by 
themselves and others, in relation to their homogeneity to those norms. In 
making normalising judgments professionals were both held to account and 
incited to give an account of themselves (Butler, 2005).  This double process was 
central to the conflicted lived experience of professionals (Butler, 2005).  
 
3.6 The Client’s Many Bodies 
 
The literature review suggested that the Client was an ambiguous concept; the 
product of social and historical constructions and was entangled with constructs 
such as race, gender, social class and age (Leonard, 1997; Patton & O’Byrne, 
2000). Historically, a Client was someone who was under the protection (in need 
of care) of their superior, who used the services of a professional, and who was 
assisted by a professional (Rose, 1985, 1990, 1996). Rose (1985, 1990, and 
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1996) argued that all three senses of Clients were contemporaneously present in 
modern Psychotherapy and I would suggest in Educational Psychology16.  
 
In Educational Psychology practice there was a certain attitude of innocence 
towards the processes of clienthood17. For example, the Client’s needs always 
appeared to be discovered rather than fabricated (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 
2000). Although, this narrative was innocent it was also complex. Different 
Clients were understood to have different needs and characteristics and the 
possible conflicts between Clients was recognized (e.g. Farrell et al., 2006).  
Educational Psychologists were frequently asked to obtain Clients views to 
empower the Client (e.g. Frederickson & Cline, 2002). However, this can be 
underpinned by a naive realist perspective if it was not recognized that Client’s 
views were, at best, co-constructed with the EP (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000). 
Historically, EPs have employed a medical model that had a “within child focus” 
(Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000). The child, parent, teacher also became an EP’s 
Client both through engagement with documents, reports,  tests scores, 
assessment, surveys, referral forms and face to face encounters (Foucault, 
1977).  Clients were also always, already categorised in terms of age, gender, 
social group, ethnic origin, etc. in the EP-Client encounter (Stoiber & Wass, 
2002). 
 
In encounters with Clients, professionals engaged in acts of formulation where 
Client identities were offered (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). This was achieved 
through making identity categories inferentially available by using specialized or 
technical language (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor 2000: Jayyusi 1984; Potter 1996).18 
The formulation of client categories was used to rationalize, legitimize and 
warrant action using institutional talk (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Hobbs, Todd & 
                                                 
16
 Clients needed the assistance and care of the Educational Psychologist, there was an asymmetrical 
relationship between the EP and client used the services of EPs. 
17
 The term Clienthood was borrowed from Patton & O’Byrne (2000). It was used to signify that being a 
client was an identity 
18
  For example, terms such as attention difficulties, concentration difficulties could be a predicate for the 
category AD/HD. 
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Taylor, 2000; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996; Zimmerman & Boden, 1991). Jayyusi 
(1984) added that because judgements, description and inferences were used to 
achieve practical tasks that categorization was enmeshed in the “moral order” 
(Ibid, page 2). The moral order referred to the continual (re)negotiated and 
(re)constructed local fluid understandings of rights, duties and responsibilities 
which are intertwined in everyday talk (Kurri & Wahlström, 2001). Moral order 
was evident in the assignation and appropriation of accountability, culpability and 
responsibility (Zur, 2005). The right to define the moral order was achieved 
through processes of categorization that provided participants with the moral 
adequacy to make categorization or objects of those categories (Kurri, 2005).  
Some categories such as professional have moral criteria such as obligation and 
commitment which were cardinal criteria for inclusion in that category (Francis, 
2009; Jayyusi, 1984). This implied that to be professional was already to be 
moral.  
 
The categories offered by professionals reflectively categorized those 
professionals (Sacks, 1995). For example, offering the category SEN to a child 
made available the category of educational specialist (e.g. EP) and authorized 
the speaking rights of the speaker.   This included the nature of the advice given 
or how resources were allocated.  The client was therefore a construction of an 
institution and the discursive practices which regulated the utterances and 
speaking rights of professionals and clients (Lewis & Miller, 2011; Benwell & 
Stoke, 2010). 
 
The Client was not always portrayed passive in these encounters and could 
resist offered categories. This was typically achieved through being silent, 
offering an alternative category, defining a category to demonstrate their 
exclusion, changing their tone of voice and explicitly stating that they do not 
belong to the offered category (Austin & Fitzgerald, 2007; Fitzgerald & Austin, 
2008). These types of resistance were different from the concept of unsaying 
suggested by Levinas (1981). The type of resistance suggested by Levinas’s 
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(1981) resulted from the ultimate uncategorizability of Others whereas Austin & 
Fitzgerald (2007) focused on active, often articulated, resistance by Others.  
Austin & Fitzgerlad’s (2007) resistance was therefore at the level of the said. 
 
The EP-Client relationship could also be characterized as a type of confessional 
relationship (Foucault, 1999). This was because one person was the object of 
knowledge and the other was the subject that knew. The Client confessed and 
disclosed while the professional made normative assessments (Zur, 2011b). 
Bourdieu (1991) asserted that this kind of asymmetrical relationship amounted to 
“symbolic violence” (e.g. Ibid, page 140). 
 
The pressing concern for theorists of the Other was how to have a relationship 
with Others which was not colonizing (Benjamin, 2004, 2009; Buber, 1960; 
Frosh, 2010, Hollway, 2008; Levinas, 1981).  Frosh (2010) suggested that the 
renewed interest in the right way to treat people was a post-holocaust 
phenomenon and was fed by post-colonial interest in racism and global networks 
of communication which shaped how the other was problematized. Billington 
(2002) suggested that attempts to (re)structure EP practice were a consequence 
of awareness of the asymmetrical EP-Client power.  However, Goodman, 
McElliot and Marks (2003) claimed that   professional concerns about the right 
way to treat Clients pre-dated the Second World War atrocities and an emphasis 
on ethics rather than practice directed the analytical gaze towards the 
professional-client relationship and obscured professional-state relationship.  
 
This section argued that both the client and EP were constructed through talk 
and practices.  The processes of clienthood were linked to the moral order with 
consequential moral implications.  Concern about the EP-client relationship was 
argued to be part of the broader concern about the asymmetrical power in 
Professional-Client relationships.  The EP-Client relationship will be explored 
further in the next section.  
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3.7 The EP-Client Encounter 
The EP-Client encounter was considered along four dimensions: 
• EP-as-functions19/EP identity 
• EP-as-a-person/non-EP identity 
• Client-as-functions/client identity 
• Client-as-a-person/non-client identity 
The role of EP and Client as functions appeared to be a dominant theme in the 
literature and resonated with the scientific practitioner model of practice (e.g. 
Lund, 2000; Moore, 2005; Webster, Hingley & Franey, 2000).   Taylor (2006) 
argued that the aim of the scientific practitioner was to achieve self-mastery and 
a: 
“Disengaged self capable of objectifying not only the surrounding world but also 
his own emotions and inclinations, fears and compulsions and achieving thereby 
a kind of distance and self possession which also enables him to act rationally” 
(Taylor, 2006, page 21).  
 
Taylor (2006), above, was suggesting that processes of objectification and 
distancing privileged and facilitated rational practice.   
 
Billington (2002) characterized the relationship between scientific practitioners 
and clients as involving, at least, two stories that were in tension called the 
professional’s and user’s stories. The professional’s story tended to be 
pathologising, fed from the “deficit model of human development” and 
reproduced social exclusion (Ibid, page 39). The user’s story tended to be highly 
subjective, rich and underpinned by emotion. Billington (2002) argued that the 
epistemological power exercised by the EP facilitated the client to internalize 
external descriptions of themselves.  Molad (2001) argued, or hoped, that the 
binary relation between professional and client could be mitigated through 
                                                 
19
 By EP-as-function I meant  the EP professional role. This would include a focus on functions such as 
assessment, training,  advising, writing reports, etc.  EP-as-person was intended to point to the non-
professional identity of the EP.  This was based on the view that professional was a contingent role and the 
sense that there was more to me that being an EP.  What it meant to be a professional EP and the nature of 
the relationships it promoted were a major part of the analysis of results.   
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process whereby we “attune ourselves to the other” (Ibid, page 97).  Benjamin 
(2000) appropriated the term “sanctification” to describe a more appropriate 
Professional-Client relationship. Sanctification was useful because it captured 
both an active formative engagement that cherished what it constructs. Benjamin 
(2000) was aware that creating a space where the Other was cherished while 
accepting that the Other cannot be fully known is extremely difficult.   Benjamin 
(1997) argued that there was an emotional impact resulting from the professional 
not being able to fall back on   a positivistic  knowing “God’s eye view” while 
remaining responsible for  the power subsumed by being the professional and 
not the client (Benjamin, 1997, page 261).  
 
This concern for the Client as Other facilitated a problematization of what it 
meant to know the Other. Burber (1959) contrasted the positions as “I-Thou” and 
“I-it”. In the “I-Thou” the engagement with the Other was with a “full being”, 
however, in the “I-it” relationship the other was a means to an end.   In 
psychology the other was made knowable though examination and assessment 
(Rose 1999). Things can be said about the other, such as, they are of below 
average ability or that they have an impairment of social communication.   The 
Other became instrumentalised through becoming the exemplar of a condition or 
a target for non-differentiated intervention (Rose, 1999). The role of the 
professional was therefore to remove the Other’s Otherness and make them 
understandable, that was, to make the Other a certain type of universal other 
through categorization. Derrida (1995) found in the relationship between the 
universal (categorized) other and a particular Other the impossibility of ethics: 
“As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, 
love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing 
ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same 
way, in the same instant, to all the others” (Derrida, 1995, page 68). 
 
Following Derrida (1995), when EPs responded to the needs of a particular child 
with reference to needs of pupils in general the same tension between the 
universality of ethics and the demands of the proximal present Other arose. 
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Levinas (1981) suggested that the attempt to make what was infinite about the 
Other finite was the product and aim of reason. However, Foucault (2002) while 
recognizing the relationship between excessive political power and rationalization 
thought that a focus on reason as the source of violence was misplaced. Rather, 
the level of analysis should be “specific rationalities” rather than “rationalization in 
general” (Ibid, page 329).   
 
Benjamin (2004) utilized of the concept of web of identification20 to examine 
Professional-Client relations. Figure 1 below represented the possible inter and 
intra identification using arrows. The arrows suggested that there were intra-
relations between the EP’s Educational Psychology and non-Educational 
Psychology identity and the individual’s Client and non-Client identity. There 
were also inter-relations between the EP’s EP-identity and individual’s Clients-
identity.    









The above figure suggested that the relations between the EP’s identity and the 
Clients identity were characterized as object-to-object relations whereas the 
relations between the non-EP and non-client identities were characterized as 
                                                 
20
 Identification meant a process through which individuals came to see (recognize) themselves and were seen (recognized) by others 
as inhabiting particular identities. These identities could include; e.g.  mother, daughter, sister, student, partner, Human Resources 
Manager, etc. An individual could therefore be  both a mother and have other non-mother identities.  Benjamin (2004) argued that 
there was a possible web of relationships between an individual’s identities and the identities of others. These relationships were 























subject-to-subject relations.  Benjamin (1998) argued that the most common form 
of relations were the alienating object-to-object relations. Benjamin (1998, 2004) 
further suggested that not only can the EP be alienated from the individual’s non-
Client identity they can also be alienated from their own non-EP identity in the 
clinical encounter.  Each half of the dyad experienced themselves as the subject 
that knows, and the object of knowledge (doer and done to) in the bi-directional 
and co-created dance of EP-Client relations (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).  
 
However, Foucault (2002), in an interview, claimed that rather than being an 
oppositional binary the subject who knows and the object of knowledge were 
interrelated processes.  This was because one must make oneself an object of 
knowledge to become a subject that knows.  These processes of objectification 
and subjectifcation also multiplied the individuals’ responsibilities to take care of 
themselves and to responsible21 for their wellbeing (Davidson, 2003; Foucault, 
2003a; Foucault, 1965; Zur, 2005, 2011a). Foucault (1989, 2003b) argued that 
the processes that facilitated responsibilization made the individual culpable for 
the label(s) they were given.  This was partly achieved by accepting a normalised 
and valorised hierarchical categorization of the self. Foucault (1989) argued that 
in Eighteenth Century asylums that a “madman’s” guilt was no longer punished 
but organised: 
“… as a consciousness of himself, and a nonreciprocal relation to the keeper; it 
organized it for the man of reason as an awareness of the other, a therapeutic 
intervention in the madman’s existence” (Foucault, 1989, page 235). 
 
The patient was therefore made aware of themselves as an object to be known 
and subject to reason. This objectified the patient while making them vulnerable 
to themselves and others. To the process of self-recognition and perceptual 
judgement (by self and others) Foucault (1989) added the “apotheosis of the 
medical personage” (Ibid, page 256).  The status of the medical personage was 
                                                 
21
 The words Foucault used most frequently were “culpabilité” and  “culpabilisation”, which translates as 
guilty and made guilty.  The English “culpable” or, when wanting to express a state or action, 
“culpabilization”, would also be a good alternative.   
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employed to authorize, legitimize, justify and warrant both the treatment and the 
doctor’s role. It was not the doctor’s scientific or medical skills that were 
privileged. Rather, the doctor’s authority derived from their status as a “wise 
man” that provided judicial and moral guarantees (Ibid, page 257). The doctor’s 
personality, “great probity”, “utter virtue”, “indefatigable perseverance”, caring, 
“firm character” and “scruples” assured their domination over patients (Ibid, page 
257-259). These processes of apotheosis22 provided the doctor with a form of 
charismatic authority23 that worked with their legal authority (Foucault, 1989; 
Weber, 1964). Foucault’s (1989) analysis of origins, function and power of the 
medical personage resonated with the romanticised tradition of professionals 
discussed above.  
 
Foucault (1989) further claimed that as medicine embraced positivism 
practitioners, while continuing to exercise the power entangled with their medical 
persona, forgot the source of their power/authority to treat patients. Directing the 
practitioner’s gaze away from the disciplinary and pastoral power further 
increased the status and quasi-miraculous power of the doctor to treat and 
understand madness while increasingly subjugating the patient (Foucault, 1989). 
However, the doctor’s positivism would not tolerate occultism and therefore the 
patient was made reasonable for the mystification of the doctor.   
 
This thesis utilized the inter and intra processes in the web of identification as 
resource to examine and analyze the construction and regulation of EP-Client 
relations. This included how they were understood (made understandable), made 
problematic and rationalized by EPs. This section argued that the EPs’ and 
Clients’ identities provided the opportunities for alienation but also had ethical 
consequences.  Benjamin’s (1998, 2004) construct of the web of identification 
                                                 
22
 Apotheosis means to glorify or deify. Foucault (1989, page 256) used apotheosis to describe the position 
of the “medical personage”. 
23
 Weber (1964) described charisma as “ a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he 
is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least 
specifically exceptional qualities” (Ibid, page 329).  Foucault’s significant debt to Weber was not always 
fully acknowledged. For a good overview of the points of comparison and contrast between Foucault and 
Weber see Szakolczai (1998). 
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was suggested as a possible model to understand the possible alienation in the 
EP-Client relationship. Finally, Foucault’s (1989) entanglement of the doctors 




This thesis argued that the encounter with a Client was not a straightforward   
mirror into the wider world of Educational Psychology or a window into the inner 
life of the Client.  Rather the encounter was seen as a performative act speaking 
a world into being (Dillard, 1982).  This approach viewed encounters as 
interpretive practices. The meanings generated were not only improvised and 
contextual but also fabricated and constructed (Dillard, 1982). The EP and the 
Client had simultaneous and sequential roles as performer and audience with 
blurred boundaries (Butler, 1997). Institutional encounters were argued to be 
asymmetrical in speaking rights and roles (Mauthner, 1998; Stanley, 1990). This 
included practices such as “doing rapport” which led Clients to disclose more 
about themselves than they had perhaps intended (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; 
Pudlinski, 2005; Zur, 2001b). The institutional nature of the EP-Client encounter 
also worked to alienate the EP both from their non-EP identity and the Client’s 
non-Client identity.  Finally, the power of professionals was argued to be linked to 
their positive personal/professional characteristics.  
 
In the next section the thesis moved on to consider the nature of ethics in 
everyday practice and introduced the idea of microethics.  Ethical reasoning and 
the debates between principle and particulate approaches to ethics was then 
considered.   Next, Foucault’s (1990) approach to ethics was presented and 
critically examined. Levinas’s (1981) construct of the ethical demand was then 
introduced because it provided a decentred ethics based on the Other which 
balanced Foucault’s (1990), somewhat, egocentric approach.  Ethics was further 
challenged by arguing that it could be employed both to discipline professionals 
and as a rhetorical tool to be used strategically.  The ethical codes that framed 
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EP’s practice were then critically considered. Finally, the ethically challenging 
situations experienced by EPs and related international professions were 




The literature review suggested that ethics was a highly complex and situated 
construct (Francis, 2009).  This thesis was interested in everyday ethical 
practice, a microethics of practice as opposed to the more dramatic big ethical 
dilemmas (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Komesaroff, 1995). A range of terms and 
overlapping approaches have been used to describe and examine everyday 
ethical practice:  
• Situational ethics (e.g. Fletcher, 1997)    
• Care ethics (e.g.  Benner, 1997)  
• Ethics of intersubjectivity (e.g. Popke, 2003) 
• Practical ethics (e.g. Singer,  1993) 
• Ethics of care (e.g. Tong, 1998) 
• Ethics of responsibility (e.g.  Tauber, 2005) 
• Ethics of ambiguity (e.g. De Beauvoir,  1948) 
• Proximity ethics (e.g. Nortvedt & Nordhaug, 2008) 
The above microethics negotiated tensions between the binaries of autonomy 
and dependence, self-determination and paternalism, interference and 
abandonment, particular and universal, rationality and emotion and between 
justice and care so as to privilege one of the elements. The microethical 
approaches also positioned themselves, in varying degrees of proximity,   in 
relation to bioethics (Komesaroff, 1995). There was, in effect, an ongoing 
dialogueic and formative relationship between the microethics and bioethics.  
 
As suggested above, the negotiations of ethical tensions occurred in discussions 
about rights, responsibilities and obligations between professionals and Others 
(Zur, 2005, 2011a & 2011b). This, in turn, took place in a society that privileged 
independence, self-reliance and self-sufficiency (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & 
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Kvale, 2008; Popke, 2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 1998).  Wendell (1996) argued 
that a fetishism with independence had adverse consequences for specific 
groups (e.g. women and individuals with disabilities) and should be replaced with 
the concept of interdependence where the capacity to make choices was 
sustained by Others. This challenged myths of the autonomous, independent 
rational decision making professional.    Verkerk (2001), agreeing, argued for 
practitioners to adopt a position of “compassionate interference”, which involved 
both care-giver and care-receiver having responsibilities which were colloquially 
known as ‘being there’, or ‘standing next to me’.  Frank (2002) added that the 
ethical challenge was for professionals to see themselves as characters in others 
stories. 
 
Unlike the quandary-style of professional ethics, founded on the discourse of the 
autonomous individual, microethics might not involve questions about the 
clinically right choices.  Rather as Giroux (1997) argued: 
 
“Ethics, in this case, is not a matter of individual choice or relativism but a social 
discourse grounded in struggles that refuse to accept needless human suffering 
and exploitation. This ethics is taken up as a struggle against inequality and a 
discourse for expanding human rights” (Ibid, page 219). 
 
Giroux’s (1997) view of ethics was radically different from that traditional 
expressed in professional codes (examined further below). Ethically challenging 
situations therefore arose when professionals might know what do, but were 
unable to do it because of organisational or resource issues.  These dilemmas 
can often be practical and political.  Austin (2007) suggested that that ‘moral 
distress’   was a more relevant concept than ethical dilemma to characterize the 
everyday experience of professionals. Austin’s (2007) concept of moral distress 
echoed the discussion above about the emotional impact on EP-Client relations 
(e.g. Benjamin, 1998, 2004)  During periods of moral distress evidence based 
practice was less useful and effective resolutions were more likely to be achieved 
through dialogue (Austin, 2007).  Microethics was therefore not about displaying 
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one’s ethical reasoning skills during a crisis but an expression of commitment to 
those the professional worked with (Austin, 2007; Giroux, 1997). The next 
section considered the tensions and debates between principled and particular 
approaches to ethics.  
 
3.10 Ethical Reasoning (Principlism and Particularism) 
There was a spectrum of approaches to ethical reasoning ranging from 
particularism which included the  various forms of casuistry (e.g. narrative ethics, 
pragmatism and feminist ethics) to principlism of which Beauchamp & Childress 
(2009) have been the most influential (Arras, 1990). This section of the literature 
review provided an examination of the debates and tensions between bioethics 
(principlism) and particularism before delineating significant criticisms of 
bioethics.   
Beauchamp & Childress’s (2001) seminal commission on research bioethics 
established four supposed universal, prima facie and culturally neutral ethical 
principles (Gillon, 1994): 
• Respect for autonomy 
• Beneficence  
• Non-malfeasance 
• Justice24 
The four principles articulated a space where there were multiple asymmetrical 
moves of dominance and submission.  Ethical conflicts occurred when two or 
more principles were in conflict.     
The most consistent criticism of the principled position was from the particularist 
perspective (e.g. Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004; Dworkin, 1995). Dancy (2006) 
defined particularism as “the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not 
depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles” (Ibid, page 7). 
                                                 
24
 See definition section for descriptions of the four principles.  
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Particularism tended to privilege proximity over distance25, bottom-up induction to 
top-down deductive thinking, care over justice, particularities of a case over the 
general principles, cultural/social embeddedness over abstract reason and  the 
messiness of lived experience over ideal abstracted views of how life should be 
(Arras, 1990; Elliott, 2000; Singer, 2004; Toulmin, 1982). Particularist 
approaches had, in turn, been criticized for lacking rigour, intellectually dishonest, 
inconsistency, being over-subtle, overly concerned about political realities and 
causing the erosion of standards (Francis, 2009). The principled approach, 
however, failed to acknowledge the normative role of institutional practitioners 
and the conflicts between the principles and resources or that decisions could be 
made for casuistic reasons. Principled account also underestimated the role of 
situational factors such as time and resources available on individual behaviour 
(Darley & Batson, 1973).  
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) responded to criticism and included concepts 
of bottom-up case based approaches in their framework (Beauchamp, 2005).  
Beauchamp (2005) have even argued that particularistic approaches such as 
casuistry and virtue ethics were consistent with principle-based account. 
However, Lee (2010) and Rauprich (2008) claimed difficulties remained when 
Beauchamp and Childress (2009) attempted to provide a foundation for moral 
actions based on common morality.  This was based on a distrust of bioethics’ 
appeal to universalism and justification or explanation of actions from outside the 
context/situation in which the issue arose and not allowing for cultural diversity 
(Westra, Willems & Smit, 2009). However, particularistic accounts can lack utility 
as rhetorical justifications. Educational Psychologists worked in communities 
where they were accountable to their profession and community. A justification of 
practice that did not make appeals to ethical codes, values or principles might be 
unintelligible and court hostility (e.g. Dworkin, 1997; Lance and Little, 2006; Little, 
2001).The tensions between particularism and principlism overflowed into their 
approaches to theory. Principlism claimed to be founded on theory whereas 
                                                 
25
 The client we are with over strangers or future clients. 
 59
particularism appeared to be anti-theoretical (Lance and Little, 2006; Little, 
2001). Particularism’s desire to escape theory was problematic. This was 
because discursive researchers consistently assert the presence of 
unacknowledged theoretically informed discourses in everyday and professional 
talk (Potter, 2005; Rachels, 1998).   
The conflicting nature of theories used to examine and understand ethical 
behaviour/judgements can be problematic, e.g., utilitarianism, consequentialism, 
deontologicism, and pluralsim (Rowson, 2001). The competing nature of theories 
promoted relativism as different policy decisions can be justified by different 
theories (Rowson, 2001). This made it difficult for practitioners to appeal to 
theory. Rather they might find themselves caught between theories. 
Consequently, many theorists have questioned the utility of ethical theory in 
everyday ethical practice, which in turn undermined principlism (e.g. Daniels, 
2007; Fulklinwider, 2008; Gutmann and Thompson, 1998).   
The relationship between particularism and principles was not a simple binary 
one but a subtle entanglement.  Particularism and casuistic approaches to ethics 
had developed historically, in relation to moral principles (Arras, 1998). The aim 
of particularism was not necessarily to undermine moral codes but to navigate 
and negotiate between them (Arras, 1998; Dancy, 2006).  
 
Bioethics was the dominant ethical framework that informed medical and caring 
professional (e.g. Hoeyer, 2006). Bioethics, however, had also been criticised 
widely by medical anthropology and sociology for being unable to encompass the 
complexity, ambiguity, and actual social context in which individuals have to 
make choices (Hoeyer, 2006).  These studies also portrayed patients as 
vulnerable, passive,  weak and dispersed and medical professionals as powerful, 
active and homogenous (Gabe, et al, 1991; Hoeyer, 2006; Kleiuman, 1999; 
Laidlaw, 2002). Patients were described having partial, relative and subjective 
outlooks whereas professionals were portrayed as having universal and objective 
perspectives (e.g. Gammeltoft, 2001; Kaufert and O’Neil 1991).   
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Critics of Bioethics tended to adopt a (1) deficit, (2) replacing or (3) dismissal 
approach to bioethics (Hoeyer 2006) as outlined further below:   
1. Deficit approaches tend to emphasis bioethics lack of context or relations. 
2. Replacement approaches suggest alternative approaches to ethics. 
3. Dismissal approaches tend to see bioethics as so beyond repair and 
demand that it is abandoned.  
 
Turner (2009) defending bioethics,  stated that social scientists made gross 
generalizations, over simplified,  and provided reductive  accounts of bioethics 
that lacked subtlety (e.g. Alderson, 1993; Bosk, 1992; Kaufman, 1997). 
Bioethicists were accused of engaging in “thin”, “analytic”, “conceptual”, 
“deductivist”, “abstract”, “formalistic”, “universalistic”, “absolutistic”, “rationalistic 
logic-chopping” guided by the “mantra” of “principlism”  (Turner, 2009, Page 90). 
Whereas social scientists claimed that they were engaging in thick, locally 
situated, complex, substantively “rich,” highly contextual, “bottom up” moral 
engagement (Ibid, page 90). Turner (2009) found these characterizations crude 
and tantamount to statements of prejudice.  
 
Turner (2009) further, perceived a “measure of sanctimony” (Ibid, page 90) in the 
formulation of binaries between bioethics and other approaches to ethics.  Turner 
(2009), echoing Beauchamp (2005) above, asserted that the bioethics had 
undergone substantial revision and that modern bioethics has drawn from a 
range of methods and approaches including casuistry, situation ethics, virtue 
theory, feminist ethics, hermeneutics and interpretation theory, narrative ethics 
deliberative democracy, communitarian thought, pragmatism,  discourse ethics, 
utilitarianism and cost benefit analysis, organization ethics and continental 
philosophy.   However, Turner (2009) might have to admit that all of these 
approaches were developed in resistance to traditional bioethics. Turner (2009) 
was perhaps correct when arguing that social scientists had under examined the 
conflict within bioethics to focus on the relations between bioethics and other 
ethical approaches.   
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This section critically reviewed the apparently binary principled and particularist 
approaches to ethics. Although, significant (and possibly irreconcilable) 
differences were recognized it was also argued that these approaches were 
entangled dialogueically.   The next two sections examined first Foucault’s (1990) 
and then Levinas’s (1981) approaches to ethics. Foucault’s approach to ethics 
was included because of his central role in this thesis. Levinas’s approach was 
included both because it acted as a corrective for some of the potential 
egocentric tendencies in Foucault’s ethics and because it provided a creative and 
original way to think about EP-Client relationship.    
 
3.11 Foucault’s Ethics 
This section first differentiated between morals codes and ethics before 
considering Foucault’s (1990) description of ethics as a relation the self has with 
itself. Foucault’s approached to ethics was then critically examined.  
 
Foucault (1990) differentiated moral codes from ethics. Moral codes were 
concerned with the observances of rules and regulations. Ethics were processes 
by which we shape ourselves in relation to an ideal. Foucault (1990) was not 
overtly critical of moral codes but the argument that moral codes were the 
foundation of ethical behaviour. What was important was the relationship the 
individual had with the moral codes in so far they are accepted, rejected, or 
interpreted in the processes and practices of self formation.  Foucault (1990) 
characterizes ethics as a: 
“…process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the 
object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will 
follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. 
And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and 
transform himself” (Foucault, 1990, page 28). 
 
This was ethics as reflexive processes in which an individual’s conduct was 
transformed through attending to their experiences and thoughts. Ethics was 
more than how individuals regulated themselves according to social, cultural, 
professional norms it was also an orientation, attitude or position to those norms.  
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Foucault (1984/1986) suggested that ethics could be perceived as the 
“aesthetics of existence” (Ibid, page 348).  Ethical conduct was not the freedom 
to express our true selves but the potential to modify the self26. The freedom to 
be other than what I had been called to be required that the discourses that 
established the ontological and epistemological limits of what I am had to be 
made problematic (Foucault, 1988a).    
 
Foucault’s (1990, 1984/1986) interest in ethics was part of his larger interest in 
the care of the self. This was understood as a set of “technologies” through which 
the self was constructed. The (pre)formation of the self was both an occupation 
and preoccupation which occurred through the self reflecting on its behaviour, 
actions and thoughts. This reflection had a judicial flavour as the actions of the 
self were normatively examined from a hierarchical perspective. The individual 
would reflect on what had been done and what ought to have been done   and be 
weighted in the balance. During these processes individuals reflected not only on 
who they had been and are but also who they could become. This ethical 
relationship with the self had four aspects; ethical substance, mode of subjection, 
self forming and telos. Davidson (1998) provided a brief description of these 
aspects below: 
 
“The ethical substance, that part of oneself that is taken to be the relevant 
domain for ethical judgment; the mode of subjection, the way in which the 
individual established his relation to moral obligations and rules; the self-forming 
activity or ethical work that one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself 
into an ethical subject; and finally, the telos, the mode of being at which one aims 
in behaving ethically” (Davidson, 1998, pp. 200-201). 
 
Foucault’s ethics has been widely criticised for being “dangerous”, narcissistic, 
nihilistic,  egotistic and , underpinned by “aestheticist cruelty”  (Grimshaw, 1993; 
Longford, 2001, page 569;  Taylor & Vintges, 2004 ). Longford (2001) argued 
that there was a potential for ethics focused on the self to be indifferent to 
Others.  However, ethics concerned about the self also had the capacity to 
                                                 
26
 It was not “I am what I am” more Iago’s statement; “I am what I am not”. 
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engender feelings of curiosity and care for others (Longford 2001). Foucault 
(1986c) also argued that the technologies of the self were social because they 
were concerned about the need to take care of the self so that the self could take 
care of Others.   Foucault’s approach to ethics has also been called elitist 
(Grimshaw, 1993). However, Foucault (1986b) suggested that everybody’s life 
could become a work of art.   
 
While not accepting that Foucault’s approach to ethics was wholly egocentric the 
next section critically presented a different, but I feel complementary, decentred 
position to ethics inspired by Levinas (1981).  
3.12   The Ethical Demand 
Traditionally, professional ethics argued that knowledge of what would enhance 
client’s development and well-being should be based on the values of ‘good 
psychology’ as set out in a code of conduct which acts as the ‘conscience’ of the 
profession (Webster & Bond, 2002). The arrow of ethics therefore pointed from 
the professional to the Client. However, rather than seeing “ethics” as something 
done or facilitated by the Educational Psychologist to the Client this section 
critically examined ethics as the awareness of the ethical demands imposed on 
the EP in the  face to face encounter with the Client. Here the arrow of ethics 
pointed from the Client to the professional.  The ethical occurred when the EP 
recognized the Other as a singular Other and not just another other. Awareness 
of the other as a singular Other engendered the tensions between self-
determination (autonomy) and paternalism. This was because it created the 
potential for EPs to recognize the tension between the fear of abandonment and 
the danger of colonization in the EP-Client relationship (Ellwood, 2006; Verkerk, 
2001).  
 
The Other for Levinas (1981) was radically different from and ultimately 
unknowable by the self.  Symmetry, equality or reciprocity between the self and 
the Other was impossible (Levinas, 1981; Eagleton, 2009). The experience 
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between the self and other was one of intense and unbearable alterity in which 
the self was responsible for the Other (Levinas 1981; Eagleton. 2009). The 
ethical demand, therefore, originated from an epiphany that the other was 
unknowable. This epiphany produced a set of obligatory relations between the 
self and the Other. The Other commanded and the self had duties.  
 
Following Levinas (1981), ethics was something that the EP was called to accept 
and shaped by.   Vetlesen (1994) argued that in the traditional Professional-
Client relationship the professional had the following choices: 
• How will they use their professional power in this specific relationship?  
• How will aspects of the professional’s values enter this relationship? 
• How much does the professional disclose of their personal experience?  
• When and how will the professional offer or withhold insights, 
interpretations or specific techniques?  
• What were the professional responsibilities to this particular client?  
 
In the above, the arrow of ethics was from the Professional to the Client. In each 
instance the professional was sovereign and in control of the situation. 
Paradoxically, if the professional was insensitive to the ethical demand presented 
by the Other they might not address the concerns that instigated the above 
questions (Vetlesen, 1994).  This required a move by the EP from dominance to 
passivity. This changed the question from “what am I to do?” to “what does the 
Other want from me?” (Eagleton, 2009).  
 
In the EP-Client relationship the ethical demand and consequential responsibility 
were present when the EP became reflexively aware of the processes of inter-
subjectivity.  It was possible to practice and be unaware of the epistemological 
and ontological processes of inter-subjectivity. However, when EPs   experienced 
their practice as being present-to-hand this awareness was experienced as an 
ethical demand where the EP had responsibility to the client27. This was because 
                                                 
27
 Heidegger (1962) used the metaphor of hammering to illustrate the nature of this disruption and in doing 
so highlighted a useful difference between “ready-to-hand” and “present-to-hand” (Ibid pages 103-106).  
When using a hammer it was in the mode of “ready-to-hand”. The hammer was, not reflecting on the nature 
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engaging with clients when it relates to who they are, how they regard 
themselves, how they resolve concerns or conflicts, to achieve good ends were 
ethical issues. Therefore being ethical was not something the EP possessed; 
rather being ethical resulted from an awareness of the complex and expanding 
interdependence of interests, persons, actions, and decisions. Therefore the 
ethical demand preceded freedom to act professionally (Levinas, 1981).  
 
The Client did not literally ask the professional to be ethical. Rather, the Client by 
resisting the thematic and categorization processes of professional, just by being 
Other, placed the professional and their practice in question. The Other by being 
irreducible to a label or category (Other) was unsaying what the professional had 
said about them.  The ethical demand was therefore an unarticulated question 
and cannot therefore be directly answered. This placed the professional in a web 
of infinite responsibility.  
 
The ethical demand being relational took place in a social, historical and cultural 
context (Løgstrup, 1997).  The social nature of the ethical demand enabled the 
demand for infinite responsibility to be resolved because it introduced a third to 
the Self and Other (Levinas 1981). The third could be understood as recognition 
of the need for justice that came from acknowledging pre-existing social 
arrangements (Levinas 1981).  
 
Levinas’s (1981) approach to ethics fundamentally challenged the argument that 
ethical practice was a product of a psychological approach which framed ethical 
dilemmas in terms of rational, automatons, emotional distant  decision making 
(e.g. Chevalier & Lyon 1993). Levinas (1981) argued that rational responses to 
                                                                                                                                                 
of a hammer, how it was to be used or the meaning the hammer had to the user. One was just hammering. 
There was no subjective/objective difference between the hammer, hammering and the one who was 
hammering.  However, this changed if the hammer broke or the person hit their thumb! This disruption 
changes the nature of the relationship from “ready-to-hand” to “present-to-hand as the hammerer was made 
to reflect on the process of hammering. This disruption was a move away from being-in the world. The 
cause of the disruption was not chosen but it placed a demand on the hammerer to be reflexive. In the EP 
encounter with the client can be analogous to the metaphor of the hammer.   
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the ethical demand functioned to negate the demand by reducing it to the 
language of the said.   
 
Butler (2005) argued that Levinas’s construction of the opacity of the other could 
be an ethical resource: 
“To acknowledge one’s opacity or that of another does not transform opacity into 
transparency. To know the limits of acknowledgment is to know even this fact in 
a limited way; as a result, it is to experience the very limits of knowing. This can, 
by the way, constitute a disposition of humility and generosity alike:” (Ibid, page 
42).  
 
Butler (2005) argued that opacity facilitated a reflexivity that established the 
conditions for both vulnerability and responsibility.  Boucher (2006) while 
agreeing with Butler’s aspirations was troubled by what he saw as 
methodological individualism in her work. However, Davis (2006) claimed that 
Butler’s (2004) ethics of responsibility were opposite to the neoliberal ethics of 
responsibility where the Self was made responsible for the Self while shedding 
responsibility for the Other.  Neoliberal responsibility aimed to make bodies more 
governable and useful and increased the difficultly of reflexivity (Davis, 2006). 
Whereas, Butler’s (2004) responsibility presupposed reflexivity and demanded 
responsibility for the Other. Acknowledging the inherent opacities in the relations 
between Self and Others facilitated the question, “Who I was professionally?” 
and hopefully provide opportunities for humility and generosity.  
 
An additional response to Levinas (1981) might be to develop practices that were 
dialogueic, hetroglossic (multi-voiced), that emphasised difference and embraced 
multiplicity. The thesis therefore considered whether it was possible to question 
from below what was imposed from above when the act of questioning can be 
part of the processes that reinforces what has been imposed (Critchley 2007).  
Levinas’s (1981) construct of ethical demand had received extensive criticism 
(Badiou, 2001; Eagleton, 2009; Hutchens, 2008, Lyotard, 1998; Zizek, 2001). 
Hutchens (2008) criticized Levinas generally for having a hyperbolic style and 
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leaving key constructs ambiguous. I have found Levinas perplexing and difficult 
to read. However, I think that Levinas benefits from persistence.  Eagleton (2009) 
while admiring Levinas (1981) found the asymmetry between the self and other 
problematic and bordering on the fetishistic. In addition Eagleton (2009) 
wondered if an ethics based on the dyadic relationship between the Self and 
Other has much to say about broader political struggles. Zizek (2001) argued that 
rather than the other being an object of benign positive regard that the Self can 
find the Other disturbing. In addition, Zizek (2001) argued that the relationship 
between the Self and Other described by Levinas (1981) was analogous to being 
in love and that the relationship between the Self and Other should alternatively 
be founded on justice. Lyotard (1998) found Levinas’s logic and position highly 
problematic and suggested that Levinas was offering a “discourse of persecution” 
where the self was being asked to do before it understood (Ibid, page 276). 
Lyotard (1998) disagreed that it was possible for the Other to make an 
unthematic injunction arguing that the injunction to do something even if that 
something was ambiguous was still a theme. Lyotard (1989) also challenged 
Levinas’ (1981) argument that the Self did not exist until it was called to be by the 
Other, by pointing out that in order for this call to be answered there must have 
been something pre-existing to hear that call.     Finally, Badiou (2001) 
provocatively dismissed Levinas’ (1981) approach to ethics as unintelligible and 
undesirably religious.  Badiou (2001) added that the Other as presented by 
Levinas (1981) was a potential victim and that the Other was required to take on 
the role of guardian. Badiou (2001) also objected to ethics founded on the “ethics 
of difference” by arguing that if all Selves were different then difference was a 
property we all share. This meant that, at one level, there was nothing but the 
same.  
All of the above argument against Levinas (1981) had merit and to varying 
degrees were plausible. However, because the thesis had adopted a broadly 
post-structuralist position the “truth” of Levinas’ (1981) description of the ethical 
demand was secondary to its utility in describing a process and as a rhetorical 
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device.  I was practically interested in how the asymmetry towards the Other 
inherent in Levinas’ face to face encounter worked against the asymmetry of the 
professional-client relationship, which was biased towards the professional. This 
fundamentally challenged the attitude that good/ethical practice was a product of 
the psychological approach employed by the psychologist.  
The previous two sections have critically examined Foucault’s and Levinas’s 
approaches to ethics.  There were number of tensions and differences between 
Foucault and Levinas accounts. Table 1 below provided a summary of four 
possible points of contrast:  
Table 1. Foucault & Levinas Contrasted 
Foucault’s approach to 
ethics 
Levinas’s approach to 
ethics 
Ethics was the relation the 
self had with the self 
(Foucault, 1983/2003).  
Ethics was the non-
relation with the Other 
(Veling, 2009).  
Ethics was a historical and 
cultural construct (Foucault, 
1983/2003). 





Ethics was a duty owed to 
the Self first (Longford, 
2001). 
Ethics resulted in a 
duty to Others first. 
(Tatransky, 2008) 
Responsibility was an 
imposed discipline on the 
Self by Others. 
Responsiblization of the self 




demanded in the 
encounter with the 
Other. Responsibility 
was mostly perceived 
as positive (Levinas, 
1981). 
These tensions might have suggested that it would was incongruous to attempt 
to employ the approaches together. However, both approaches were deeply 
concerned about and committed to the Other (both the other as Other and the 
Self as Other) and held that the Self was contingent.  In addition, the approaches 
acted as correctives for each other. Levinas’s de-centered approach to ethics 
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balanced Foucault’s egocentric tendencies and Foucault’s analysis of 
instructional power balanced Levinas’s intra-psychic approach.  
The previous three sections critically presented different understandings of and 
approaches to ethics. The next section further explored this examination of ethics 
by making ethics problematic.   
3.13 Problematising Ethics. 
 
This section of the thesis examined two overlapping ways to problematize ethics. 
The first was to explore the discipline function of ethics and the second was to 
critically examine the rhetoric role of ethics in practitioners’ deliberations.  
 
3.13.1 Ethics as Discipline 
 
To critically examine ethics the first question to ask was; “what is being hidden 
when using ethics as a tool of analysis”? The first error would be to perceive 
ethics just as a neutral epistemological concept and be unaware of its normative 
role in shaping ourselves and Others. This prompted two further questions: 
1. When the question was asked; “was this ethical?” What work was being 
done?  
2. What did adding the word ethical to dilemma add to the issues that were 
presented in practice?  
 
It’s often reported that practitioners need prompting to describe practice issues 
as ethical28 (e.g. Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009, Water, 2008). Water (2008) 
suggested that practice issues needed to be shaped as ethical, which enabled a 
particular form of predicable analysis and produced a particular praxis. The call 
for increased ethical awareness of practitioners was therefore a call to bring 
experience into a particular discourse, which provided both possibility of utility 
and limitations.  Applying an ethical framework provided tools for analysis, 
                                                 
28In fact, Beaver (1996) felt able to write a popular book on Educational Psychology Casework 
with a single reference to ethics. 
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principles and strategies for argumentation and disputation. However, Water 
(2008) argues that resulting discussions can feel “predetermined” where the 
issues were “already labelled and classified” (Ibid, pages 12 &13). However, 
what was frequently missing was a discussion about the suffering of participants. 
For example, what an EP might formulate and sanitise as a conflict of interest the 
Client might perceive as abandonment or betrayal.   
 
The highly preformative and hegemonic nature of formal ethical thinking was 
exemplified in   Rieman’s (2002) four year longitudinal study, which suggested 
that the transformation of practitioner ethical judgment and behaviour required a 
sustained dialogue combined with real world experience.  Rieman (2002, 2004) 
emphasised that talk, teaching or experience alone were insufficient to produce 
sustained change in thinking or behaviour. Rather, five conditions were 
necessary; role taking, guided enquiry, discussion about process and content, 
supervisory challenge and continuity.   
 
The processes whereby professionals make ethical decisions was acknowledged 
to be complex and contested (Blair, et al., 2006; Cushman, Young & Hauser, 
2006; Greene, et al., 2001, 2004; Haidt, 2001, 2007; Koenigs, et al., 2007; 
Pizarro, Uhlmann & Bloom, 2003; Young, et al., 2007). Traditional approaches to 
ethical judgments were cognitive, developmentalist and attributionist (e.g. 
Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).  The attributionist 
and developmental approaches assumed that ethical judgments were rational, 
deliberative, conscious, cognitive and consistent (between personal theory and 
action). Recent research has focused on the role of social, unconscious intuition, 
affective factors and inconsistency  (Cottone and Clause, 2000; Cottone, 2001, 
2004 ; Cushman, et al., 2006; Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, et al., 2003; Greene, et al., 
2001 2004; Koenigs, et al., 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006).  
 
Several types of decision making matrix have been suggested to assist 
professionals including EPs (e.g. Monsen et al 1998 & Woolfson et al 2003). 
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These typically included stages such as: issue/problem identification, 
establishing several possible actions or choices, implementation of choice or 
action and evaluation of action (e.g. Forester-Miller & Davis, 1996; Jacob and 
Hartshorne 2007; Koocher and Keith-Spiegel 2008). These models were 
sometimes expanded to include the identification of stakeholders, the 
practitioners’ duty to them, the need to consult ethical scholarship and the need 
for peer and line management supervision (Tymchuk, 1986, Welfed 1998).  The 
contextual factors identified in the decision making processes have included an 
assessment of the seriousness of the situation, the benefit of intervention/action 
to the client, the consequence/cost of the intervention/action (Sileo & Kopala 
1993).  These matrices provided highly instrumental approaches to resolving 
ethical issues. In addition, ethical decision making models employed by 
psychologists and mental health professionals tended not to be theoretically 
grounded and framed the ethical decision making process as individualistic, 
rational/cognitive or intra-psychic (Cottone & Clause, 2000). This portrayed 
ethical decisions as the sole responsibility of the decision maker. Cottone (2001) 
argued that individual and intra-psychic approaches promoted psychological 
mysticism by frequently failing to describe how choices occurred, how the values 
or issues are weighed and by excluding the relational and social nature of 
decisions.   
 
There have been attempts to weave both the social and the emotional into ethical 
decision making. For example, Betan (1997) suggested a hermeneutical 
approach which emphasized the relational and intersubjective aspects of 
decision making. Hill, Gaser and Harden (1995) proposed a framework based on 
a “feminist” approach that included power as a frame of reference. Cottone 
(2001) developed a constructivist model of ethical decision making which 
incorporated and acknowledge social and systemic processes.   
 
Water (2008) suggested framing the issues as ethical obscured the emotional 
work undertook by professionals in complex situations, where autonomy was 
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limited and with no ideal outcome.  Professionals therefore found themselves 
with limited control and were required to be a witness to the suffering of Others 
(Water 2008).   In these situations choice was a fallacy. Water’s (2008) portrayal 
resonated with the account of EPs experience of working in ethically difficult 
situations provided by Guiney (2009) and Bennett (2008) above. This emotionally 
engaged account of practice challenged the discourse that the practitioners sat in 
a neutral and objective space where they can observe, weigh the costs and 
benefits and then come to decisions (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002; Koocher & 
Keith-Spiegel, 2008; Rest & Narvaez, 2009).  Rather, in more traditional 
accounts of professional ethics the emotional work undertaken was seldom 
discussed and emotions were frequently perceived to be problematic (impairing 
rational thought) (e.g. Francis, 2009; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 2008; Rest & 
Narvaez, 2009).   Water (2008) suggested that some practitioners learned to live 
with the ambiguity. However for others ‘”forgiveness becomes a way of finding 
peace” and for others the solution was to become “desensitized and inured to the 
distress of others” (Water, 2008, page 194).   
 
This section suggested that framing issues as ethical could: 
• Discipline (govern) how Professionals thought about issues and the 
solutions they arrived at. 
• Facilitate and privilege a rational form of positivistic practice.  
• Obscure the emotional work which resulted from working in institutions  
 
The next section argued that ethics could be employed rhetorically to achieve 
personal and strategic goals.  
 
 
3.13.2 Ethics as Rhetorical Tools 
There were two overlapping critiques of ethics as rhetorical tools which differed in 
the extent to which cognitive deliberation was said to be involved. In the first 
critique ethics was a way of talking about practice issues designed to achieve a 
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personal or social goal. In the second, the employment of ethical descriptions 
was a post hoc rationalization for “non-rational” processes.   
 
Tong (1998) suggested that justification of our actions to us and others was a 
core function of ethical. Turner (2009) below perhaps unwittingly, pointed the 
rhetorical nature of medical discourse: 
 
“When bioethicists discuss such topics as truth telling, informed consent, and 
advance care planning they typically draw upon the language of autonomy and 
choice. However, when addressing other subjects, such as public health, 
intergenerational obligations, family obligations, resource allocation, and access 
to health care, they often draw upon notions of community and relationality” (Ibid, 
page 98). 
  
The above quote could be read (against) as demonstrating that ethics was a 
rhetorical device used strategically to achieve a goal rather than a principle 
position.  For example, the strategic use of ethics was suggested by linking the 
language autonomy and choice to the contexts and the aims to be achieved 
(Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter; 1988, Tong, 1998).  When the aim was to 
produce individual responsibility the rhetoric was of autonomy and choice. 
However when the aim was social good the rhetoric emphasized social 
responsibility and obligation. The focus on autonomy, while emphasizing choice 
and consent29 perpetuated asymmetrical power relations. For example, the Client 
was expected to consent based on technical information using a specialised 
vocabulary from an institutional context (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Frank & Jones, 
2003).  
The second related challenge to ethics emphasized emotional, social and cultural 
influences in ethical decisions and that the rationalizations given for ethical 
decisions were later constructions (Haidt, 2001). Typically, the practitioner found 
themselves in a perplexing situation and made intuitive social and culturally 
informed decisions or actions. Only later when asked (by Self or Others) to speak 
                                                 
29
 For a further critical discussion and problematization of consent see appendix 8. 
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about their decision/action in rational terms did the individual employ formal 
ethical thinking. Furthermore, Dancy (2006) argued that rationalizations when 
applied to ethics had a contributory rather than a causal function. Contributory 
reasons on either side of an argument did not necessarily negate each other, 
rather contributory reasons are weighed in the balance and the decision was 
based on the quantity rather than the quality of the reasons (Dancy, 2006). In 
addition, research frequently found that practitioners’ rationalizations were 
inconsistent (Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; Hundert 1987).  
However the content of the ethical justifications were still important to examine 
because they pointed to culturally important aspects of past decisions (Toulmin 
1982).  The difference between the rational and Haidt’s (2001) approach to 
ethical judgments was illustrated in Figure 2 below:  
 
Figure 2. The Realist and Haidt’s (2001) Models of Ethical Decisions. 
 
This section argued that ethics could be employed as a tool to achieve social and 
political goals. The section also contrasted the post-rationalization approach with 
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often intended to inform how professionals think about difficult situations. The 
role of ethical codes was further critically examined below.  
 
3.14 Ethical Codes 
 
Educational Psychologists in the United Kingdom can obtain guidance from   
HPC, BPS (2006), AEP (2003) and DECP (1997, 2000).  However, the role and 
function of ethical codes was highly contested (Lindsey, 1996).  This section 
explored both negative and positive perceptions of the role and function of ethical 
codes before exploring the possibility of a post-modern approach to ethics.  
 
The traditional normative role of professional ethics was outlined by Francis 
(2002) in his emphasis on law, morality and the explicit aims of policing 
behavioural standards.  However codes of ethics also protect and reinforce the 
power of the practitioner (Lindsey, 1996). Ethical codes were designed to 
regulate the conduct of behaviour (Francis 2002). 
 
Lindsey (1996) argued that these codes were “social constructions” that resulted 
from conflicts, compromises and tensions between professional behaviours and 
societal constraints (Lindsey, 1996). Forsyth & Pope (1984) argued that 
practitioners could take a principled, relativistic or prima facie approach to ethical 
guidelines.   That was to adhere to them regardless of, time, place and situation. 
Pope and Vasquez (1998), however, suggested the following limitation of ethical 
codes: 
 
“Ethical codes cannot do our questioning, thinking, feeling, and responding for 
us. Such codes can never be a substitute for the active process by which the 
individual therapist or counselor struggles with the sometimes bewildering, 
always unique constellation of questions, responsibilities, contexts, and 




The above limitations were recognized by the BPS (2006) and stated that “… no 
Code can replace the need for psychologists to use their professional and ethical 
judgement” (Ibid, page xiii). 
 
Brown (1994) further argued that legalistic adherence to ethical guidelines was to 
misunderstand their more positive function of equalising power within 
professional relationships to promote ethical thinking.   Ethical guidelines have 
also been described as “something the mental health professional must worry 
about, confront or simply ignore rather than as a core aspect of the profession 
(Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal 2008). Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) added that 
strictly adhering to ethical guidelines could actually impair the practitioner and 
client relationship where the primary motivation is to behave in a manner so as 
not to get sued.   
 
The BPS and HPC codes of ethics were underpinned by utilitarianism and 
deontological ethics combined with what Talbot (2000, page 9) called liberal 
moral theory or “contract ethics”. This approach, underpinned by principlism,   
emphasised autonomy, reason and universality over emotion relatedness and 
particularity (Lindsey, 1996). Ethical codes asked that we thought about the 
particular as if it were universal by offering processes through which we 
established   which universal principle(s) applied in a particular case (Koocher & 
Kieth-Spiegal (2008). As discussed above, to make a maxim universal was to 
abstract the person from it and enabled Others to become generalized others 
belonging to a category/label, exemplar of a syndrome or a client (Benhabib, 
1987; Mensch, 2003). Categorized and differentiated Others, however, remained 
entitled to rights. This facilitated discourses of respect, obligation, dignity, rights, 
duty, entitlement and worthiness which negated the need to relate to an 
individual Other but enabled professionals to relate to the Client as just another 
other (Benhabib, 1993).  
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There have been attempts by “postmodernist” theorists to suggest alternatives to 
ethics based on codes (Bauman, 1993; Elliot, 2000). Elliot (2000) argued that 
postmodernists privileged: 
 
 “… the debunking of universalism and totality, prizes appeals to instinctual 
intuition and passion in the formation of judgement, values irony and cynicism as 
a means for keeping a firm distance from intellectualism and elitism, while all the 
time remaining committed to self-reflexive subversions in order to give the slip to 
conceptual closure and thus authoritarian communication and politics” (Ibid, 
Page 338). 
 
This was an ethics focused on the Other and, in short, the aim of ethics was to 
establish ways of living with others. Bauman (1993) criticised ethical codes 
because they denied “human reality” was messy and ambiguous which meant 
that “moral decisions, unlike abstract ethical principles, are ambivalent” (Ibid, 
page 32). Bauman (1993) also challenged ethical codes because they made the 
practitioner answerable to legislators but not to the “Other and to moral self-
conscience and the context in which a moral stand is taken” (Ibid, page 250). A 
close reading of Bauman (1993) suggested that postmodern ethics remained 
problematic.  For example, Bauman (1993) could be guilty of mystifying ethics by 
privileging intuition30, reintroducing essentialism and being open to the self-
refuting argument.  31Bauman’s (1993) intuitionist approach was implied in his 
request that ethics be based on “human moral intuition” and “ability to negotiate 
the art and usages of living together” without reference to ‘artificially constructed 
ethical codes’ (Bauman, 1993, pages 33-34). Bauman’s (1993) recommendation, 
flowing from the intuitional approach, to “consult your conscience” to establish if 
an action was ethical was perilously close to a traditional deontological position 
(Bauman, 1993, page. 250).   Bauman’s (1993, pages 32-33) frequent references 
to “truth” opened up the possibility of having a self-refuting proposition.  However, 
if Bauman (1993) replaced truth with fidelity, then the position became one of  
                                                 
30
 Intuition was problematic because it was not open to being tested by theory. Intuition also appeared to 
stand outside of power and discourse.  
31
 For example, claiming that “it was true that there was no truth”.  This statement undermined itself 
because it cannot be true that there is no truth. That would mean that if the statement was itself true then it 
would be false.  
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staying true to the consequences of  accepting a postmodern perspective and 
avoided (or temporally sidestepped) the self refuting argument. Bauman (1993)  
also found himself in a bind through arguing that modernity was an illusion but 
also finding merit in modern moral concerns such as  “human rights” and “social 
justice” (Bauman, 1993, page 4).  
  
This section critically reviewed the function of ethical codes and explored 
postmodern ethics as an alternative.  While accepting that ethics based on 
ethical codes was problematic it was also argued that alternatives were also 
problematic. The complex relationship between ethical codes and practice was 
further discussed in the methodology section of the thesis. The next section 
critically examined the nature of the ethically challenging situation experienced 
by EPs and related professions.  
 
3.15 Educational Psychology and Ethical Practice  
 
Educational Psychologists’ and analogous professionals’ (e.g. American School 
Psychologists, Australian School Councellors) attitudes to ethics and 
experiences of ethically challenging situations have been reviewed internationally 
and nationally (e.g. Chevalier & Lyon, 1993, and Jacob-Timm, 1999). The 
majority of these studies had survey designs. Crane (1999) argued that research 
employing questionnaire designs perpetuated a positivistic, objective and   
rational approach to ethics. The majority of studies have been North American 
and therefore not easily transferable (e.g. Canter, et al., 1994; Jacob-Timm, 
1999). For example, a significantly higher proportion of School Psychologists 
were self-employed whereas the majority of EPs worked for Local Authorities 
(Guiney 2009).  This meant that there could have been a greater preponderance 
of ethical maters relating to managing a business (e.g. payments). However, 




Studies consistently reported that School Psychologists claimed that they found 
themselves in “difficult situations” (e.g. Canter, et al., 1994, Jacob-Timm, 1999). 
Jacob-Timm’s (1999) survey of 1025 School Psychologists identified 222 
ethically challenging incidents which where were grouped into 19 different 
categories. The three most consistently identified issues were administrative 
pressures to act unethically, unethical assessment and diagnostic procedures 
and confidentiality dilemmas.   
 
Concerns about confidentiality were not unique to North America.  In a study of 
Israeli mothers’ attitudes towards seeking help for their children from School and 
Private psychologists, Raviv et al. (2003) found that mothers had significantly 
greater concerns about referring their child to a School Psychologist than to a 
private psychologist.  The reasons given included concern about;  
• Their child being stigmatized at school for accessing the school 
psychologist.  
• The school psychologist breaching confidentiality.  
• Sharing private family issues with other school professionals.  
 
Raviv et al. (2003) concluded that School Psychologists needed to be proactive 
in educating parents about the confidential nature of their work in schools. 
 
Jacob-Timm (1999) found that the most common ethically challenging situation 
involved administrative pressure for the School Psychologist to act beyond their 
professional boundaries. This included a Principal wanting a School Psychologist 
to discipline students. The pressure to act unethically was often indirect with 
appeals to teamwork. For example, one School Psychologist was accused of not 
being a team player for not giving a student a particular diagnosis that would 
have benefited the school.  Kendrick & Chandler (1994) found that psychologists 
reported that they were being asked to undertake activities that they did not have 
the time or training to deal with.  Glosoff & Pate (2002) described the School 
Psychologists’ experience as a “complex balancing act” where they endeavour to 
meet their clients’ needs, the needs of the setting they work within, the needs 
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and expectation of multiple stakeholders while attempting to maintain 
professional standards.  This echoed the description of EP issues with working 
with clients described above. 
 
British studies found that EPs frequently experienced similar ethical challenging 
situations in the work place (Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; Murphy, 1998). 
Guiney (2009), using structured interviews, argued that there were six areas that 
consistently presented EP with ethical dilemmas.  These included: 
• Cases involving abuse of a child by an adult (e.g. parent, teacher etc). 
• Cases involving the inclusion of children in mainstream school or special 
school. 
• The location, quality and amount of provision available for SEN provision. 
• The tension between the different roles EP’s had (e.g. Local Authority 
officer, Educational Psychologist, provider of advice to school, supporters 
of children inclusion, etc). 
• Instances where EPs felt that they had received inappropriate supervision 
from their line management. 
 
  Bennett (2008) described nine categories of ethically troubling incidents: 
 
1. Weighing and balancing the rights and best interests of different Clients/ 
Stakeholders  
2. Respecting  clients’ confidences 
3. Challenging other discourses 
4. Being between a rock and a hard place (having to navigate between difficult 
choices with no clear positive outcome)   
5. Maleficence/Doing Harm in relation to inappropriate administration or 
reporting of assessments. 
6. Dilemmas of Social Justice (included informed consent) 
7. Labelling children so that they can get access to resources 
8. Conflicting principles, conflicting roles and responsibilities 
9. Challenging competences 
 
Although the ethically difficult situations were varied, the dilemmas were 
surprising constant. In the majority of situations the EPs knew what to do but felt 
pressure or experienced barrier in doing what they believed to be right.  These 
included wanting to maintain good working relationship with schools and feelings 
of duty and responsibilities to their employers. Guiney’s (2008) study suggested 
that the ethical dilemmas had significant emotional impact on EPs.  These 
 81
included EPs reporting feelings of anger, anxiety and discomfort. Bennett (2008) 
said that “EPs’ experiences of ethical dilemmas involve themes of conflict, 
challenge, guilt, stress, betrayal, de-skilling, and power” (Ibid, page 137).   The 
emotions and challenges experienced by the EPs in Guiney’s (2009) and 
Bennett’s (2008) studies therefore resonated with the microethical challenges 
descried above (Austin 2007; Giroux 1997).    The Lamb Enquiry (2009) reported 
that EPs experienced ethical tugs.   
 
The Lamb Enquiry (2009) described how some EPs could be subtly “fettered” by 
the Local Authority that employed them. This included some EPs feeling 
pressure to change advice, not to make specific recommendations or not to 
recommend provision that the Local Authority did not have. The Lamb Enquiry 
(2009) argued that the consequence of acquiescing to such fettering was to short 
change children. The Lamb Enquiry (2009) wondered if the pressure from EPs 
having multiple roles could be avoided by having EPs work at “arms length” from 
the Local Authority. This recommendation assumed that there was a neutral 
space in which EPs could make neutral decisions. This naive position forgot that 
all decisions were social and in any new contexts there would be a new set of 
demands, conflicts and pressures. To be social was already to be compromised 
and to be subject to negotiation.  
 
Interestingly, Bennett (2008) & Guiney (2009) found that even when EPs where 
aware of professional codes that they infrequently or inconsistently employed 
them to resolve troubling ethical situations. This supported the argument above 
that professionals had a problematic and complex relationship with ethical codes 
(Nash, 1996; Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal, 2008).  Guiney (2009) suggested that 
EPs did not look to codes for the answers but to provide frameworks and broad 
guidance.  
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The British EPs experience of the ethical tug32 was not unique. For example, 
Raviv et al. (2003) found that American School Psychologists found themselves 
caught between different principles, dual roles (advocate, employee, etc.), law 
and ethical beliefs and between conflicting interests presented by multiple clients. 
In addition, Campbell (2004) stated that Australian School Counsellors 
experienced conflict between their role and the demands placed on them by 
school administrative staff.   Davis and Mickelson (1994) also in the Australian 
context described this ethical tug as: 
 
“A situation in which a counsellor experiences conflict in deciding on an 
appropriate decision. The counsellor usually feels pulled in several directions, 
and at times, is confronted with a situation that seems to place professional 
ethics in direct opposition to the expressed desires of others or with the legal 
system”.(Ibid, 1994, page 6). 
 
The concept  of ethical tugs  was relevant to the earlier discussion on the nature 
of the EP-Client relationship and an argument to  incorporate  the affective 
aspects to balance the cognitive and the reframing of ethics based on 
commitment and resistance (commitment to beliefs, fidelity to clients, resistance 
to impositions) (Austin 2007).  
 
This section argued that EPs experienced a wide range of ethically challenging 
situations where the tug was frequently between wanting to do what right and 
feeling unable to do it.  The tug appeared to result from political, resource and 
situational pressures.  
 
3.16 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter critically reviewed and identified debates in the two main themes of 
the thesis, professionals’ identity and professional ethics.   The review suggested 
that professionalism was a contested and ill-defined construct (Morrow et al 
                                                 
32
  This was the emotional tug experienced by EPs when they  negotiated between doing what they felt was 
right and the barrier that stopped them doing it.   
 83
2011). Professionals were portrayed as being on a continuum between 
romanticized heroes working in the best interests of clients to powerful self-
interested monopolies obsessed by rules (Coulehan, 2005; Evetts, 2003; 
Freidson, 1970; Johnson, 1993; Krause, 1996; MacDonald, 1995; Rose, 1999). 
Professional identities were argued to be continually emerging and re-negotiated 
through professional talk (Connelly & Clandin, 1999; Chreim, Williams & Hining, 
2007; Wenger, 1998).  The challenges experienced during professional identity 
work pointed to tensions in the discursive formation in which the professional 
practiced (Araujo & Martuccelli 2010). The review argued that EP’s professional 
identity confusion partly resulted from the tensions in their roles was a response 
to the political context in which EP’s practiced and the inherent instability of the 
construct of psychology.  The review of EP experience of ethically challenging 
situations suggested that some of the same pressures (political, resource, 
multiple clients with sometimes competing demands, etc.) that were claimed to 
cause role confusion also resulted in ethical tugs. EP-Client relationships were 
also critically examined.  Clienthood was argued to result from historical and 
relational, discursive processes that established roles and responsibilities. 
Finally, the EP-Client relationship was understood as asymmetrical and 
potentially alienating.  
 
The section on ethics focused on the tensions within microethics and between 
microethics and bioethics. The review challenged the bioethical portrayal of the 
rational, autonomous, neutral decision maker (professional) informed by 
universal ethical principles (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Popke, 
2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 1998; Wendell, 1996). This was balanced with 
acknowledgement of the emotional work undertaken by professionals in messy, 
interdependent and particular situations.  The rational and theoretical function of 
ethics as the source of action was contrasted with the employment of ethics as 
post rationalizations and rhetorical justifications of actions.   Ethical codes were 
argued to be underpinned by utilitarian and deontological ethics that emphasized 
autonomy, reason and universality or emotional relatedness (Lindsey 1996). This 
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was claimed to facilitate the abstraction of Clients and their exclusion. The review 
proposed that rather than professionals being the sole source of ethics that it was 
the ethical demand offered by the Client that also called the professional to be 
ethical.  Finally, the review suggested that EPs frequently found themselves in 
ethically difficult situations where they experienced an ethical tug between 
commitment to their roles, institutional stakeholders and their Client (e.g. 




















Chapter4.  Methodologies 
4.1 Practitioner Research into Professional Identity 
"Many of the most significant and exciting life events and extraordinary 
experiences - moments of clarity, illumination, and healing - have been 
systematically excluded from conventional research" (Braud & Anderson, 1998, 
page 3).  
 
Braud & Anderson (1998) appeal for research to focus on the everyday practice 
of practitioners echoed by Dewey’s (1923)  call to mine  unworked mines of  
professional practice. This thesis’s focus on the everyday practice of EPs was a 
response to the above appeals. This section of the methodology first provided 
definitions of practitioner research before providing an overview of the 
approaches used by EPs. The type of knowledge practitioner research produced 
was then critically examined.  
 
In a review of research on practice Higgs, Horsfall & Grace (2009) identified two 
approaches which they formulated as definitions: 
1. “Practice is the enactment of the role of a profession or occupational 
group in serving or contributing to society”.   
 
2. “Praxis is a form of practice that is ethically informed, committed, and 
guided by critical reflection of practice traditions and one’s own practice.” 
(Ibid, pages 3-4). 
  
The above definitions reflected either a descriptive or critical position to 
practitioner research. This thesis employed the spirit of the second definition. 
McLeod (1999), further and straightforwardly, defined practitioner research as 
“research carried out by practitioners for the purpose of advancing their own 
practice” (Ibid, page 8).  
 
Participant accounts of working in Educational Psychology Services occasionally 
appeared in professional journals (e.g. Bozic, 1999; Counsell & Court. 2000; 
Gulliford, 1999; Quicke, 2000). Ashton and Roberts (2006) identified five 
approaches used by EPs to investigate their role. These included: 
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• Self-reflection 
• EPs asking other EPs 
• Asking children 
• Asking school staff 
• Professional organisation  reviews 
 
The thesis made most use of the first two of the above approaches.  Although 
children were not asked for their views, working with M put my practice into 
question. 
 
Practitioner research frequently suggested that professional practice knowledge 
was something inside the head of the practitioner (e.g. Eraut, 1994, Higgs, 
Titchen & Neville 2001). However, Kemmis and McTaggart (2005) have argued 
for a multi-dimensional understanding of practice that encompasses an 
individual, social and reflexive-dialectical focus.  This thesis was concerned with 
the situational aspects of practice. That was the practice of a particular individual 
in a particular place and time (Foucault, 2003). Following Kemmis & McTaggart 
(2005) a social, discursive and reflexive-dialectical focus was used to critically 
analyze the situated practice. 
 
Practitioner research had been understood as a type of experiential learning, 
which reflected on the experience and the processes involved in order to profit 
subsequently from action (Wood, 2003). This recognized the difference between 
espoused theories and theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Espoused 
theories are taught, favoured by professional discourse and are derived from 
published theory or empirical research. Both espoused and theories-in-use are 
problematic.  The qualified uniqueness of each situation implied that espoused 
theories cannot be a complete guide to practice. However, because theories-in-
use developed out of practice they could become second nature and therefore 
potentially uncontested. Furthermore, just because a theory has developed 
through practice does not mean that it will be ethical. In addition, the theories-in-
use approach assumed that experience was something to be reflected upon 
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rather than retrospectively constructed within a discourse (Kerby, 1991).  
However, Kerby (1991) claimed that we were spoken into being through 
becoming conscious of, and repeating,  existing stories  that we   “encounter 
almost every day in novels, plays, and other story media” (Ibid, page 6). This was 
an outside-in process where the self was a product of its experience despite 
feeling as if it was the self who was originator of that experience.    
 
This section suggested that practitioner research was intended both to develop 
practice and produce knowledge about practice. It was argued that the type of 
knowledge could be problematic.  The next sections of the methodology   
introduced the research design before going on to define, justify and critically 
examine the methodologies.  This was followed a delineation of the research 
design, procedural issues, information about the research participants and the 
sources and methods of data collection. The ethical issues relating to the 
research design were then examined.  Finally, the Foucauldian approach to data 
collection was explained and critically evaluated.  
 
4.2 Introducing the Research Design 
 
This section reviewed the possible research designs and argued for a bricolage 
approach to methodology (Steinberg, 2006). The thesis appropriated 
autoethnography, Action Research (AR) and Self-Study (S-S) combined with a 
Foucauldian approach to data analysis.  A bricolage approach was employed to 
disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology (Curt, 1994). The 
methodology complexity arose out of wanting to employ a Foucauldian approach 
and undertaking a real time naturalistic inquiry. I therefore decided to borrow 
selectively from Foucault’s toolbox and acknowledged this by situating the 
Foucauldian approach in relation to other methodologies. The methodology 
section justified the inclusion of the different methodologies before outlining the 
four cycles of the research, summarized below: 
1. Analysis my write up of a meeting with M. 
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2. Analysis of the HPC-SCPE.  
3. Analysis of a focus group discussion with 9 the EPs in the Service. 
4. Synthesis of the analysis of the three cycles of research.   
 
This was followed by a description and critical examination of the research 
methods. There was an extended section on the ethics of undertaking participant 
research where the participant was also an object of research. A key theme 
underpinning all the research methods was reflexivity. The methodology section 
therefore provided a critical examination of reflexivity (see appendix 7 for a fuller 
examination of reflexivity).   
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
4.3.1 Reflecting the Research Gaze Back Onto the Researcher 
To answer the research questions and for the thesis also to be an opportunity for 
identity work, the research methodologies had to have reflexivity at their core. In 
qualitative research there was a continuum of reflexivity (Willig, 2003). This 
ranged from the researcher making themselves briefly visible within the research 
process to the researcher turning the methodological gaze completely on 
themselves and becoming the object of research (Willig, 2003). Researching 
oneself as a practitioner was an example of the latter.  Methodologies where the 
researcher was the object of research included: 
 
1. Narrative (the analysis of  the  stories told about and by the self) 
2. Autoethnography (analysis of self in a wider social and political context) 
(e.g. Ellis, 2004; McILveen, 2008) 
3. Life history (analysis of a particular self over time (e.g. Dhunpath & 
Samuel, 2009).  
4. Action Research: when the aim was to reflect on researchers’ practice 
(e.g. Carr & Kemmis, 1996; McNiff, 2002; McKernan, 1996)  
5. Self-Study (analysis of self in action typically in educational settings) (e.g. 
Loughran, et al., 2004) 
6. Memory work (analysis of a remembered self) (e.g. Stephenson & Kippax, 
2009, Willig, 2001) 
7. Psychoanalytic work (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 2005) 
8. Phenomenological  (e.g. Quicke, 2000, Moustakas, 1990) 
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4.3.2  Complexity and Bricolage 
The first problem in constructing this section of the thesis was to consider the 
utility of hierarchy (between AR, S-S and Autoethnography). For example, was 
the thesis based on an AR methodology which employed methods derived from 
Autoethnography and S-S? Alternatively, was the thesis based on a S-S 
methodology that employed an action research framework using methods from 
autoethnography? Or any other combination of the above. Establishing a 
hierarchy would have reduced the complexity but could privilege a specific 
methodology or theory which would undermine the post-structuralist ambitions of 
the thesis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).  Tobin & Kincheloe (2006) further argued 
that presenting research as complex enabled readers to understand that 
research was partial, fragmented, biased and ideological.  The term used to 
describe this complexity was “bricolage”33 (Steinberg, 2006).  Bricolage involved: 
 
“…taking research strategies from a variety of scholarly disciplines as they are 
needed in the unfolding context of the research situation. Such an action is 
pragmatic and strategic, demanding self consciousness and awareness of 
context from the researcher” (Steinberg, 2006, page 119). 
 
The researcher therefore needs to be an “interpretative bricoleur” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000, page 4).  The current research made use of Autoethnography, AR 
and S-S. The next section justified methodologies choices.  
 
4.4 Justification of the Inclusion of Action Research 
 
AR, when characterized as a cyclical process of problem identification, planning, 
action and reflective evaluation; where the insights obtained from one cycle 
informed the next,  was appropriated because  it provide a overall structure to the 
research (Willig, 2001). The presentation of AR as a particular way of reflexivity 
                                                 
33
 Bricolage was preferred to the term Mixed Methods, which was typically used to describe research that 
combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. However this thesis wove qualitative approaches 
together (for a description of mixed methods see Burke & Onwueguzie (2004). 
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examining and evaluating one’s own practice also resonated with general aim of 
the thesis (Car, 2004, 2006; Carr & Kemmis, 1996; McNiff, 2002; McKernan, 
1996).  Feldman, Paugh & Mills (2004) have argued that AR, because of its 
emphasis on reflection, could provide a method for S-S. However Feldman, 
Paugh & Mills (2004) also recognized that S-S and AR had different goals and 
theoretical positions. Self-study was primarily concerned with understanding 
(delineating) the researcher’s experiences34 and how they influenced and were 
influenced by the system in which they practice; whereas AR emphasized action 
(Samaras & Freese, 2009). The implication was that, rather than AR and S-S 
nesting within each other like Russian Dolls, they should be understood as 
complementary methods. Samaras & Freese (2009) argued that AR could 
provide the scaffolding and structure for S-S.  
 
Action research was also an appropriate method to explore research as 
liminality35  (Glavey, 2008).   Glavey (2008) outlined how the first stage of 
liminality resonated with the initial unease experienced by practitioners about 
their practice. The second betwixt and between phase was likened to the 
reflexive processes involved in AR. Finally, the transition and re-aggregation 
phase was held to be similar to the action phase of the AR cycle. Action 
Research, S-S and autoethnography were also chosen because of their 
applicability to a qualitative research design intended to research nodal moments 
or axial points in practice (Bennis & Nanus, 1997; Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001).  
 
These were moments when practitioners experienced dissonance in their 
practice that turned their critical gaze onto their practice. Whitehead (1993) 
referred to this as experiencing oneself as a living contradiction. For Capra 
(2002, page 1088), such moments are moments of ‘uncertainty, fear, confusion, 
self-doubt’ preceding ‘the emergence of novelty’.  Conn (1986) suggested that in 
                                                 
34
 I would prefer to say the way the researcher talks about or came to know their experience rather than 
their experience.  
35
 Research as liminality referred to two aspects of research The first, was  research as being experienced as 
being betwixt and between different roles (researcher and participants). The second, referred to research as 
a process of personal change.   
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nodal moments practitioners were aware “that our categories do not fit our 
experience, and throws the intuitive, unconscious self into gear in quest of what 
the possibilities really are” (Ibid, page 288).  The concept of nodal moments was 
central to the thesis because the research questions were born out of such a 
moment during my practice.  
 
Action Research, S-S and to a lesser extent Autoethnography all recognized the 
importance of  an ongoing tension between the researcher, researched and 
critical friends, where interactions tested, reframed and  suggested alternative 
perspectives to hypotheses and interpretation (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; 
LaBoskey, 2004; Loughran, 2004; McNiff & Whitehead,   2006). This was also 
highly relevant to the collaborative research design of this thesis. 
 
Finally, AR was also applicable to the complexity (swampy lowlands) of 
Educational Psychology practice which could be resistance to instrumental and 
technical solutions (Schön, 1995).   
 
4.4.1 Justification of the inclusion of Self-Study 
 
Self-Study was selected because it had been applied to the individual and 
situational level involving reflexive/reflective practices (Cochran-Smith and Lytle, 
1993; Hamilton, 1998; Kosnik, et al., 2006; LaBoskey, 2004; Lassonde, Galman 
& Kosnik, 2009; Lighthall, 2004; Loughran, et al., 2004; Pinnegar, 1998; 
Samaras, 2011).   
 
Self-Study had also been employed to examine professional identity (e.g. 
Muchmore 2008). Self-Study, with its emphasis on making public personal 
reflection and inquiry was appropriate given my aim to make public how I and 
colleagues talked about our practice. Self-Study researchers’ use and 
problematization of their professional practice also made S-S applicable to the 
Foucauldian approach to data analysis (Feldman, 2002). In addition, some S-S 
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researchers had aligned themselves with the post-structuralist project through 
emphasizing the non-linear nature of their research, embracing subjectivity, 
employing an ontological lens, recognizing power both in practice and research 
and acknowledging the constructed nature of knowledge (Allender & Allender, 
2008; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2004; Pinnegar, 1998; Pinnegar & Hamilton, 2007; 
Wilcox, Watson & Paterson, 2004). However, the frequent acceptance of an 
unproblematic access to, and privileging of experience opened up S-S to 
accusations of implicit realism and essentialism. The range of data collection 
methods were also appropriate to S-S (Samaras, 2011).  The recursive nature of 
S-S, AR and Autoethnography, where it was recognized that research questions, 
research focus, hypotheses and interpretation do not remain fixed but shift during 
the research process also resonated with my experience of practitioner self-
research.  
 
4.4.2 Justification of the Inclusion of Autoethnography 
 
Autoethnography provided ontological and epistemological underpinning to 
talking and writing about the self.  Autoethnographic researchers’ desire to write 
themselves into their work both to hold themselves to account and as a 
performative act made it an appropriate method to undertake research that 
aimed both to present knowledge and undertake an experiment in identity work 
(Charmaz & Mitchell, 1997). This was evident in autoethnography resistance to 
grand narratives that privileged method over subject and perpetuated myths of 
objectivity and the decontextualized subject (Denzin, 1992, 2006).    
Autoethnography was therefore an appropriate method to explore EPs both as 
the object of knowledge and as the subject who knows. Autothnography also 
provided a method to investigate my professional identity36 in the discursive 
formation in which it was produced (Brandes, 1982). This made autoethnography 
particularly applicable to the first cycle of the research where I wrote a reflective 
                                                 
 
36
 The use of professional identity rather than the more autoethnographic reference to self  was intentional 
and intended to signal a complex and contingent concept of self.     
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account of the MWM. Autoethnography also aimed to appropriate the 
researcher’s embodiment as a tool for research to examine their professional self 
as other (Spry, 2001). This was highly relevant as it was the discomfort with my 
practice that helped to formulate the research questions.   
 
However, the thesis did not have the exclusive focus on the researcher nor have 
I included any autobiography. This was both strategic and practical.  I felt 
uncomfortable with the narcissistic flavour of a lot of autoethnographic writing 
and chose to distance myself from it. In addition, given the requirements of an 
Educational Doctorate and my desire to produce a particular type of scholarship 
it would have been very hard to remain within the word count and provide 
anything but very thin biographical information.  Finally, I have to be open to the 
possibility that, following Foucault (1997) “I am no doubt not the only one who 
writes in order to have no face” (Ibid, page 17). I also found solace for my 
contingent engagement with autoethnography in Derrida’s (1995) argument that 
autobiography, rather than providing a straightforward root to truth was a 
performance and performative discipline where the author strategically played 
with masks to manage the presentation of truth. 
 
4.5 Cycles of Research 
 
The cycles of research are illustrated in figure 3 below.  The figure showed that 
the first cycle of research involved the meeting with M and then the detailed write 
up of the encounter. While reflecting on this account it became evident that it 
would be necessary to examine ethical codes that were intended to inform my 
practice. The second cycle was, therefore, a critical review of the Health 
Professional Councils Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics (HPC-
SCPE).   If I was going to locate my practice in relation to the wider practice of 
EPs it was necessary to triangulate my practice with peers and to examine how a 
community of EPs talked about their ethical practice. The third cycle, therefore, 
involved establishing a focus group to discuss my account of the meeting with M 
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and their views on ethical practice. It became evident during the analysis of 
results that there were issues and ‘statements’ common to all three cycles of 
research.  A forth cycle was added in which the results from the first and third 
cycles were synthesised. In each of the four cycles of research the analysis will 
not be exhaustive but rather will be specific to the research questions. 
 































The bi-directional arrows indicated that rather than being linear and 
straightforwardly sequential the phases of research have been circular and 
interactive.  Creswell (1998) referred to the cyclical oscillating between being 
First Cycle: 












Synthesis of   
themes from the 
first three stages 
of research 
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immersed in data, reading literature, interpretation and structuring a narrative as 
the “data analysis spiral” (Ibid, page 143). 
 




Self-study can take many forms (Loughran et al 2004). Cochran-Smith and Lytle 
(1993) described S-S as a systematic and intentional enquiry that located 
practitioners as generators of knowledge about their professions. Self-Study was 
very flexible and Loughran (2004) explained that “there is no one way, or correct 
way, of doing self-study. Rather, “how a self-study might be done depends on 
what is sought to be better understood” (Ibid, page 15). A wide range of methods 
have been applied in S-S including: autobiographical, autoethnography, personal 
history, case work, narrative and memory work (LaBoskey, 2004; Lighthall, 2004, 
Loughran, et al., 2004). This flexibility and range of methods has made S-S very 
difficult to define. Attempts had been made to define self-study by the role of the 
self in the study, practice and purpose. These are outlined below: 
 
• Self-Study Defined by Role: Hamilton (1998) defined self-study as “the 
study of one’s self, one’s actions, one’s ideas, as well as the ‘not self’… 
Self-study also involves a thoughtful look at texts read, experiences had, 
people known, and ideas considered” (Ibid, page 236).  
 
• Self-Study Defined by Situated Practice: Pinnegar (1998) defined S-S 
as “a methodology for studying professional practice settings” (Ibid, page 
33).  Samaras (2002) said that “I use the words Self-Study to mean critical 
examination of one’s actions and the context of those actions in order to 
achieve a more conscious mode of professional activity, in contrast to 
action based on habit, tradition, or impulse” (Ibid p. xiii). 
 
• Self-Study Defined by Purpose: Kosnik et al (2006) identified three 
purposes for practicing S-S: 1) personal renewal, 2) professional renewal, 
and 3) program renewal. LaBoskey’s (2004) writing emphasises the 
important moral, ethical, and political purposes of S-S. It was perhaps this 
aim to confront these issues that makes S-S an appropriate methodology 
to research ethical practice.   
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4.6.2 Characteristics of self study  
 
An alternative way to approach S-S was to ask “what it looks like?” Proponents of 
S-S characterized S-S approaches as including openness, collaboration and 
reframing (Samaras & Freese, 2009). The openness related to openness to 
ideas from others. It was through a collaborative dialogue with others that 
reframing both of practice and problems was made possible.  Self-study could 
therefore be viewed as a dialogueic approach to research (Loughran & 
Northfield, 1998). In addition, the literature on S-S tended to emphasize the role 
of critical friends and trusted colleagues (e.g. LaBoskey, 2004; Loughran, 2004, 
McNiff & Whitehead 2006). This dialogueic approach was, argued to be, required 
to make S-S valid. The dialogueic approach also made what could have been a 
personal, private and individualist process a public and social one.  The 
dialogueic nature of S-S recognized that it was not possible to separate the ‘self’ 
(researcher) from the research process or the practice which they are 
researching (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2004).  
 
This approach accepts the consequence that the knowledge generated was 
contingent. In S-S researchers took a reflective stance to better empathize with 
participants and to develop moral and pedagogical implications of their actions 
(e.g. Loughran et al., 2004, Hamiliton et al., 1998). This included becoming 
aware of what it felt like to be an object of knowledge. Loughran et al. (2004) 
further called for a blurring of the private and professional because who we were 
as people shaped and bled into who we were as practitioners. This perspective 
has significant overlap with Allan’s (1999) call for professionals to undertake 
ethical work on themselves and also Frosh and Baraitser’s (2008) call to reflect 
back the research gaze onto the researcher. It also resonated with Eagleton’s 
(2009) description of ethics as “the continual questioning from below any attempt 




4.6.3 Criticism of Self-Study 
 
There has been extensive criticism of S-S not least of which was whether it was 
a valid form of research (Northfield, 1996). There have also been criticisms about 
the validity of the findings of S-S (e.g. Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Feldman, 
2003). This perhaps mirrored the general debate in quantitative research about 
efficacy of qualitative research (e.g., Morse et al., 2002; Sandelowski & Barrow, 
2001). Rather than answering the question, “what made S-S valid?” Bullough & 
Pinnegar (2001) preferred to ask, “What made self study worth reading?” Other 
S-S researchers emphasised qualities within their research such as believability, 
credibility, consensus and coherence (e.g. Eisner, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested that terms such as ‘quality’, ‘rigor’ and 
‘trustworthiness’ were perhaps more appropriate in qualitative research. 
Northfield (Ibid, 1996, pages 6-9) suggested that in assessing the quality of S-S 
the following statements could be useful37: 
• “Self-Study is associated with serious “reframing of situations” 
• “Self-Study must be a collaborative activity” 
• “The outcomes of Self-Study are effective if they promote dialogue” 
• “The uses for Self-Study are meaningful for the person involved” 
• “Commitment to action”  
 
Finally, S-S had been criticized for diminishing the role of theory (Clough 2000). 
However, S-S that recognized that the self was socially constructed and a site for 
the production of knowledge could identify how theory was produced in practice 




Chase (2005) stated that in Autoethnography researchers “turn the analytic lens 
on themselves and their interactions with others” so as to “write, interpret, and/or 
                                                 
37
 Northfield (1996) did not present his questions as a list but rather as either heading  of paragraphs or 
within paragraphs.  
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perform their own narratives about culturally significant experiences” (Ibid, page 
660).  Ellis and Bochner (2000) wrote that:  
 
“Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre of writing and research that 
displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. 
Back and forth autoethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle 
lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal 
experience; then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by 
and may move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations” (Ibid,  page 
739) 
 
It was this turning the research gaze back onto Educational Psychology and 
myself that drew me to autoethnography as a possible method.  
Autoethnography has been used to study a wide range of issues and 
experiences (e.g., Chang, 2007; Ellis, 2009). Autoethnography can be 
understood as a critical engagement with a socially constructed self so as to 
reflexively critique the situatedness of the self (Hickey & Austin, 2007; Reed-
Danahay, 1997).    Autoethnographical research was typically written in first 
person,   contained contextual details, dialogue, emotion, and self-consciousness 
and an awareness of the historical, social structural and cultural discourses that 
shape personal accounts (Ellis, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000, 2003; Pratt, 1992).  
 
Autoethnography was self-focused with the researcher at the centre as both 
subject (the researcher) and object (the researched) of research which 
differentiated it from straightforward Ethnography (Chang, 2008). 
Autoethnography made connections between the micro (self) and the macro 
(cultural/contexts). The intension was to resist and contest preconceived views in 
those contexts (Jones, 2005).   Autoethnography was characterized by an 
autobiographical style of writing where there was a tension between presenting 
the self in writing while attempting to hold the self as other (Bullough & Pinnegar, 
2001; Ellis, 2004).   This tension was frequently used as a resource.  Ellis and 
Bochner (2000) argued that autoethnographers differed on the emphasis they 
placed in either the cultural (ethno) or self (auto) in their writing (graphy). 
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However, Anderson (2006) made a distinction between autoethnographers that 
had evocative (evoked an emotional response) or analytical (systemically 
examined an issue) aims. However, these were not mutually exclusive. Whether 
the method was evocative or analytical, the desire was always to make a 
difference or to be transformative (Denzin, 2006; Renner, 2001).  This thesis 
tended towards the more analytic autoethnography of Anderson (2006), not 
because of any criticism of the evocative method but more a recognition of the 
limitation of my writing style and personal preference.  
 
The process of auto ethnography involved the utilization of surprises. Beginning 
with the surprising or  intriguing the aim was  to identify of the difference between 
what I do know and what I need to know so as to understand and/or explain what 
happened (Agar, 2006; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992) This was  abduction.  Whereas 
induction worked from the precondition to the consequences abduction began 
with the consequences and worked backwards towards the precondition (post 
hoc ergo propter hoc38).  Abduction was therefore not a single event but rather a 
form of recursion.  
 
Autoethnographers tended to resist strict guidelines on the correct way to do 
research (Ellis 2001, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000). This could lead to confusion 
and blurring of methodological boundaries between autoethnography and other 
forms of participant self research.  This lack of guidelines extended to information 
on data analysis.  However, Ellis (2004) suggested either thematic or structural 
analysis of texts would be appropriate.    I hoped that providing details on the 






                                                 
38
 “after this, therefore because of this” 
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4.7.1 Criticism of Autoethnographic Approaches 
 
Autoethnographic accounts frequently state their aim to reveal or show personal 
experiences. However, Vance (1986) argued that writing about the self by the 
self was problematic because: 
“The autobiographical undertaken is constituted, by two distinct fictions of 
preferentiality, that of an “I” of the “present” whose identity derives from 
circumstances alleged to prevail ‘now’ during this actual moment of writing and 
the ‘I-as-object’ manifested in the historical statements cast ‘then’ in the network 
of past tenses where the first and third person are collapsed into one” (Ibid, page 
1). 
 
This was linked to a specific game of truth because the truth of the text was 
dependant on the reader investing in the fiction of the convergences of the “I” of 
the present and the “I” as object. Gannon (2006), from a post-structuralist 
perspective, had been highly critical of unproblematic approaches to representing 
the self in writing about the self, arguing that the self: 
 
“… both is fiction and not fiction; is unified and transcendent and fragmented and 
always in the process of being constituted, can be spoken of in realist ways and 
cannot; its voice can be claimed as authentic and there is no guarantee of 
authenticity” (Ibid, page 474). 
 
Accepting the post-structuralist argument that self was fractured and fragmented 
and that knowledge about the self was contingent, incomplete, partial and plural 
had implications about the possibility about writing about the self which has 
already been extensively discussed earlier.  
  
Harré (1989) further problematized the use of “I” to refer to an inner subject by 
arguing that this myth of the self is undermined by two mistakes. (1) It treated all 
things referred to as mental as occurring in some inner substance and (2) this 
inner substances was what was being referred to by the use of “I”.  In addition, 
Harré (1989) argued that the use of “I” had been appropriated within Judaeo-
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Christian cultures to enable the performance of moral acts. This was because “I” 
enabled the actor to claim responsibility for an act and their choices.   
 
It was important also to recognize the power inherent in autoethnographic 
research. For example, my attempts to examine my lived experience produced 
that experience as an object of knowledge. This in turn shaped my 
subjectification because power regulated and created through an “affirmation of 
the self” (Foucault, 1979). It was through a reflexive gaze that normalised, 
classified and tested through micro judgments that the subject comes to be 
(Foucault, 1979).   
 
Delamont (2007) identified six problems with autoethnography, outlined and 
responded to below:  
(1) Autoethnographers’ desire to make the familiar unfamiliar could be highly 
problematic from an insider position. While recognizing that this was 
methodologically difficult, the thesis acknowledged that it was the relation with 
the Other (Client) that made my practice unfamiliar.   
 
(2) Autoethnography was argued to be almost impossible to publish ethically as it 
was difficult to maintain anonymity of the research participants as their 
connection to the researcher meant that they could be identified.  I have 
attempted to make the participants anonymous, made them aware that the 
research will be published and provided the opportunity for them to withdraw at 
each stage of the research process39.    
 
(3) Autoethnography privileged experience over analysis. Etherington (2004) 
added that autoethnography “had been characterized as “self-indulgent, 
solipsistic and narcisstic” (Etherington, 2004, page, 141). This thesis attempted 
to balance the personal experience with an analysis of the HPC-SCPE and the 
focus group.  
 
(4) Autoethnography focused on the powerful rather than on the powerless. 
Appropriating Foucault’s (2000) intention  of producing research that made 
institutional practitioners less  confident about their practice so that “certain 
phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no 
longer so unhesitatingly, performed”  (Ibid, page 234) was intended act as a 
corrective for this thesis’s focus on the EP and not the Client . 
 
                                                 
39
 For a more detailed account of the thesis’s ethics see the ethics section.  
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(5) Autoethnography abrogated the duty to collect data. This thesis balance self-
reflection with data obtained from a document review and analysis of a focus 
group transcript. 
 
(6) Researcher and practitioners are not sufficiently interesting enough to warrant 
research.  This ultimately has to be a matter of your opinion dear reader.  
 
The next section critically examined AR practice.   
 
4.8 The What of Action Research 
 
Carr and Kemmis (1986) defined AR as: 
“Action research is simply a form of self-reflective inquiry undertaken by 
participants in social situations in order to improve their own practices, their 
understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are 
carried out.” (Ibid, page 162).   
 
It was the potential of AR to be an elaboration of practice-as-inquiry that of 
particular relevance to this thesis (Schön, 1983; Whitehead, 1989). Lewin (1948), 
outlined the AR approach involving a series, or spiral of steps including planning, 
action and fact-finding.  McNiff & Whitehead (2000) suggested that there were 
three approaches to action research; interpretive, critical and living theory, each 
having a distinctive ontology and epistemology.  
 
4.8.1 Action Research (The How) 
  
This thesis was partly concerned with Whitehead’s (1993) question “How do I 
improve my practice”? McNiff & Whitehead (2005, page 29) unpacked this 
question by providing additional questions to be considered:  
• What is my concern? 
• Why am I concerned? 
• What kind of evidence do I produce to show I am concerned? 
• What can I do about it? 
• What will I do about it?  
• What kind of evidence do I produce to show that what I am doing is having an 
educational influence? 
• How do I evaluate that influence? 
• How do I ensure that any judgements I make are reasonably fair and accurate? 
• How do I modify my practice in the light of my evaluation40? 
                                                 
40
 I have abbreviated McNiff & Whitehead’s  (2005) detailed discussion and organized the questions using  
bullet points.    
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All of the above were employed to provide structure for the thesis. Action 
Research was frequently claimed to be emancipatory (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; 
Parker, 2002; McNiff & Whitehead, 2005.)   These authors argue that AR 
revealed and challenged ideologies, raised consciousness and brought about 
social change.  This sidesteps the rather thorny philosophical question as to 
whether it was possible to be free or even if it was possible to exist outside of a 
regime of power (Foucault, 1986c). For many in the AR tradition, AR was 
inherently collaborative (Kagan, Burton & Siddiquee, 2009). This was problematic 
because I was a single researcher.  However, McNiff & Whitehead (2006) 
accepted that AR could be carried out by a single researcher.  
 
4.8.2 Action and Commitment 
 
The inclusion of AR in the methodology section of a thesis was not straight 
forward.  Carr (2006) also reminded us that AR during the 1940s and 50s 
developed in relation to the positivist epistemology of the time with the highly 
modernist aims of social action and social change.  Carr (2006) argued that AR 
continued to justify the knowledge it generated by constituting its research 
subject in relation to a particular theory of action.  This theory emphasized the 
personal and contextualized nature of knowledge (Carr 2006, page 6). Action 
Research could also be seen as part of the professionalization of educationalists 
and the need to find methods appropriate to educational practitioners (Carr, 
2006). This potentially, linked AR to the performance and standards agenda.  In 
the post 1960s revival of AR, the nature of action changed from 
functional/instrumental techniques or skills to ethically informed action (Carr, 
2006; Elliott, 1991). It was this revived view of AR that had synergy with the aim 
to critically examine Educational Psychology as ethical practice.  Carr & Kemmis 
(2009) held that education, and I would add by association Educational 
Psychology, was “indissoluble” from ideas about the “good society” (Ibid, page 
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80). This made education deeply ethical.  Their implication was that for 
practitioners this blurred the boundaries between the personal, professional and 
political and that all forms of AR were therefore simultaneously personal, 
professional and political.  Personal and professional because AR aimed to 
achieve self-transformation and professional development, and political because 
the location of research was always political.   
 
Carr & Kemmis (2009) argued for a Critical AR. The word ‘critical’ was used to 
emphasis the inclusion power and the need for AR to be emancipatory.  In 
addition, it was held that there could not be a single universally accepted version 
of critical practice and that AR had to remain open to debate and contestation.  
Carr and Kemmis (2009) wanted this debate to be non-political.  This meant a 
debate without a fixed outcome. However, Carr & Kemmis (2009) also asked for 
the debate to be based on “rational discourse” and be democratic where 
everyone participates on equal terms (Ibid, page 78). This was obviously 
privileging a humanistic and liberal approach to dialogue. Ironically, Carr (2006) 
had already reminded us that there was no neutral viewpoint.   
 
Altrichter, et al. (2008, pages 5-6) outlined six distinguishing features of AR that I 
have adapted and considered below: 
1. AR was   performed by individuals who were directly concerned with the 
social situation that is being researched.  This made AR applicable to S-S 
or participant observation, in particular the study of educational 
psychology by an EP.  
2. AR originated from practical questions arising from everyday work. This 
thesis was prompted in part an encounter with a pupil in a high school. 
This encounter was typical of the everyday work of EPs. 
3. AR must be compatible with the values of the organization and working 
practices of the researcher. The formation of AR as enquiry in practice 
made it compatible with undertaking research while working. 
4. AR was characterized by a continuing effort to closely interlink, relate and 
confront action and reflection, to reflect upon one’s conscious and 
unconscious actions in order to develop those actions, and to act 
reflectively in order to develop one’s knowledge. This is highly relevant to 
the aim of developing my praxis as an EP.  
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5. AR was flexible. The flexibility of action research was a highly attractive 
feature because it enabled the methods to be adapted to the complexity 
involved in studying naturalistic practice.   
 
Action research required both action and commitment (Daloz, et al., 1996; 
Parker, 2002; Sallis & Jones, 2002; Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). Carr (2004b) 
argued that AR approaches that privileged action over theory fell into the same 
dualistic trap that privileged theory over action which assumed that action 
occurred in the body and theory in the mind.  However, post-structural theory has 
problematized the idea of a decentered and detached subject possessing 
personal knowledge independent of the history and culture that constructed that 
subject (Foucault, 2003). The role of knowledge was to engender compliance 
and useful and docile bodies. The role of practitioners was to manage their 
compliance in either resistance to or in cooperation with the regimes of 
knowledge (Carr, 2004b; Foucault, 2003, 1977).   The target of this disciplinary 
power was the thoughts, emotions, desires, dreams, and actions of subjects. 
 
Action research also involved making a commitment to personal and research 
subjects’ goals (Daloz, et al., 1996; Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). The commitment 
to research subjects involved mutual both trust and respect (Whitehead & McNiff, 
2006).  This included a commitment to the research subject’s political and 
emancipatory goals (Carr and Kemmis, 2009).   
 
4.9 Action Research, Autoethnography and Self-Study: 
This section argued that there were significant overlaps between AR, 
autoethnography and S-S that enable them to be applied together.  For example, 
all three methodologies were: 
1. Interested in research phenomena occurring in real time and are therefore 
methods of naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1986).   
2. Qualitative research methods that have aligned themselves, in varying 
degrees to the post-structuralist project. 
3. Emphasized emancipation or empowerment of participants as a goal for 
research. 
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4. Appropriate for research focused on personal or professional 
development. 
5. Desired to have reflexivity at their core. 
 
There were also however considerable differences that could cause tensions. For 
example, S-S evolved out of educational research focusing on teachers 
developing their practice (e.g. Loughran et al., 2004, Hamiliton et al., 1998). 
Autoethnography has roots in sociology and social anthropology (Ellis, 2009). 
Action research was primarily concerned with action, whereas autoethnography 
and S-S were concerned with professional/individual development and 
understanding. All three methods also strove to be ethical both in the approaches 
they used and the aims they hoped to achieve. The next section of the 
methodology reviewed the ethics of this thesis. 
 
4.10 Ethics of Research 
 
This section of the thesis delineated the general ethical issues relevant to the 
research design and the specific ethical issues relevant to the research methods.  
 
“Language can never contain a whole person, so every act of writing a person’s 
life is inevitably a violation,” (Josselson, 1996, p. 62). 
 
The above quote was a succinct description of my approach to the ethics of 
research. This was the feeling that research was inherently violent despite the 
intensions of the researcher to do good, or be emancipatatory (Redwood, 2008). 
The reference to violence was provocative and recognized that there are different 
types and levels of violence.  Violence in research can be very direct, such as, in 
the Nazi regime but can also be symbolic.  Levinas (1981) suggested that the 
process by which the Other became understandable required an act of 
ontological violence because to understand the Other, the Other must be 
categorized, abstracted and made thematic through reason. The project to know 
the Other was part of the process of constructing the self where the other was 
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made instrumental by being the means to develop self knowledge (Levinas 
1981).  It was difficult to imagine research that did not impose meaning, 
regularities, coherence or order in the form of codes, categories, discourses or 
themes. Research by its nature seems to find ambiguity problematic.  Self-
research did not remove the potential of ontological violence. In self-research the 
researcher was still being asked to give an account of themselves. Butler (2005) 
argued that giving an account of oneself required a justifying, defensive or 
confessional practice. Yet, here I am involved in the research process.   
 
There was no way out of the dilemma that absolved conscience nor was there a 
single solution.  Rather, the dilemma was a call to accept responsibility for my 
judgements. This included acknowledging which themes and meaning I had 
privileged and attempting to postpone closure and remain open to ambiguity.  
 
As a researcher I was still required to make judgements. Ellis (2001, 2007) 
implied that good ethical judgment could develop from experience which was 
both optimistic and problematic. The assertion was optimistic because it argued 
that I have the potential to develop my ethical practice. However, the assertion 
did not hold out much hope for the new researcher. It also left open the question 
of whether relational ethics could be taught or just acquired through experience. 
In addition, Kant (1956) claimed that general ethical principles could not be 
developed or inferred from experience or specific case example. However, 
Badiou (2001, page 28) argued that there was no overarching ethics but just the 
“ethics of" (e.g. “of politics, of love, of science, of art”).   
 
Perhaps Ellis’s (2007) delineation of relation ethics could be interpreted as a call 
to the new researcher to adopt humility and to perceive themselves to be on a 
journey where they are a novice.  This call to humility might help to moderate 
some of the excesses of research by emphasizing responsibility and caution. 
Both Ellis (2007) and Guillemin & Gillam (2004) were echoing Foucault’s (1990) 
examination of the Greek word “askesis” where the individual was called to have 
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an ethical relation with themselves (involving practical training or exercises) so 
that they can take possession of themselves (have agency) (Foucault 1886, page 
9). 
 
Guillemin & Gillam (2004) identified two aspects of ethics relevant to this thesis. 
The first was “procedural ethics”. This was the type of ethics required by ethics 
committees and focused on issues of informed consent, confidentiality, deception 
and disclosure, etc.  Emanuel, Wendler & Grady (2000), from a procedural 
perspective suggested seven requirements to ensure ethical research: 
 
1. The research must enhance knowledge; 
2. The research must be methodologically rigorous; 
3. The benefits from doing the research must exceed the risk/harm; 
4. The research must be independently reviewed; 
5. Respect for participants (respect for privacy, opportunities to withdraw, 
monitoring of wellbeing); 
6. The subjects should be selected fairly (not because they are convenient or 
vulnerable; 
7. There must be informed consent. 
 
These requirements demanded that the researcher had the necessary skills and 
expertise to undertake research. The above list also suggested ethics had to be 
concerned with means, ends and the protection of clients. However, it would be 
possible to meet all of the above criteria and the research to be unethical. This 
was because the criteria are innocent of power and did not ask “who 
benefited?”41 Researchers from a qualitative perspective, particularly those from 
a feminist perspective, would add the need for the research to be emancipating 
for it to be ethical (e.g. Taylor, 2002; Willig, 2001). However, emancipation could 
also be problematic if it was something that was given by an 
institutional/professional researcher rather than taken by the oppressed 
individual.  
                                                 
41
 For example, research focused on the social and emotional development of children of ‘working 
mothers’ might meet all of the above criteria. However, it did not acknowledge that pointing the 
research gaze at women could be highly political and that the research question could be 
ideologically informed. 
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The second was “ethics in practice” which was concerned with the researcher’s 
responses to the unpredictable and multiple ethical moments that occurred while 
in the field (Ibid, page 262). For example, what if a colleague discloses 
confidential information about themselves or another EP?  In practice these 
decisions were made in ambiguous, messy, uncertain and difficult situations. The 
ethics of practice was therefore concerned with issues about micro obligations 
and duties between the researcher and the researched which tended not to be 
discussed in procedural ethics. 
 
Ellis (2007) suggested that relational ethics could be usefully appropriated for 
research because relational ethics was concerned with the intersubjective 
processes between the researcher and the researched and the researcher and 
the communities in which the research occurred (Ellis, 2007). Relational ethics 
constantly called the researcher to ask “what should I do now?” rather than the 
statement “this is what you should do now” (Ellis, 2007, page 4). Here, Ellis 
(2007) was suggesting that the call to be ethical was derived from the relational 
context rather than being imposed from outside that context.  The ethical 
question was born out of the specific ethical moment, for example, by asking 
“how do I respond to what my colleague has disclosed?” rather than 
remembering procedural ethical guidelines which would be a secondary 
consideration.   
 
Arguing for a microethical approach was not an argument against procedural 
ethical guidelines but rather to suggest that they had limitations (Guillemin & 
Gillam, 2004). Procedural ethics, for example aimed to protect research 
participants from abuse and provide a basic checklist of the possible risks 
inherent in research practices (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, page 267). However, 
there could still a gap between the macro-ethical approach of procedural ethics 
and the micro-ethical moments that occurred in practice. The researcher 
therefore had to be careful that the ethical guidelines did not turn the face of the 
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other into a mask where the other was merely another to-whom-I-am obligated 
(Wolcher, 2003). 
 
A second tension between procedural ethics and ethical-in-practice arose from 
the assumptions in procedural ethics. Procedural ethics provided general and 
abstract principles and assumed that research was undertaken on strangers 
whereas in this thesis the research subjects included friends/colleagues and 
myself.  I therefore had to be more aware of the particular ethic issues of 
disclosure, shared relationships and disengagement given their privileged access 
and existing relationships (Robert & Labaree, 2002; Taylor, 2011). 
 
Parker (2002) argued that the reflexive nature of psychology produced a 
moral/political stance and made psychology a moral science. Parker (2002) 
explained that psychology became political in action. This occurred while the 
psychologist negotiated boundaries, for example, the boundaries between ethical 
and unethical research, between treating participants as subjects or objects, 
between objective and subjective perspectives and between personal reactivity 
and procedural reactivity. The terms personal and procedural reactivity were 
attempts to capture the research experience to control and understand the 
research within demands of the situation that limits their choices. For example, 
the need to obtain informed consent while worrying about giving the game (true 
nature of the research) away. Parker (2002) argued that discussing and insisting 
on the inclusion of informed consent, debriefing and minimising are strategic 
devices to enable the research to enhance personal reactivity at the expense of 
the research subject or topic.  
 
This section argued that research had the potential to be violent which in turn 
emphasized the need for it to be ethical. Both procedural and relational ethics 
were critically examined. It was argued that ethical research needed to be 
mindful of both its procedural and relational aspects.   The next section examined 
the ethical consideration specific to focus groups. 
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4.10.1 Ethical Considerations Specific to Focus Group 
 
All the members of the FG were given a letter that explained the nature of the 
research and how the data would be used (see appendix 12). The participants 
were then informed that they did not have to take part and that they could 
withdraw at any point. This opportunistic group contained 1 Principal EP, 3 
Senior Management Team members and 5 mainscale EPs.  Three of the 
mainscale EPs were male.  All the other EPs were female. I was mindful of the 
impact of professional hierarchies in focus groups and the potential for individual 
to be silenced (Clavering & McLaughlin, 2007; Kitzinger, 1995). I strived to 
mitigate this difficulty by attempting to include voices that were being resisted. 
Having members all belonging to the same profession should have given the FG 
some homogeneity. However issues of gender, ethnicity, age, social class, 
hierarchical position, prior experience would all have been present.  
 
Following Kitzinger (1995), the setting of the FG was relaxed and the participants 
sat in a circle.  I introduced the purpose and aim of the FG and that it was hoped 
that the participants would talk to each other as well as to me.  My role during the 
discussion was to be both a structured eavesdropper and facilitator of 
discussions (Kitzinger, 1995, page). This included supporting the FG in 
discussing inconstancies, differences and elucidating points and clarifying issues.   
The size of the FG was within the range that was considered conducive to 
dialogue and reflection (Morgan, 1997; Tang & Davis, 1995).   
 
The researcher had a high degree of control over the process because I chaired 
and regulated the discussions (McNiff, 1999). This could have enabled me to 
impose my meanings on the participants as I privileged some responses and not 
others (Wilkinson, 1998). In addition, I had total control over the analysis of the 
data and presentation of the results.  I attempted to mitigate this asymmetry by 
sharing the transcripts with the participants, feeding back my interpretations and 
providing opportunities for the participants to make comments and provide 
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feedback. The next section delineated and critically examined the methods of 
data collection. 
 
4.11 Data Collection 
 
The following methods were used to collect data: 
 
• Document analysis  
• Participant (self)observation including MWM (see appendix 2 
• In-depth discussions with colleagues  
• Educational Psychology Service Focus group ( see appendix 4 for 
transcript of FG meting) 
• Keeping a research diary 
• Collecting relevant EPS documents, policies and guidance 
 
While implementing the above data collection methods I was aware that the 
subject matter was sensitive (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). The research 
was sensitive because the research questions mattered at a personal level to the 
participants and explored emotionally evocative issues such as confidentiality 
and professional practice.  This required close attention to the ethical 
consideration discussed in the Ethics of Research section above and the Ethical 
considerations specific to Focus Group below. The data collection methods were 
further described below. 
 
4.11.1 Document Analysis 
 
This was a continuous activity and included an analysis of the HPC-SCPE, the 
Educational Psychology Services documents that made references to ethics and 
documents that aimed to hold EPs to account. The relationships between MWM 
and FG and the HPC-SCPE were not understood as causal linear relations 
where one was said to be caused by the other; this would be too crude as it was 
recognized that there would always be a gap between professional codes and 
professional actions. In fact, all of the participants of the FG stated that they were 
aware of the HPC-SCPE but had not read it in detail and could not quote it.  
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Rather, the relations were of resemblance, analogy or equivalence (Foucault, 
1989). The HPC-SCPE was therefore understood as a codification of statements 
presented in the discursive formation in which EPs practice.    
 
4.11.2 Participant Self-observation 
 
This was archived through writing an account of and reflecting on my practice 
with a client.  The account of the MWM was written within 24 hours of my 
meeting with M in the first person (see appendix 2).  I also made notes reflecting 
on my discussions with colleagues.  
 
4.11.3 In-depth Discussion with Colleagues 
 
This involved an ongoing email conversation about the issues involved in the 
research with one colleague and several discussions about aspects of the 
research with two other colleagues.  These discussions were very open-ended.  
This form of colleague interaction was a core feature of autoethnographic 
research. These discussions were not included directly in the analysis of results.  
 
4.11.4 Focus Group 
 
A focus group42 was held with 9 EPs members of the EPS.  The relational nature 
of the FG method resonated with the ontology and epistemology position of the 
research. Rather than the researcher just asking questions and the participants 
responding, the participants could take the lead, share stories, ask questions and 
provide feedback on each Others’ responses (Bloor, et al., 2001; Kitzinger, 
1995). The discussion was recorded and transcribed. The FG was therefore 
“guided but informal conversation” (Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003, page 493). The 
                                                 
42
 I have positioned focus groups as a method rather than a methodology. However given its ambivalent 
methodological role I have provided an extensive review.  
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focus group was structured both by providing a vignette and then open ended 
questions and discussion.    
 
Discussions were initiated by asking the FG to read my encounter with M.  
Subsequent discussion was structured around seven questions, derived from the 
literature review, to introduce topics: 
1. What ethical issues, if any, were raised in the account of the meeting with 
M? 
2. Do you think about ethics in your everyday practice? 
3. Can you say what ethics means to you in your everyday practice? 
4. What sort of situations do you encounter in your everyday practice that 
brings ethics to the forefront? 
5. What has influenced your current approach to ethical practice? 
6. What barriers do you experience to ethical practice? 
7. Has your approach to ethical practice changed over time? 
 
The aim of the questions and vignette were to encourage the participants to 
explore the issues that were important to them in their own language (Kitzinger, 
1995). Questions two to seven were perhaps more formal than was usually 
suggested by proponents of qualitative FG research (Stroh, 2000). However, it 
was evident during the discussion that the questions were treated as topics 
rather than strict questions.   The questions aimed not to establish the truth but to 
provide data that could then be analyzed. The first question had two broad 
functions. The first was to triangulate my reflections on the meeting with M. The 
second function was to act as vignette to facilitate a more general discussion on 
ethical practice. Questions two and three were attempting to establish the 
relevance of ethics in the EPs’ everyday practice. Questions four and five were 
designed to explore the situations that the EPs identified as ethically problematic 
and how they responded to them. The sixth and seventh questions were 
intended to explore how contexts shaped, facilitated and acted as a barrier to 
ethical practice.  It was hoped that by asking questions about their everyday 
practice that the EPs would be more responsive (Ball, 1991). In addition, asking 
about specific situations was intended to facilitate talk about specific practice 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).  
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The FG discussion was recorded and lasted about an hour. The FG discussion 
took about ten hours to transcribe verbatim using a simplified version of Gee’s 
(1986) method.  
 
4.11.5 Research Diary 
 
This was my personal account of the research. It included notes, musing, and 
reflections and hypothesis. This was not a factual account rather it was the 
beginning of the interpretation, construction and analysis (Glesne & Peshkin, 
1992; Maxwell, 2005). Keeping a diary was analogous to a hypomenemata, 
which Foucault (1991) described as “books of life” (Ibid, page 364). This 
recognized that keeping a diary was both a record and technique of self-
formation.  
 
4.12 A Foucauldian Approach to Data Analysis 
 
This section of the thesis provided a description and critical examination of 
Foucault use of the following terms: 
• Discourse 




This thesis adapted a Foucauldian approach (including aspects of archeology 
and genealogy) to discourse analysis, which meant remaining open to 
undecidability, resisting closure derived from systematization and   avoiding 
essentialism (Harwood, 2000).  Foucault’s (1997) concept of discourse included 
not only speaking about a text, an individual utterance or linguistic performance 
but also discursive formations or disciplines such as medicine, science psychiatry 
or history.  This also included the practices and procedures through which social 
and historical concepts such as delinquency, sexuality or madness are formed 
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and governed.  Foucault (1997) admitted that approaches to discourse had 
lacked clarity but suggested that his approach to discourse was “a discourse 
about discourse” (Ibid, page 205). Hall (1997, page 72) stated that this was 
“discourse as a system of representation”. This included the analysis of the rules 
and practices that regulated and produced what was said and done. This blurred 
the distinction between acts and talk and acknowledged that talk could do work. 
These rules and practices did not exist outside or apart from of the episteme43 in 
which they operated, rather they were historically contingent.  This relational 
construction of discourse challenged the criticism that discourse analysis was 
reificationistic and anthropomorphist (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009).  
 
Foucauldian approaches differed from other forms of discourse analysis because 
the focus was not on moves or strategy44 to achieve a social or personal goal. 
Rather discourses were perceived to be performative and disciplinary tools 
(Willig, 2003). Adopting a Foucauldian approach also implied a problematizing 
engagement with truth that recognized the rhetorical use of truth claims (Edwards 
& Nicoll 2001). The meaning generated from the data analysis would therefore 
always be contingent on and produced from a particular epistemological position 
(Wetherell, 2001).  
 
Unlike purely linguistic approaches Foucault (1997) was interested in how 
meaning, practices and knowledge were produced through discourse rather than 
language (Hall, 1997). Foucault was not implying that nothing existed outside 
discourse rather that nothing had meaning outside discourse (Foucault, 1972). 
The issue was not whether objects existed but how do they come to exist and 
have meaning. Therefore, discourse referred to all the statements45, the rules by 
which statements were formed and the processes by which those statements 
                                                 
43
 For some readers episteme could be an unfamiliar construct. Other terms that have 
some of the same resonances included paradigm and tradition.   
 
44
 It should be noted that  Foucault (2003) was intensely interested in power as strategy.  
45
 Statements will disused below but can be understood as authorized utterances.   
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were circulated or excluded. The thesis selectively incorporated both 
archeological and genealogical approaches to data analysis (outlined briefly 
below) by first considering archeology and then genealogy methods.  
 
Archaeology described discourses with the aim to “uncover”, “suspend”, 
“question”, “disconnect”, “define”, “interrogate”,  “break-up” and “replace”  local 
discursive unities, e.g. medicine, psychopathology, etc (Foucault, 1997, pages 15 
to 26).  Archaeology can be understood as the analysis of the 
unspoken/unwritten rules that organized, produced and distributed the 
statements (Foucault, 1997). Kendal & Wickham (1999) described archaeology 
as: 
“Archaeology helps us to explore the networks of what is said, and what can be 
seen in a set of social arrangements: in the conduct of an archaeology, one finds 
out something about the visible in “opening up” statements and something about 
the statement in “opening up visibilities” (Ibid, page 25). 
 
Archaeology thus simultaneously made apparent how statements construct and 
sustain an object/subject.  This type of analysis aimed to describe rather than 
explain the relation between statements. However, the approach to data analysis 
was not strictly archaeological because it was not the exhaustive archaeological 
reading of all texts within the archive46 (Foucault, 1997). 
 
Neither was the method strictly genealogical as it was concerned with the 
present. The aim of genealogy was to describe how events, rather than being 
inevitable, were the result of contingent historical turns. Arribas-Ayllon and 
Walkerdine (2009) added, that: “Genealogy investigates the specific effects by 
which objects are constituted in ways that are amenable to technical and 
governmental intervention” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009, page 93).  
Genealogy, was an “ontology of ourselves”, that was, an analysis of what 
enabled us to exist (to be) in the way we did (Foucault, 1988b, page 234). This 
highlighted the contingent nature of selfhood and therefore enabled us to see all 
                                                 
46
 The archive  can be understood as including  all of texts and statements relevant  to a discourse  
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the possibilities of who we might have been or have not been and could hence 
be used as a tool for freedom (Kendall & Wickham, 2003). Foucault (1979, page 
98-100), outlined four “cautionary prescriptions” when undertaking genealogical 
research, these are summarised below: 
1. Rule of immanence47: analysis should be at the level of “local centres of 
power-knowledge” (Foucault 1979, page 98). This implied that the level of 
analysis should be the EP and Client relationship. 
2. Rule of continual variations:  This was the analysis of power as it was 
disrupted rather than who possessed it (EP) or was deprived of it (Client). 
This required exploring ways in which EPs were both subjects that 
exercised power and objects of power. It also required an examination of 
how the relationship with the client called the practice of the EP into 
question. 
3. Rule of double conditioning: This was the analysis between the local 
power-knowledge level and an overall strategy.  The local power-
knowledge centre (the EP-Client relationship) was not a micro version of 
the macro state-subject relation. The EP could not simply stand for the 
state. 
4. Rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses. This rule warned against a 
“world of discourse divided between accepted and excluded discourse, or 
between dominant discourse and the dominated one” (Foucault, 1979, 
page 100). Rather one should consider that there were a multiple of 
discourses that have diverse strategies employed different depending on 
who was speaking, their position and the institutional context in which they 
are enunciated. Discourses therefore both transmit and undermine power.  
 
The analysis of data attempted to adhere to the above as an exercise in self-
imposed discipline to remain close to the genealogical method.  
 
There was no necessary contradiction between borrowing from both archeology 
and genealogy as they were mutually compatible (Foucault 2003b).   Foucault 
(1980)  explained the relation between the archeology and genealogy as: 
 
“archaeology” would be the appropriate methodology of [the] analysis of local 
discursivities, and “genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the 
descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were 
thus released would be brought into play’ (Foucault, 1980,  page  85). 
                                                 
47
 The heading of the four cautionary prescriptions were Foucault’s (1979) and can be found on 
pages 98-100.  
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Archaeology was therefore used to describe and analyze the local discursivities 
of the EP-Client relationship. The de-subjected discourses were then brought into 
play to oppose and struggle against the coercion of the discourses that 
disciplined and regulated the local EP-Client relationship.  
 
The thesis, therefore, appropriated and adopted a Foucauldian approach to 
undertake an examination of how EPs were constituted as subjects of 
knowledge, subjects acting on others and as ethical agents.  Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine (2009) stated that data in the form of personal observation, 
descriptive ethnographic accounts, field notes, policy documents, official 
publications and transcripts of focus groups are all suitable for analysis by a 
Foucauldian approach.  In addition, Foucault’s interest in subjectification made a 
Foucauldian approach highly relevant to psychological research on identity 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008).  
 
It was difficult to be precise about following a Foucauldian method because 
Foucault (1994) disliked prescription stating, “I take care not to dictate how things 
should be” and wrote provocatively to disrupt stability and certainty, so that “all 
those who speak for others or to others no longer know what to do” (Ibid, page 
288).  
 
However, there have been a number of attempts to instrumentalize and formulate 
a Foucauldian approach to discourse. Parker (2002) suggested a twenty step 
approach to analyzing data. Kendal and Wickham (2003) suggested five steps 
that focused on the relationship between rules and statements. Willig (20030 
recommended six stages to data analysis. However, Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine 
(2009) suggested a Foucauldian approach to data analysis needed to be flexible. 
Mills (2003)   also suggested that rather than following strict Foucauldian 
methods researchers should adopt five Foucauldian dispositions or attitudes 
including: 
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1. Radical skepticism: this involved suspending judgements and not 
assuming that events were true. 
2. Avoiding second order judgements (judgements about the issues that 
were not your own). 
3. Exploring contingencies not causes: this recognized that events had 
multiple causes and could have had multiple outcomes 
4. Investigating problems not subjects: this included the relations between 
subjects and institution.  
5. Suspicion about making over-generalizations.  
  
While undertaking this thesis I attempted to adhere to the sprit of the above 
disposition and attitudes. 
 
The aim of data analysis was to describe statements48. Foucault (1997) 
explained that statements were not to be understood as sentences but as a 
“function of existence” (Ibid, page 86).  They can be understood as groups of 
verbal performances or performative acts.   The analysis of statements was 
employed both in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical periods.   
Statements occurred in either single or multiple discursive formations (e.g. 
statements about normalization can be found in biology, psychology, economics, 
medicine, etc). Discursive formations can be understood as sets and statements 
as members (of that set) that define what can belong to the set and regulate that 
set.  As Butler (1997) said “One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, 
but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable” (Butler, 1997, page 5). 
 
Statements also included graphs, figures, tables, mathematical equations, 
historical artifacts, etc. Foucault (1997) was very carful to distance statements 
from “speech acts”49 and propositions which are a core unit of analysis in 
discourse analysis. The statements have an “enunciative function” and regulatory 
function. They interpellated into being, thus positioning a subject and regulating 
who can speak and what can be said about others (Kendall & Wickham 1999). 
                                                 
48
 The French word that Foucault uses is “énoncé” which has the same etymology as enunciate. Statements not only 
state they also herald or announce into being.   
49
 Although they have some similarities, speech act also perform tasks. For example, utterance such as “I pronounce 
you man and wife” and acts such as oaths can be statements because they perform work.  
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However, statements did not cause something to be said; rather they make some 
utterances more likely and regulated the degree of legitimacy that utterance had. 
Statements therefore named, classified or labelled what was seen by the 
professional. Statements also included the practices that enabled both the 
professional and the subject they were speaking about to be seen while 
warranting those perceptions (Foucault, 1997). Statements enable the formation 
of both professionals and others as ambiguous doubles.  They were objects that 
were known and subjects that knew (Foucault, 2001). Statements also had the 
key function to articulate the relations of same and difference. This enabled 
classification and labelling which formulated how an individual or group became 
known as the problem (Foucault, 1997). Categorization enabled subjects to be 
allotted to disciplinary spaces and made subject to subjugating discourse and 
practices. The relational space between professional and client was therefore 
demarcated by procedures that established emotional distance, objectivity, and 
authority (Mellow, 2005; Paternelj-Taylor, 2002).  
 
The analysis of statements was undertaken without reference to a thinking 
subject (“cogito”) who was revealed; rather it was situated at the level of “it is 
said” (Foucault 1997, page 122). This was not the same as “communal opinion” 
or echolalia of a universal discourse (Ibid, page 122). Rather, statements should 
be analyzed in relation to the “totality of things said” (the discursive formation) so 
as to identify regularities and transformations (Foucault, 1997, page 122). Finally, 
statements should be described with reference to their fragmented and 
incomplete nature.  
 
The task was therefore to describe how statements functioned to establish a 
discursive framework that enabled a particular and privileged reading of the 
subject and the practices that flowed from and perpetuated that reading 
(Graham, 2005). The analysis was therefore always “…interpretive, always 
contingent, always a version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological 
or ethical standpoint” (Wetherell, 2001, 384). 
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The next section undertook a further critical examination of Foucauldian 
approaches to discourse analysis.  
 
4.13 Criticism of Foucauldian Approaches 
 
Given the ambiguity associated with a Foucauldian approach it could be asked 
why more established methods of discourse analysis were not employed. I 
considered Conversational Analysis (CA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
Discourse Psychology (DP) and Narrative Inquiry (NI) as alternatives because 
they have all been employed in identity research.   
 
Discursive Psychology when considered as a critique of psychological topics and 
explanations could have been appropriate for this thesis (Edwards, 2005). 
However, because the aim of the research was not a strict examination of 
“everyday psychological categories used in discourse” or how “psychological 
business”50 was managed in talk, but the EP-Client relationship and EP practice 
and professional identity work, DP would not have been a straightforward choice 
(Edwards, 2005). However, Wetherell & Edley (1999) argued that a post-
structuralist informed approach to DP could incorporate a Foucauldian 
perspective. Edwards (2005), like Fairclough (2003) remained concerned that a 
Foucauldian approach to discourse lacked clarity and paid insufficient attention to 
social interaction.  Discursive Psychology would have provided a way to analyze 
subject talk in everyday contexts and explore how subjects strategically used 
language resources to manage their interests (Willig, 2003). However, a 
Foucauldian approach focused on how discourse constructed subjectivity made it 
more appropriate to the thesis. In addition, a Foucauldian approach enabled a 
critique of Educational Psychology that was a necessary part of the intended 
identity work (Parker, 1997).   
                                                 
50
 Edwards (2003) referred to psychological business as “motives and intentions, prejudices, reliability of memory and 
perception, etc” (Ibid page 259) 
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Foucault’s intense focus on history and context could have made an ahistorical 
CA approach problematic (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010).  However, Wetherell (1998) 
has suggested that there could be some compatibility specifically between CA 
and post-structural approaches in relation to the examination of subject positions. 
In particular, both CA and Foucauldian discourse analysis shared a bottom-up 
approach to subject formation. For example, Have (1991) argued that 
asymmetries in relationship were constructed in those relationship rather than 
imposed from the outside. This had a great deal of synergy with Foucault’s 
(1979) assertions that power was “produced from one moment to the next, at 
every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” and that   
“power comes from below” (Foucault, 1979, pages 93 & 94).  However, subject 
positions were not the exclusive focus of the thesis and the subject positions 
were located in the discursive practices in which they occurred. In addition, CA 
exclusively analyzed transcribed real talk interactions (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; 
Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Have, 1991). However, the thesis included 
documents and a personal account 51as data as a well as personal and 
ethnographic observations. A Foucauldian approach therefore provided a 
flexibility that was not available in traditional CA. It would have possible to 
analyze the focus group discussion using CA.  
 
However, my aim to include  both micro and macro analysis of discourse (text 
and context) presented three challenges to using CA. Firstly,  CA argued  that 
macro perspectives were unnecessary given that language was a “complete 
cultural system  of description and accountability”  (Edwards 2006, page 42). 
However, Wetherell (2001) argued that too close a focus on text to the exclusion 
of context risked losing insightful and useful relations between the individual and 
context. Secondly, ascribing labels (including identifying them as statements) to 
chunks of discourse has been criticized as being reductive and having no 
evidential bases to warrant specific attributions of labels (Wooffitt, 2005). If we 
                                                 
51
  I had asked M if it would have been possible to tape one of our sessions but he did not want to do this.  
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accepted that each text could have multiple readings then all readings of text/talk 
would be selective and reductively focused on the research question(s). In 
addition, asking for an evidential base for attributing chunks of text to discourses 
perhaps conceded too much ground to positivism.  Consequently, I have avoided 
phrases such as “a discourse of …” and referring to chunks of text as providing 
evidence of specific discourses (medical discourse, etc).  I also recognized 
Wooffitt’s (2005) criticism that focusing on the research participants’ response 
rather than the researchers’ questions, obscured the co-constructed nature of 
data.  I attempted to work against this by emphasizing the relational nature of the 
research. Thirdly, Foucauldian approaches privileged the researcher’s voice 
because they shaped how readers understood the data (Woolfitt 2005). 
However, Riessman (1993) defended this approach arguing that the researcher’s 
“authorial voice” was required to “knit” together the “desperate elements” within 
the data. (Ibid, page 27). Riessman (1993)  rationalized  the privileging of the 
author’s voice because narrative data, being interpretations, did not “speak for 
themselves” and thus required the author to give them voice (Ibid, page 22).  
 
CDA’s emphasis on social and political inequalities and how power relations 
were sustained, reproduced and were manifest in discourse combined with the 
adoption of a macro approach to bring about social change via critical analysis 
could have made CDA appropriate (Fairclough, 2003). However, the focus on 
top-down processes of domination and a frequently unproblematic understanding 
of emancipation in CDA would have made the desire to have a Foucauldian 
approach problematic. The differences between CDA and Foucauldian 
approaches  were illustrated  in  Fairclough’s (2003) unhappiness with Foucault’s 
lack of “textual analysis” ,  “confusion” in the  definition of discursive practices as 
rules, passive portrayal of individual’s relation to power, emphasis on structures, 
non-dialectical position to a “material reality” that “preconstituted social objects”  
and “resistance to the concept of ideology” (Ibid, page 56-60). Fairclough (2003) 
however thought that Foucault’s analysis provided valuable insights which should 
be incorporated into CDA. Ultimately, the targets of Foucauldian approaches and 
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CDA were different. For example, Foucault was concerned with how subjects 
became subjects in medicine, psychiatry and institutions whereas CDA examined 
“conversation, classroom discourse, media discourse and so fourth” (Fairclough, 
2003, page 38).   
 
If the data from the focus group and the MWM were framed as stories told by the 
participants about their experiences embedded in socio-historical and socio-
cultural discourses then NI could be considered appropriate. This was because 
NI would have enabled reflection on my practice as socially and historically 
situated (Johnson & Golombek, 2002; Georgakopoulou, 2002 Riessman, 2005).  
Johnson and Golombek (2002) also described teachers’ NI as a “journey of how 
they are known as a well as what they know” which also resonated with themes 
in this thesis (Ibid, page 10).   Bruner (1990, 2004) added that telling stories 
about the self reflected how individuals made sense of their lives and shaped the 
person they became through privileging and legitmising particular subjectivities 
and excluding others. This included an emphasis on what was said rather than 
how it was said. Bruner’s (1990, 2004) description would therefore also have 
resonated with a Foucauldian approach.  Narrative approaches have also been 
employed in identity research both in and outside institutions (e.g. Bruner, 1990, 
2004; Schiffrin, 1996) 
 
Although, NI would have provided a useful methodology it would have been 
difficult to apply it to the analysis of HPC-SCPE or the other ethnographic 
aspects of the research. In addition, I was not interested in an analysis that 
encompassed how participants structured or shifted their stories or the narrative 
devices they selected.   
 
After undertaking a critical comparative examination of Foucauldian approaches 
to discourse the following examined more general criticisms of Foucauldian 
approaches. In particular, whether Foucauldian approaches were useful to 
examine change, too focused at the micro level, lead to opacity, were under 
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implemented, did not provide clear methodological guidance, were subjective, 
lacked integrity and rigour, and privileged the author and secretly structuralist.  
 
A persistence criticism of Foucauldian analysis was that it might tell us how 
things are but not why things change (Henriques, 1998). In addition, that a 
Foucauldian analysis excluded the “powerful social forces” that exist externally to 
institutions and local discourses that influence human action (Ibid, page 105). 
The risk in using a Foucauldian method was that the power and regulatory 
processes would be overestimated and the agency of participants 
underestimated.  
 
However, genealogy enabled the examination of discursive practice and 
conditions of possibility at the micro-level (Henriques, et al., 1998). This level of 
analysis did not require but did not exclude and may even facilitate an analysis at 
a more global level (Foucault, 1978/2003; Henriques, 1998). Foucault, bottom up 
and circulatory approach to power did not exclude the possibility that the micro-
technologies could be colonized and supported by global mechanisms and finally 
the State (Foucault, 2003a). However, the difficulty remained in explaining how 
the local or individual acts of resistance could be generalized into movements.  
      
An additional challenge was to remain open to contingency and uncertainty 
without sounding unclear or vague. This involved being very clear about what I 
was doing without suggesting that it was the (only) “way” to do it (Foucault, 
1997). Adopting a Bricolage approach was also a strategy to postpone closure. 
However, Bricolage’s interdisciplinarity opened up the method to criticism of 
superficiality (Friedman, 1998). A single methodology would have enabled a 
more in depth exploration of that methodology.  However, this supposed that 
there was truth in methodology rather than seeing methodologies as tools to be 
appropriated and adapted (Kellner, 1995). Multiple methodologies also acted as 
a corrective to the unchallenged assumptions and limitations present in single 
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methodological studies. This was because multiple methodologies provided 
multiple ways of seeing (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Kellner, 1995).    
  
There was a relative scarcity of research that applied Foucault’s ethical 
framework and therefore few texts that provided guidance (e.g. Aycock, 1995; 
McPhail, 1999; Moisander & Pesonen, 2002; St Pierre, 2004). There have been 
a few noteworthy attempts to use Foucauldian ethics in research (e.g. Aycock, 
1995; McPhil, 1997; Monisander & Pesson, 2002, St Pierre, 2004). However, 
there have been inconstancies in how researchers applied a Foucauldian 
approach. The above researchers provided individual readings of Foucault. This 
was typically evident while attempting to justify and explain the methodological 
approach that the researchers employed. I have therefore attempted to balance 
the references of seminal works by Foucault by locating it in a review of the 
literature. 
 
In any event, making direct appeals to Foucault were problematic because 
Foucault (1997) described his approach as being at a “rudimentary stage” where 
he “stumbles” and “gropes” with a “rather shaky hand” (Ibid, pages 208, 113). 
Furthermore, Foucault’s (1997) methodological project was only an “initial 
approximation” and not a theory “in the strict sense of the term” (Ibid, 210, 114). 
In addition, Foucault’s later, so called; turn to genealogy could be seen to 
undermine the archeological method Lemert & Gillan (1982).   However, it would 
be impossible to do genealogy without archeology, which needed genealogy to 
connect power to knowledge and subjectivity (Stone, 2011). Ray (1987) 
contested that the later move to genealogy had not so much diminish the 
discursive approach as to let go of “the structuralist preoccupation with rules” that 
characterized the archeological approach (Ray, 1987, page 45).  Genealogy, 
therefore, enabled the description of normative relations in EP practice, how EPs 




The methodology depended on pre-selected cases. Therefore there was no 
pretence of objectivity. For example, other focus groups in different services 
could have developed different themes particular to those services.  However, 
this inherent subjectivity reflects the partial and particular nature of research and 
a resistance to the fetishism of objectivity in positivist research (Angrosino & 
Mays de Perez, 2003).  
 
The anti-positive position and “methodological flexibility” could be criticized for 
lacking methodological rigour or “methodological indifference” (Bryant, 2002, 
page 25).  The claim that qualitative research designs lacked rigour has a long 
history (e.g. Van Maanen, 1995; Guba & Lincoln, 1981).  Rigour was argued to 
be essential because it legitimized the qualitative research methodologies as 
scientific and evidence based (Morse, 1999).  Morse et al (2002) worried that 
without rigour qualitative research would have the status of fictional journalism.   
Calls for rigour could also be a strategy to gain access to policy makers and 
resource holders in an area dominated by quantitative research (Aroni, et al., 
1999).  
 
The accusation of poor rigour could be compounded by having an “insider” 
position in the research (McCracken, 1988). It would perhaps be easy to try and 
sidestep the debate by claiming that engaging in a discussion about rigour was to 
be lured into a positivist and reductive discussion that should be focused on 
methodological integrity (Aroni, et al., 1999). However, appealing to integrity 
appeared to swap one normative discipline for another (where integrity became 
the benchmark rather than rigour). Furthermore, juxtaposition rigour and integrity 
could be a false dichotomy because it assumed that one can not have both. 
Rigour could be a means to demonstrate integrity (Aroni et al 1999). Discussions 
about validity, reliability, and generalizability could, but not necessarily, enable 
the researcher to facilitate the reader to take a position on what the researcher 
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said. The issue was not the possibility of rigourous research but the nature of the 
relationship between researcher and reader and how this was managed52. 
 
Having a post-structuralist approach to research and to adopting a Foucauldian 
approach to data analysis was also problematic because the degree to which 
Foucault escaped structuralism was contested (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1982; 
Carrette, 2000). Foucault frequently and consistently stated that he was not a 
structuralist (i.e. see Foucault, 1979, pages 199-202). However, Foucault (1979) 
admitted that some of his early works had “frequent recourse to structural 
analysis” (Ibid, page 16). Foucault’s preoccupation with rules suggested a 
difficulty with letting go of structuralism as a type of formalism (Carrette 2000). 
Even sympathetic readers have called Foucault a “counter-structuralist 
structuralist” (Geertz, 2010, page 29). Foucault (1998) in an interview suggested 
that he found the term post-structuralism unhelpful as he could not identify a 
shared problem between authors labeled post-structuralist. Additionally, Foucault 
(1998) disliked the prefix “post” because it indicated a lack of humility. Post 
signaled that the author imagined that their period was somehow  a “rapture”, 
“high point”, “completion” of history, and where “everything was completed and 
begun again” (Ibid, page 449).    While acknowledging the above criticisms and 
arguments I have retained the term post-structuralism because it signaled a 
move away from meta-narratives explanations and phenomenological 
understanding of events that solidified meaning.  
 
Foucault’s writing has been criticised for the lack of references and footnotes 
(Carrette 2000).  Foucault (198o, 1984/1986) put forward two defences of this 
position. Foucault (1980) with references to Marx stated: 
 
“I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people 
are incapable of recognising Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who 
doesn’t quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it 
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necessary to quote Newton and Einstein? He uses them, but he doesn’t need the 
quotation marks, the footnote and the eulogistic comment to prove how 
completely he is being faithful to the master’s thought”.  (Ibid, page 52). 
 
Foucault above appeared to be trying to resist the authority of the author. 
However, this move could actually privilege the author because Foucault 
appeared to be the sole innovator of the theories and constructs.  Foucault’s 
(1984/1986) claim that there was no “we” or “community” to which he belonged 
or could have “referred to”, could further privilege his role (Ibid, page 385). This 
claim came perilously close to suggesting that his work was outside discourse. 
To attempt to both avoid privileging the author and locate this thesis firmly within 
discourse,   this thesis employed extensive references.  The inclusion of 
references was not to signal unproblematic generalizability or transferability 
between the studies or books quoted and the thesis; rather they had three main 
functions: 
1. Acknowledging the reading and authors that informed the ideas in the 
thesis. This was respectful, recognized the debts owed to others and 
accepted that research was collaborative.   
2. To locate the discussions and conclusions within a tradition to balance 
the authorization of the author.   
3. To act as contributing to the debates for or against a position, rather than 
as facts.  
 
4.14 Selecting Statements 
 
The analysis of data and selection of statements was achieved by adapting the 
methods suggested by Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2009) and Willig (2003) as 
outlined below: 
 
The analysis selected statements relevant to research questions rather than 
make an exhaustive list of possible statements. This was more than a key word 
search, not least, because issues not talked about or described differently could 
be interesting (Willig, 2003). The aim was to identify phrases, sentences, groups 
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of instances and other artifacts that had a positioning, regulatory or performative 
function. When analyzing statements I was mindful of how participants: 
• Claimed authority 
• Rationalized what was said 
• Justified what they said  
• Formulated issues/events 
• Imposed limits on what could be said by participants  
• Legitimized what was said 
 
This was because the research was interested in the   site from which the 
professionals spoke53. The site was the ground on which they claimed to stand. 
These sites regulated and warranted practices and establish boundaries which 
facilitated while circumscribing what could be said about the other (i.e. how they 
were described, classified, normalised). The analysis of statements was 
achieved through identifying (1) problematizations, (2) technologies of self, (3) 
subjecfications, (4) positionings, (5) rhetorical strategies and by (6) reading 





Problematization involved making the familiar strange and the certain uncertain 
so that they become visible to analysis.  Problematization enabled the researcher 
to “establish a critical relationship with the present” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 
2009).  The analysis was, therefore, interested in how EP-Client relations were 




Technologies were practical disciplinary regimes aimed at governing the Self and 
Others (Foucault, 1979, 1986c, 1990). The analysis examined both technologies 
                                                 
53
  For example the clinic, the school, the LA, professionalism, psychology, from an evidence base, from 
experience, diagnostic manual, developmental disorder categories, conversion tables, etc. 
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of government and Self.   Crudely, the technologies of government sought to 
govern the subject from the outside whereas technologies of the Self described 
the disciplinary regimens by which the Self sought to govern itself. These 





The analysis identified the forms by which the EPs sought to fabricate 
themselves as ethical subjects in relation to ethical goals (Foucault, 1990).  This 
included how EPs identified the ethical substance, their mode of subjection, the 




Foucault’s concept of subject position provided a resource to examine 
professional identity in the thesis. The construct of positioning was closely 
associated with Davies and Harré (1991). However, Boxer (2004) pointed out 
that despite Davis and Harré not referencing Foucault directly they did refer to 
eight Foucauldian influenced authors including Hollway (1984).  Benwell & 
Stokoe (2010) defined positioning as: 
 
“The process through which speakers adopt, resist and offer subject positions 
that are made available in master narratives or discourses” (Ibid, page 139). 
 
The above quote recognized that positioning was a dynamic interactive process 
shaped by power. Subjects were both positioned by discourse and were actively 
involved in positioning themselves and others (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 
1997). Subjects were also positioned by social status or role (Taylor & Littleton, 
2006). Taylor and Littleton (2006) argued that participants could be presented 
with choices of positions and could adopt conflicting positions. To take a subject 
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position subjects drew on available positions within the discursive formation 
(Edley, 2001). 
  
Benwell and Stokoe’s definition resonated with Foucault’s (1997) description of 
his project: 
 
“I wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject but to define the positions 
and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse”. (Ibid, 
page 200) 
 
The thesis embraced the aim of both identifying the positions and functions and 
exploring the relations between the positions and functions of the EPs.    
 
Potter (2001) argued that researchers matching of text/talk to positions frequently 
appeared arbitrary.  Davis and Harré (1991) acknowledged that in participants 
talk multiple reading and positions were available. Davis and Harré (1991) further 
argued that individuals would differ in their willingness and capacity to position 
and be positioned. Therefore, positions were not allocated arbitrarily but were 
privileged and particular readings of the text/talk.   
 
4.14.5 Rhetorical Strategies 
 
Billig et al (1988) argued that subjects employed rhetorical strategies to warrant 
and privilege the positions they had taken. This involved adapting a strategic 
approach to social talk. This included the methods of argumentation, 
rationalizations employed and   the juxtaposition and contrasts made.  In 
identifying rhetoric, I therefore, attended to “the particular story told, the manner 
and detail of its telling, the points emphasized” and “the morals drawn…” 
(Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, page 35). The discursive choices subjects made 
therefore revealed both what was privileged and the strategies used to achieve 
this.  The analysis also employed the construct of ideological dilemma (Billig, et 
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al., 1988).  This suggested that individuals employed conflicting and inconsistent 
discourses to achieve strategic goals 
 
4.14.6 Reading Against 
 
The method of reading against or a resistant reading was employed to analyze 
the data.  This method had its roots in literary criticism and discourse analysis 
(Mills, 2009; West, 1992). Reading against was frequently contrasted with 
reading with, which was understood as reading a text in the way the author 
intended (Mills, 2009).  Reading against worked to disrupt the assumptions about 
texts and required the reader to be unaligned from the author54.  Reading against 
had some similarities with Billig’s (1987) construct of ‘talking against’. This 
suggested that during conversations there were several levels to the interaction. 
The individuals were not only speaking and responding to the persons present 
but to past fanaticized or actual encounters and criticisms.  Therefore, in taking 
personal positions individuals were also reflecting and engaging with ongoing 
political/social debates.   
 
4.15 Research Site and Participants 
 
The participants were chosen because I had access to them, and they provided 
an “opportunity to learn” (Stokoe, 2000, p. 446).  I also think that the participants 
chose me because the issues captivated me despite me. While accepting that 
knowledge was co-created I recognized the power imbalances in this process 
(Butler, 2005; Fontana & Grey, 2000).  It might have been possible to involve 
participants more in the interpretative process or even to go back and check the 
interpretations. However time and resource constraints worked against this. 
 
 
                                                 
54
 In the autoethnographic method the requirement to be unaligned with the author produced an interesting 
tension:  I had to read against myself.  I have already discussed above how this meant attempting to be what 
I am not and the need to make problematic my practice. How much this was achieved I leave to readers.  
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4.16 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The chapter located the research design within the practitioner research tradition. 
The chapter reviewed the research methodologies that would both enable me to 
further my own practice and examine the practice of others.  Bricolage was 
employed to capture the complexity inherent in the appropriation of AR, 
autoethnography and S-S combined with a Foucauldian approach to data 
analysis.  The methodologies were critically examined and their inclusion was 
justified on their appropriateness for participant research, examining real time 
phenomena, compatibility with post-structuralist epistemology, professional self-
development and their mutual compatibility.   It was recognized that tensions 
remained between the methodologies but it was hoped that these tensions would 
be creative. The inclusion of a Foucauldian approach to data analysis was 
rationalized as enabling an examination of how EPs were constituted as subjects 
of knowledge, subjects acting on others and as ethical agents.    
 
The chapter outlined the four cycles of research.  This was a highly iterative 
process that was constantly informed by reading. The chapter also critically 
examined and acknowledged the ethical problematics of this research.  Including 
myself as research subject, recognizing the relational nature of the research, 
adopting epistemological humility were all intended to agitate against the 
problematics inherent in research.   While accepting the difficulties of employing 
a Foucauldian approach to data analysis the chapter mitigated those difficulties 
by providing a clear description of constructs and data analysis methods while 
locating the approach in the literature.  In my view, the benefits of a Foucauldian 
approach outweighed the difficulties. This was because while being, to varying 
degrees, compatible with the other discursive methods considered (CA, CDA, DP 
and NI) a Foucauldian approach also enabled a focus on how discourse 
constructed subjectivity, a critique of Educational Psychology, an engagement 
between micro and macro and bottom-up and top-down processes of identity 
formation and flexibility to include an analysis both text and talk. 
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The chapter also recognized that the evaluation of qualitative research remained 
highly contested. The debate on rigour and quality assurance was both between 
quantitative research and qualitative research and within qualitative research.  
Within qualitative research the debate was about the utility and relevance of 
quality assurance and the applicability of terms borrowed from quantitative 
research.  This did not imply that rigour and quality should not be sought in 
qualitative research; rather it was an attempt to demonstrate quality assurance in 
qualitative research remained problematic regardless of the constructs used. 
Finally, the chapter provided an outline of how statements would be identified 
and analyzed. It was recognized that while all the methods used to identify and 
analyze statements were not strictly Foucauldian they were either inspired by or 
















Chapter 5. Results 
  
5.1 Summary of Results 
 
This chapter presented the findings from the fourth cycle of the research55 which 
synthesized the findings from the first and third cycles; the MWM and the FG. 
The second cycle of research (analysis of the HPC-SCPE) was omitted from the 
main body of the thesis because of the need to remain within the mandatory 
word count56. The analysis of the HPC-SCPE can be found in Appendix 13.  The 
fourth cycle established three overlapping discursive meta-themes57 relevant to 
the research questions: 
1. The problematic relationship with the client 
2.  The appropriation of ethical rhetoric 
3.  The strategic presentation of the Educational Psychologist 
 
The three figures below show the meta-themes and the related fourteen 
subthemes:  
 














                                                 
55
 I am deeply aware of the irony of presenting results in a thematic way when the thesis has consistently attempted to 
make the processes of thematicisation problematic.  
56
 However it should be noted that the meta themes were also in the second cycle of research. 
57
 This position was antithetical to approaches that assumed that themes arose from data bottom-up rather than imposed 
top-down by the researcher or research processes.  I was therefore not finding or revealing but constructing meaning.   
1. The problematic 
ethical relationships 
with clients  
 






asymmetry 1c. Objectifying the 
client 
1d. . Categorizing 
and presenting the 
client 
1e. Responsiblization of 
EP and Client 
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The analysis of results, below argued that not only did the meta-themes and 
subthemes overlap they also worked collaboratively to achieve strategic goals.  
These goals included: 
• How the EPs constructed, formulated, sustained and regulated clienthood 
and the EP-Client relationship. 
• How EPs legitimized and authorized their role.  
• How EPs constructed themselves and were constructed as ethical 
professionals.   
 
Juxtaposing the analysis of the FG and MWM also acted as a form of 
triangulation.  In keeping with the research design, phrases such as “the analysis 
“found”, “revealed”, or “discovered” were avoided. This was because data, like 
2. The appropriation of 
ethical rhetoric  
 




• Not causing 
harm  
2c. Micro ethics 
virtue ethics, care 
ethics 
2d. Tensions between 
principles and 
particulars/contexts 
3. The strategic 
presentation of 
the EP 
3a. The professional 
rationalization of EP 
practice 
 
3b. Being betwixt 
and between 






3d Independent and 
autonomous 
professional 
(privileging the rational 
decision maker 
2a. Emotional work 
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truth, was argued to be constructed and not found. Rather words such as 
“suggested”, “implied” and “argued” were used.  The extensive quotes (data) 
appeared in italics in text boxes.  Each quote will have the cycle of research it 
came from (e.g. MWM or FG), the person who said it (e.g. 01) and the line 
numbers in the relevant transcript.  For example, something said by 01 in the FG 
occurring between lines 566 and 569 in the transcript will be references as (01, 
FG, lines 566-569). The next section presented the analysis of results.  
 
5.2 Analysis and Discussion of Results 
 
This section examined each of the three meta-themes with the related 
subthemes. The way each subtheme was expressed in cycles one and three was 
critically examined and discussed in relation to relevant literature.  
 
5.2.1. The Problematic Relationships with the Client 
 
This section of the results delineated how the EP-Client relationship was 
presented as problematic in the first and third phases of the research. There 
were five discursive subthemes that spoke to a problematic EP-Client 
relationship: 
• Managing and regulating the EP-Client asymmetry 
• Anxiety about the EP-Client symmetry 
• Objectifying  the client 
• Categorizing and presenting the client 
• Responsiblization/culpilization of the client  
 
The analysis also examined cumulative function of statements. This was evident 
when the same statements simultaneously presented  the Client as a set of   
institutional categories that provided an objectified clienthood while attempting to 
make the Client   responsible/culpable for  positions they  were offered.  How the 
EP-Client couple was problematized and their boundaries established and 
regulated were also examined. The analysis also suggested that the EP and 
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Client were presented as objects of psychological knowledge which positioned 
the EP and Client as both a subject that knows and an object of knowledge. 
 
5.2.2 Anxiety about the EP-Client Asymmetry 
 
Although never explicitly stated in the MWM, it was evident that a motivation for 
the written account of the MWM was concerns about the right way to treat   
Clients (Benjamin, 2000; Billington, 2002; Buber, 1960; Frosh, 2010; Hollway, 
2008).  02, below, appeared to aware of the asymmetry through acknowledging 







Awareness of the asymmetry was also evident in the 02’s attempts to make his 
thinking visible to M. For example, below, during the discussion about M’s 




Revealing the question’s aim problematized the expert model of therapeutic 
relationships and attempted to address the asymmetry by making the EP’s 
thought processes visible (Lazarus & Zur, 2002:  Zur, 2011b).  This move while 
acknowledging the asymmetry also, by presuming asymmetry, (re)produced it 
(Hepburn, 2003). The EP was presenting himself as the expert adult explaining 
to and protecting a vulnerable Client/child.  The above descriptions of the 
asymmetry supported the widely acknowledged power differentials between 
“I further explained that there was very little connection between reading 
and spelling and intelligence. This was to make him feel better (after all I 
had just made him do something he found difficult in front of a stranger) 
and also to dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have about the 
meaning of his difficulties with spelling and reading”. (02, MWM lines 24-
28). 
 
“I explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been 
badly bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their 
hygiene, adding if M knew what hygiene meant.” (02, MWM lines 38-40) 
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professionals and Clients which was also assumed in ethical codes (BPS, 2006; 
Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1970; Rose, 1999). The next section explored the source 
of this asymmetry and how it was established, regulated and sustained.    
 
In the FG the EPs’ position seemed to oscillate between anxiety about the 
asymmetrical EP-Client relationship and the need to regulate and maintain the 
asymmetry.  03 below shared concerns about his authority to speak/write about 
and make decisions for clients.  
 
03, above, acknowledged the asymmetry in power between the EP and client, 
specifically the EP authority to make decisions about clients. 03’s use of the 
phrase “Who am I, what right do I have…” suggested that that he was unaware 
of the source of his authority to speak about and make decisions for Clients.    
The EPs in the quote below suggested that the Client’s “preconceptions” was the 
source of the EP’s authority: 
 
The Client admiration was suggested through the phrase “… looking up to you…” 
however, the source of the Client’s “preconceptions” and admiration was not 
questioned. For example, why and how did the Client come to have those 
preconceptions and that admiration? Foucault (1990, 1989) argued that source of 
professional’s authority was cultural and historical rather than the Client’s 
perceptions.   The moral superiority of the EP was inherent in the category of EP 
“When I meet parents when I write reports it’s always… back of my mind. 
And little light that keeps flashing.  Who am I? What right do I have to make 
so many different judgements?”  (03, FG, lines 377 – 380)  
“Is very diff… they have all have preconceptions about you.  Coming into 
that relationship” (04, FG, lines 293-294). 
 
“So the relation between you and this boy there is a power dynamic. It might 
be possible that this young guy is looking up to  you, He might he might  I 
am not saying he does, he might be looking up to you”  (03, FG, lines 307-
309). 
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because of its association with professionalism (Jayyusi, 1984).  Failing to 
recognise the source of this authority obscured the role of the EP in producing 
regulating and managing the EP-Client asymmetry. This was further discussed 
below.  
 
5.2.3 Managing and Regulating the EP-Client Asymmetry 
 
The EP-Client asymmetry was partly managed and regulated through the acting 
out of roles made inferentially available through the categories professional and 
Client (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996).  In the above 
quotes (MWM lines 24-28 and 38-40) the EP established the EP-Client 
asymmetry by positioning himself as the holder and provider of specialised 
knowledge and M as a receiver of knowledge.  This was analogous to the 
position of host and guest. While welcoming the guest the host simultaneously 
reminded the guest that they have entered their domain. Hospitality always 
remains conditional; the host was always master in their home (Derrida & 
Dufourmantelle, 2000; Derrida 1999). Following Derrida (1999) it was the role of 
the EP to offer hospitality and the Client’s to say yes. However, this also opened 
up the potential for the Client to say no. The means by which Clients said no was 
discussed later. However, the EP was still responsible for what, how much, when 
and how to disclose.   The EP was, however, hostage to the Client because 
without the Client’s compliance the EP did not have a role. M through 
disclosing/confessing was simultaneously a speaking subject and the object of 
discussion.   
 
In the FG the EP-Client asymmetry was partly regulated through articulating the 
boundaries between the participants. For example, below 04 was discussing the 





04’s primary concern appeared to be the potential disclosure by the EP and the 
difficulties it caused to the professional relationship.  These concerns were 
justified by 04 arguing that disclosure was both risky, ethically, for the EP and the 
EP-Client relationship.  The above quote attempted to establish and discipline 
the asymmetry between the EP and the client by establishing their roles. As in 
the MWM, it was the Client who disclosed (confessed/revealed) and the EP that 
listened (remains hidden); it was the client that was known and the EP that knew.  
04 also appeared to suggest that the EP-Client relationship had confessional 
aspects. Foucault (1999) argued that confession was central to the operation of 
pastoral power and was a key technique in producing truth. Through the use of 
the word “professional” The above statement also attempted to categorize and 
differentiate the relationship between EP and M as different from non-
professional relationships. This categorization of professional was essential to 
the establishment of asymmetrical roles in the relationship because it made them 
inferentially available (Drew & Sorjonen 1997; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; 
Mauthner, 1998; Potter & Hepburn, 2003; Stanley, 1990). Through appropriating 
the term ‘Professional’ 04 was enacting identity alignment (Potter, 2005; Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003). 04 also, simultaneously, linked professional regulation of the 
EP-Client boundaries to the regulation of professionalism.  The above quote, 
therefore, illustrated how statements were entangled and worked in combination 
(Foucault, 1990). 04 was saying “I behaved in this way because I am 
professional” while simultaneously reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship.  04 
was quite emphatic about the boundaries of the professional relationship in the 
quote below: 
 
“I pick put, picked up, on the first page the first page of narrative that he had 
experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several times.  You said I 
shared my feeling about this and I wonder (YEA) and I wondered about your 
self disclosure (right) of the  of, the em professional in the situation in a 
situation like this and the ethical boundary of that is.   You don’t actually say 
what was said. I didn’t quite understand that bit you said that you shared your 
feeling but I didn’t, didn’t understand quite.” (04, FG, lines 43-49) 
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04, above, appeared to appeal to the authority of counselling ethics through the 
use of the phase “person centred counselling training”.  Self-disclosure would 
only be legitimate if it was a strategic move to achieve an aim (“strong effect”) 
and even then needs to be conditional and partial.   Boundaries were also 
emphasized in relation to the work undertaken: 
 
This quote suggested that the context established what could be done and the 
EP-Client roles.  The ethical question under consideration was whether it was 
legitimate for the EP to extend their involvement beyond the assessment for 
exam concessions given that this was what the meeting was arranged for.  This 
debate pointed to the boundaries between permissible and non-permissible work 
by EPs. The legitimization of the EP’s work required a (re)formulation of the 
context (Garfinkel & Scaks, 1970; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996). This was 
achieved through arguing that transgression of roles was permissible because 
consent had been given. The role of consent was discussed further later.  
 
“Em my view and my practice I admit are probably quite different. My view is 
that we shouldn’t self disclose and that has probably come form a person 
centred counselling training … but then there are times that you do and, and it 
has a very strong effect. In a relationship and it , you know a session. But 
there are ethical, for the want of a better word ethical parameters to the level 
of self disclosure.  For instance, has he said em, I,  my dad beating me up or 
something like that  it would not be within the realms of ethical disclosure  to 
say  my dad beat me up as well. Em but then to say… there is a line that one 
has to establish cause where you are coming from in your personal practice” 
(04, Fg,  lines 55 to 63). 
“The first thing that comes to mind that is that you went into do one thing, an 
exam concession, and it has become a completely different thing, and if you 
got… And his age comes into play as well because if you have got consent 
from parents to do something did they realise that it was going to develop into 
this.  But actually do they need to realise  is it up to him to use the session as 
he wants which is actually what I think he did he used it as a space to talk and 
say what was on his mind, that was the very first thing that stuck out to me”  
(01, FG, lines 4-10.  
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Disclosure was therefore a means of distancing the EP from the Client. In the 
quote below 02 attempted to establish another form of distance between himself 
and the Client: 
 
02, above, justified the boundary by stating the need for personal space and 
appealing to a normative about the appropriate relation to have with a young 
Client. The quote also suggested that different sorts of relations existed with 
different types of client.  The quote below suggested that context also shaped 
what could be said: 
 
 
The above suggested that speaking rights of the participants were regulated by 
the categorization of the encounter as Educational Psychologist (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2010).  This balanced the presentation of professionals as powerful by 
recognizing that EPs were also objects of power (Benjamin 2000, 2004; Evetts, 
2003; Foucault, 1979, 1997; Freidson, 1970; Krause, 1996). Specifically there 
were things the EP wanted to say but was unable to say.   This suggested that 





                                                 
58
 This term meant being subjected to and influenced by outside forces. This could include laws and the 
desires of others.  
 “I don’t, do we,  give our number, I don’t give my number to children so it 
makes it more difficult, I know , that he is at the sort of middle age but I still 
wouldn’t feel comfortable about giving my number,  my mobile to a 14 year old 
boy” (02, FG, lines 33-34). 
“… because there are times when I go to a case and I want to say to the boy 
or girl, get yourself together !  because that’s the, the thing, but I cannot do 
that.  Because that’s, you know “come on”! , that behaviour you cannot do 
that, I want to say that I know I can’t say that” (04, FG, lines 569-573). 
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5.2.4 Objectification of the Client 
 
In the MWM the objectification of M was evident in the tension between relation 
and non-relation/alienation (Benjamin, 2000, 2004; Butler, 2005). The non-
relation was between EP-as-function and Client-as-function rather than the 
relations between “persons”, subject-to-subject (Benjamin 2000, 2004; 
Emirbayer, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). For example, 
the EP below expressed concern about noticing particular and personal aspects 





Noticing a hygiene problem had a particular problematic when the EP-Client 
relationship was professional.  In professional relationships particular features 
(ethnicity, gender, social class) about the client were intended to be ignored 
(HPC, 2008; BPS, 2006). Anxiety about noticing the issues with hygiene resulted 
from the tension between the demand from the Other to be recognized as a 
person and the demand for discourses within professionalism to see the Other as 
just another other, i.e. as a case, a category, a label (Benjamin, 2000; Billington, 
2002; Burber, 1959; Rose, 1999).    
 
The processes of objectification attempted to pin M down in his own particularity 
but also in relation to discursive formations.  Derrida (1995) argued in the act of 
locating a particular Other in a system of general themes was a betrayal of the 
Other’s uniqueness and closed the possibility of the encounter being ethical. The 
processes of objectification were therefore entangled with those that categorized 
and presented M as an object of knowledge. 
 
Positioning M as an object of knowledge was most clearly expressed in the 
phrase, “I found M very interesting” (02, MWM, line 15). This categorized M as an 
“I remember feeling a sense of unease about noticing his (M’s) lack of 
personal hygiene”. (02, MWM lines 3-4) 
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object of study and clinical curiosity.  Allan (1999) had characterized this type of 
curiosity as “acts of voyeurism” (Ibid, page 113). 
 
In the MWM the EP, also, endeavoured to make M an object of knowledge by 
framing M through the lens of Systems Theory and Cognitive Behavioural Theory 
(Beck, 1996; Broderick, 1993). In the quote below the EP was using a Systemic 
approach based on each member of the family having roles and functions 
(Broderik, 1993).  
 
 
The influence of cognitive behaviour theory was evident in interactions where M 
was asked to think about his situation in a different way and attempting to 
establish a relationship between behaviour, feelings and beliefs.  In the example 
below the 02 attempted to get M to make the connections between his beliefs 







02 was again calling M to have agency and attempted to give M responsibility for 
his actions. This supported arguments that the processes of agency and 
responsibilization were entangled (Foucault, 1989; Rose, 1999). M was being 
asked to govern himself and consider himself as an object to be watched 
(evaluate his thoughts). 02, through asking the question, was calling M to 
estimate which was “better, worrying or avoiding”.  Establishing an economy of 
“M changing the subject said that when something was not right or someone 
was going to make the wrong decision he would let them know. I asked if this 
was his job in the family but M said that it wasn’t and that he had to let them 
know. I tried to explain how everybody in a family could have a role and 
perhaps he saw his as stopping bad things happen”. (02, MWM lines 75-79) 
 
“M explained that his brother and sister were not going to CAMHS and were not 
having the same problems as him. I asked why this was. M explained that his 
bother and sister did not worry as much as he did and did not think so deeply 




values offered “worrying” and “avoiding” as a moral choice.   These were 
processes of individualization, responsibilization and self formation (Foucault, 
1977; Butler, 2005, 2007).  
 
M also became an object of knowledge through an incitement to speak (Foucault, 
1979). The EP-Client relations appeared to   facilitate M to ‘disclose’ information 
about himself. The confessional relationship reified (essentialized) stories about 
M that were constructed while confessing (Foucault, 1979, 1999). This was 
because disclosure suggested that there were hidden/secret or essential truths to 
be revealed.   Within the asymmetrical relationship M’s disclosures enable him to 
be assessed and then allocated appropriately.  In the quote below M was stating 
that he was revealing secret information. During the follow up meeting M was 




M, above, was speaking about the strangeness of the situation and his attempts 
to make sense of what was going on and how to respond. This suggested that M 
was exercising agency.  M also made a direct link between his understanding of 
the professional’s role and what was expected of him, i.e. classifying 02 as a 
Child Psychologist appeared to facilitate his disclosures about his private life 
(Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Foucault, 1989; Heritage & Greatbatch 1991; Potter & 
Hepburn, 2003; Potter, 2005). This was perhaps another example of object-to-
object relations (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).  
 
“I told you about me, mum being a spiritualist medium. Well at that time I didn’t 
know what you do. I know that you were something to help me in my exams 
but nothing. When you informed me that you is a child psychologist. I think I 
am better off talking and I did …  I was a bit nervous at first. I had no idea 
what he wants, what he was talking about. It is not everyday somebody pull 
you out of lessons, I had no idea Well its ok to know stuff about that. I felt 
alright telling you personal stuff. Some people might not, it depends on the 
person” (FUP,  lines 94-101). 
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In the FG concerns about objectification were most clearly articulated in 
discussion related to the Matrix 59 (see Appendix 9).  For example 05, below, 
articulated concerns that the Matrix was shaping how he wrote about children: 
 
05 suggested that the discursive formation in which he practiced was 
establishing the possible ways in which a child could be described and 
categorized and hence privileged the Professional’s story over the Client’s 
(Billington, 2002; Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; Stoiber & Wass, 2002).  The 
objectification of the client was therefore facilitated through their categorisation 
(Foucault 1989; Garfinkel & Sacks 1970; Jayyusi, 1984).  
 
M was also presented as a case by the EP. This included providing brief 
biographical details, clinical descriptions and test scores (MWM lines 1 -133). 
The inclusion of personal information about M was rationalized as flowing from 
“psychological thinking” (MWM line 124) which therefore made the topic 
legitimate for discussion by EPs. The relationship between M’s 




                                                 
59The Matrix was a tool used by the EPs in the EPS to categorize and allocate financial resources to schools 
to meet the needs of children with special educational needs.  For each of the special educational needs 
(cognition and learning, specific learning difficulties, visual impairment, physical impairment, hearing 
impairment,  speech and language difficulties, social communication and interaction difficulties, social 
emotional and behavioural difficulties, mental health difficulties and medical health needs) the matrix 
provided a description of severity ranging from mild to  moderate, significant, severe, complex and 
profound.  As part of the statutory assessment process the EP was asked to place the child on the matrix. 
This meant identifying the nature and level of the special educational needs.  The EPs were also asked to 
use the language of the Matrix so that the panel could allocate resources for a child with special educational 
needs. The panel, who met once a fortnight, was a group of appointed  professionals (a paediatrician, head 
of EPS, head of the Inclusion Service,  a representative of a head teachers from the special schools on 
rotation, a primary school and secondary school headteacher on rotation and the senior manager from the 
Local Authority special  needs services).  
“Writing about children speaking about children, how do I do that, that’s 
intelligible to others. So if speak, if I write in a child in a way demanded of 
me by the local authority , how am I re-creating this child how am I 






04, above, linked the discussion of M at a meeting and his engagement with 
CAMHS as enabling to be said what was said.  The analysis suggested that, 
tautologically, EPs presented M as case which in turn legitimized and authorized 
the EP’s role in the case. This suggested that the ethical substance was, again, 
the nature of the EP-Client relationship (as opposed to the non-EP-non-Client 
relationship). Again the non-EP-non-Client relationship appeared to be highly 
problematic, if not dangerous.  This was also evident in the EP’s objectification of 
M in the MWM and the FG’s desire to formulate and hence legitimize M as a 
case.  This required a positioning of M as a role or function that enabled the 
privileging of justice/fairness over care (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; 
Foucault, 1997; Rose, 1990, 1996). While accepting the legitimacy of this aim the 
depersonalization/objectification of the client also enabled their potential 
abandonment and abjectification60 (Verkerk, 2001). Following Hepburn (2003) 
the EP in the MWM and the discussion in the FG through 
assuming/acknowledging the asymmetry also solidified and (re)produced that 
asymmetry. The EPs’ objectification not only of Clients but themselves enabled a 






                                                 
60
 This is not a spelling mistake and means the reduction of the self to a suffering object.  
“But you do say in your second paragraph I was aware of M through the JCM 
That’s right!.. so you , you didn’t actually come to this case without any 
background knowledge.  Knew that he had been with CAMHS for a while. Yea,  
em it may be that there was a subconscious part of yourself saying  well  
people are dealing with. Yea (04, FG, lines 129-133). 
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5.2.5 Categorizing and Presenting the Client 
 
As discussed above presenting M as a case began with a quasi-clinical 
description of M in the MWM.  Firstly, the Client was made anonymous by 
referring to him as M. Biographical and clinical information was given. This 
included his family structure and age. Clinical and special terms were also used 
e.g. “personal hygiene” and “depression”. In addition, M’s gestures and 
interaction were described clinically using terms such as “non-verbal”.  The 
further construction as client-as-function was suggested by the repeated 
attempts to present M as understandable through categorization as a set of 
special educational needs (Allan, 1999; Billington, 2002; Heritage & Greatbatch, 
1991). This was despite claiming that M’s gestures were “indefinable” (02, MWM 
line 21).   M was partitioned into behaviours and capacities. M’s talk was 
examined for articulation and production difficulties. For example, the account of 
the MWM said; “I noticed that he pronounced his “th” sound as “d”” (02, MWM 
lines 20 to 21) M’s reading skills were standardized (02, MWM lines12-13). Even 
M’s smiles were classified as evidence of appropriate social skills (02, MWM 
lines 10-11). Concerns about M’s attendance were medicalized through 
reference to M attending CAMHS (02, MWM line 7).  This use of technical 
language established category entitlement, enacted institutional identity while 
positioning M as a case (Benwell & Stoke, 2010; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; 
Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1995).   
 
M also arrived pre-presented as a case through being described in the Request 
for Service Involvement 61form (RfSI) and as a set of concerns (see Introduction 
for a list of those concerns). The RfSI form presented M as demographical details 
that enabled a file to be opened. It also provided information on the nature of the 
problem, strengths, difficulties, actions already taken and other 
services/professionals involved.  The process of presenting M as a case, 
                                                 
61
 See appendix 9 for a blank example of the form.  
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therefore, facilitated the classification of M while the classification of M facilitated 
his presentation as a case (Foucault, 1977).  
 
In the FG there was also concern about the labelling (categorizing) functional of 
EPs, for example:  
 
 
04, above, stated that despite the continual concern about labelling and 
categorizing persisted in Educational Psychology.   The need to invent words 
perhaps reflected that categorizing was inherent in the EP role (Nikander, 2003). 
In the EPS the words; ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’, ‘significant’ and ‘profound and 
complex’ had technical meanings and administrative functions in the allocation of 
resources.   The minimum threshold for additional resources for children with 
learning difficulties was ‘severe’.   However, there was anxiety about using the 
label of ‘severe’: 
 
The EP, above, rationalized the categorization of the Client as being required to 
obtain resources. The EP was also presenting themselves as a reluctant 
categorizer.  This reluctance was echoed by 04 below when describing warning 





“There is a whole ethics around the Ethics of labelling,  now we have moved 
on our labels  but we no longer  use retard  and goodness knows what but we 
have found a new set of words  meaning the same thing” (04, FG, lines 642-
644). 
“Do you often, I have found that  I have a conversation with mum, I am going 
to write severe  but that is so the child gets the money. Is that just me  (Lots of 
Yeas from the team)”  (02, FG, lines 646-648). 
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The quotes suggested that EPs were aware of and found problematic their 
gatekeeper and categorizing functions. It was unclear if the difficulty arose from 
using the categorical words or the parents reading of those words. Perhaps the 
full force of categorization became apparent when the reader became visible. 
Informing parents about the language used in the report could also be seen as 
asking them to collude in the of processes categorization.  The EPs in the 
quotes, below, further pointed to tensions between their administrative function 
and the ethical desire not to label:   
 
“… Caught between what we would like 
to say and what we need to say for 
resources to be in place (02, FG lines 
645-655).  
 
Writing about children speaking about 
children. How I do that, that’s 
intelligible to others? So if speak if I 
write in a child in a way demanded of 
me by the local authority, how am I re-
creating this child how am I shaping 
that child?  (05, FG, line 545-547). 
 
 
The above quotes suggested that EPs’ professional role both limited and 
structured what was and could be said (Benwell & Stoke, 2003). 05’s quote 
suggested that it was the identity of the child that was at stake in this 
epistemological game.  
 
The Matrix was itself a statement. It suggested that children’s’ needs could be 
taxonomically tabulated, normalized and categorized.  The Matrix standardized 
the categories by providing descriptions of each category. The Matrix also 
enabled the EPs to avoid using contentious words such as ‘severe’.  This was 
“When you  get my report it may sound  really negative  I will put some positive 
in about Johnny  but it is,  you know,  in order for the school to get, to do what 
he needs and..” (04, FG, lines 650-625).  
 154
because the EP could use descriptors (phrases from the Matrix) that Local 
Authority Officers could use to categorize the child and allocate resources.  This 
move both increased and decreased transparency. The Local Authority Officers 
would clearly know what the category would be, but the parents, without access 
to the Matrix would not be able to crack the code.  The reductive potential of the 
Matrix was acknowledged by the EPs below: 
 
02, above, suggested that the Matrix provided the possibility for a child to be 
reduced to a coordinate where the letter specified the category of SEN and the 
number the severity.  
 
5.2.6 Responsibilization of the EP and Client 
 
The account of the MWM frequently posited the positioning of M as hypothesis 







The above could be read as a neutral and exploratory dialogue; however this 
forgot the power inherent in Professional and Client relationships (e.g. Benwell & 
Stoke, 2010; Butler, 1997; Dillard, 1982; Mauthner, 1998; Stacey, 2002; Stanley, 
1990). Following, Butler (1997), the positing of hypothesis can be read as 
interpellation where M was being called to recognize (identify) himself as a set of 
deficits and needs that were normalized and valorised. This interpellation was 
“I then asked M about his fingernails and M explained that he had a bath every 
night but that his fingernails, because they were long, got dirty, very quickly. I 
explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been badly 
bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their hygiene, 
adding if M knew what hygiene meant” (02, MWM lines 37-40) 
 
 “08 once said that she was never going to describe a child as an I4 or what 
ever the words were” (02, FG, line 549)  
 
“Yes, yes that’s what I think, is that want you’re on about (yeah, yeah)” (08, 
FG, lines 552) 
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also located in medical and educational discursive formations which warranted 
both the categories and the speaker (Billington, 2002). M was therefore being 
asked to recognize (identify with) his Clienthood (Murry, 2007).   
 
M was not only fractured into a constellation of ‘needs’, those needs were also 
combined through suggesting causal links. For example, 02 stated: 
 
 
Combining the categories of needs could function to increase their explanatory 
function while warranting the individual categories (Foucault, 1977). 02’s 
connection of M’s reading difficulties and his Speech Therapy emphasized the 
importance of both and wove them into a new narrative that privileged the EP as 
the expert. 
 
In the FG responsibility was a recurring theme. As noted previously there was a 
discussion about whether the EP or M was responsible for the wide ranging 
nature of their discussion. This was resolved by make M responsible through 
formulating that he had consented to it.   A further example of how Clients were 
made responsible occurred in the discussion about whether, how or when to 
broach personal hygiene issues with a Client.   02 used the phrase “…children 
with hygiene problems” (02, FG, Line 105). Using the word “with” suggested that 
the Client was directly responsible for their hygiene. The possibility that the child 
might not have a problem and the problem was for the others they came into 





“I said that it was very common for young people who had persistent Speech 
and Language difficulties when they were younger to later have problem with 




The analysis suggested that the EP-Client relationship was characterized by 
processes that fabricated, formulated, positioned, authorized, justified and 
regulated the Client’s Clienthood. These processes included categorization, 
objectification and establishing boundaries. It was argued that while establishing 
Clienthood the identity of EPs’ was also being constructed and regulated.  The 
processes of clienthood also worked to locate both the EP and Client into a 
network of responsibility. Despite expressing anxiety about the asymmetrical EP-
Client relationship the analysis suggested EPs where actively involved in 
constructing and justifying that asymmetry. Some EPs suggested that the source 
of their power and the asymmetry was the preconception of the Client. The thesis 
argued that the EP, as a professional, was made available and presented as a 
subject to be admired in the discourses about professionalism (e.g. Arnold, 
2002).  This was discussed further below. These discourses also provided the 
EP with moral authority in the EP-Client encounter.      
 
Following Foucault (1989) the aims of the processes of Clienthood were to 
establish an EP-as-function and Client-as-function relationship. This, in turn 
alienated the EP from their non-EP identity and the EP’s non-EP identity from the 
Client’s non-Client identity.   However, recognizing the problematics produced in 
the EP-Client asymmetry facilitated ethical work (Allan, 1999). The EP-Client 
relationship was the ethical substance that needed to be worked over.  In the 
MWM there were no significant bioethical questions to be answered. Rather 
there was a distress about the wellbeing of another combined with an anxiety 
about having noticed particular features of the Client.  This prompted the 
question “what was it about being an EP that made noticing particular features of 
a Client problematic?”  The next section of the analysis of results will delineate 
how EP employed ethical rhetoric to present and position themselves as ethical 
professionals.   
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5.3 The Appropriation of Ethical Rhetoric  
 

















In line with national and international research the EPs reported that they 
frequently found themselves in ethically difficult situations (Bennett, 2008; 
Canter, et al., 1994; Chevalier, 1993; Glosoff & Pate, 2002; Guiney, 2009; Jacob-
Timm, 1999; Kindrick & Chandler, 1994; DCSF, 2009; Raviv, et al., 2003). This 
section analyzed how a range of ethical rhetoric was employed by EPs to 
position participants and rationalize, justify, authorize and warrant actions. In 
addition, the EPs descriptions of the emotional work resulting from the ethically 
difficult situations were also examined.   The section focused on biomedical 
ethics because it was the most frequent rationalization employed. However, other 
ethical positions such as care, virtue and particularism were also utilized as 
rationalizations for practice. As in the meta-theme “problematic relationships with 
the Client” the analysis of statements was made more complex because of the 
simultaneous and overlapping work done by the statements.   For example, 
confidentiality was entangled with consent and respect; while these bioethical 
themes worked together to enable the responsibilization, objectification and 
categorization of the Client and EP.   
 
3. The appropriation of 
ethical rhetoric  
 




• Not causing 
harm  
2c. Micro ethics 
virtue ethics, care 
ethics 
2d. Tensions between 
principles and 
particulars/contexts 
2a. Emotional work 
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During the FG I was aware of having introduced the theme of ethics into the 
discussion by asking the participants to consider their practice in this way. Some 
EPs stated that they had difficulties using ethics a frame to examine their 
practice.  For example 06, in the quote below suggested that ethics was not a 
construct that she frequently used:  
 
However 06 also suggested that although she might not have used the construct 
that she still evaluated her practice.  01, below, also appeared to have difficulties 
with disentangling whether the issues were practice or ethical issues: 
 
01, above was expressing difficulties disentangling ethical issues from child 
protection procedures. 06 and 01 responses supported the argument that 
participants did not readily frame work dilemmas as ethical dilemmas and that 
they had to be structured as ethical (Guiney, 2009; Nash, 1996; Water, 2008). 
However, 05 said that he thought about ethics “all the time” (05, FG, line 377). 
This suggested that framing issues as ethical, although not universal, was 
familiar to some of the EPs.  The subsequent discussion in the FG also 
suggested that even if EPs had not previously framed difficult work situations as 
ethical that they were able to do so.  
 
“… in that respect, but I don’t know whether its ethics or practice. I don’t know 
whether it is the difference between ethics and practice. This is what I am 
struggling with. Also when I think about doing a session with children it is 
always child protection, it could just be in my mind, that what I kept thinking 
about was child protection procedures.  And then I am thinking well there are 
ethical things within child protection procedures, well is that , the two , two 
separate things as well and  I think that it is all kind of messy in my head. 
Laugh (01 Lines 21-28) 
No I think you are right, so when you said do you think about ethics in your 
practice?  I think, I never think of the word ethics.  It not a word that pops into 
my head but I am always aware but I never… But I never think that’s not 
ethical but I am aware of what I am doing. (06, FG, lines 793-796) 
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The next section analyzed the bioethics subthemes before examining the 
microethical subthemes and the tensions between principles and contexts. 
 
5.3.1 Confidentiality  
 
Confidentiality was both explicitly referred to and implied in the MWM. 
Confidentiality was implied in anonymizing the Client using the letter M.  The 
phrase “during the meeting M made several disclosures” (MWM, line 30) 
positioned the meeting as a professional encounter through the use of technical 
vocabulary (Potter, 2005). Disclosures in this context were utterances that were 
bounded by codes of confidentiality.  The use of “XXX” 62 (MWM, line 45) to 
describe the amount of money M’s father had taken very clearly signalled 
confidentiality.  In the exchange below the EP established the formal rules of 
engagement and the limits of confidentiality: 
 
The above illustrated the complex, entangled and cumulative nature of 
statements. 02 positioned M as needing of care and protection.  This was 
signalled by the phrase “I would have to tell”. This suggested that the EP role 
was to protect the Client.  Also informing M that he did not have to disclose 
information was letting him know that he had rights that 02 was protecting those 
rights.   The phrase “you do not have to tell me” also linked confidentiality to 
consent. This, when combined with the statement that 02 would have to pass on 
information if 02 believed that the Client was at risk asked M to take some 
responsibility for the consequences of the disclosures he might make. The 
statement also presented 02 as being subject to rules and obligations (they 
                                                 
62
 The use of “XXX” to describe the amount  because in the follow up meeting with M he requested that the 
amount not be shared.  
“M then said he was going to tell me something about his family that no one 
knows and that he couldn’t believe that he was going to tell me. I said that he 
did not have to tell me and if there was something that was causing him harm I 
would have to tell” (02, MWM, lines 56-58). 
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would “have to tell”).   The next section further explored the relationship between 
consent and responsibility.  
 
5.3.2 Respect and Consent 
 
In the quote below, 02 attempted to show that the discussion not only took place 
with M’s consent but that M actively sought it: 
 
The rhetorical move, above, made M culpable/complicit in his objectification while 
02 adopted a posture of passivity.  The positioned passivity of 02 would need to 
be viewed in the extensive discussion about asymmetrical EP-Client relationship. 
02 also positioned himself as respecting M’s autonomy through presenting 
interpellations as suggestions (e.g. 02, MWM, lines 37-40). M was being asked to 
recognize the problems with hygiene as a response to bullying. In the same 
exchange 02 asked if M knew what hygiene meant. This could be read as an 
attempt to establish M’s capacity to understand (consent to) the interpellation 
made to him. In bioethics capacity to understand was considered to be the 
minimum requirement to autonomously to make an informed choice or consent 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000; Wolpoe, 1998).  However, it could 
also be perceived as being paternalistic. In the FG bioethics themes of respect, 
consent, confidentiality, concern about doing harm dominated and were further 
examined below.  
 
5.3.3 Respect (Continued) 
 
In the quote below 04 inferred that the EP in the account of the MWM had 
respected M’s religious beliefs:   
“It was lunch-time and my next child was not due until much later in the 
afternoon. I noted that it was lunch-time and said that he should go for 
something to eat. M said that he had already eaten and would prefer to talk” 




01, above, however suggested that respect was contingent and needed to be 
regulated by the limits on disclosure. This was perhaps an example of the 
tensions between principles that were played out in practice (Dancy, 1983, 2000, 
2004; Dworkin, 1995). 
 
5.3.4. Concern about Doing Harm 
 




In the quotes above 02’s empathy inferentially made available through the use of 
the word “feelings”. Other references to feelings included: 
 
Through referencing feelings 02 could have been “doing” (performing) empathy 
(Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; Pudlinski, 2005). This meant that 02 made readers 
“That was going to be one of my, my second points about  ,  I though that you 
were giving him some, reassurance ,  that you would respect his views em  em 
ah…  and that too is another difficult one.  Because it is about mutual self 
regard.  Our mutual regard rather.  Em but without letting him know that you 
yourself have any religious beliefs” (04, FG, lines 75-38.) 
“I further explained that there was very little connection between reading and 
spelling and intelligence. This was to make him feel better (after all I had just 
made him do something he found difficult in front of a stranger) and also to 
dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have about the meaning of his 
difficulties with spelling and reading.” (02, MWM, lines 24-28)  
 
“M told me that his family had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move 
house several time. I shared my feelings about this and asked him why he 
thought this was.” (02, MWM, lines 32-33)  
“I remember feeling” (02, MWM, line 3) 
 
“I asked M to think of three things that were positive in his life as this would 
help me after all the sad things we had talked about” (02, MWM, lines 96-97) 
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aware of his empathy for strategic purposes (to present himself positively). The 
rationalization given for making M feel better could also be read as paternalistic.  
02 appeared to be aware of the ethical concerns around testing.  However, 02 
also appeared to have already decided that testing was in M’s best interest. This 
was archived through rationalizing that the tests were necessary to have access 
to special examination arrangements.   Allan (1999) made problematic 
justifications based on acting in the Client’s best interest. M might have 
consented to seeing 02  but would he have known in detail what was being 
asked of him. For example, knowing that the testing would have to be 
administered until he repeatedly failed.  The literature suggested that these 
difficulties with informed consent were not unique to Educational Psychology 
(Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Frank & Jones, 2003).    
 
5.3.5. Care/Particular Ethics 
  
As discussed above, the MWM account attempted to positions 02 as caring by 
references to his feelings (Pudlinski, 2005). Acknowledgment of feelings and 
emotions was the antithesis of the biomedical emphasis of reason (Austin, 2007; 
Benner, 1997; Tong, 2005; Water, 2008).  In the MWM account 02 also 
emphasized contexts, human connectedness and relational aspects. 
 
The MWM emphasized contextual approaches through telling M’s story. This was 
achieved by presenting particular information about M (Charon 2001).  However, 
it was still 02 telling and editing M’s story rather than M speaking for himself. 
Contextualising M did not exclude 02 using their “logico-scientific” knowledge 
instrumentally to gain power over their Client (Tong, 1998, page 133).  That is, to 
be empathic only to better apply the treatment (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002).  In 
addition, the more 02 empathized the more vulnerable the Client was to 
exploitation (The more someone can see into another’s heart the more they 
could help or harm them). Emphasizing 02’s emotions also suggested 
connectedness with M. Connectedness was reinforced through privileging the 
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relational aspects of the encounter in the attempts to establish rapport.  However, 
connectedness and rapport can be instrumental. Duncombe & Jessop (2002) 
argued that doing rapport and “faking friendship” could be strategies to achieve 
therapeutic or research goals. For example, the Clients/Participants would be 
less resistant and provide more information if they had rapport and felt valued by 
the professional. 02 did not make any direct reference to virtue ethics. However, 
it could be argued that 02 was making a virtue of their care for M. 02, therefore, 
positioned himself as an ethical practitioner through doing empathy. The reader 
was invited to see this as a rational for 02 behaviour and interaction with M.  This 
made a link between character and behaviour and hence virtue63.  The 
rationalization 02 was making available was that to be truly caring one must be a 
caring person (Tong, 1998). This was founded on 02 presenting that he had 
feelings for the Client as emotions were considered central to making an action 
ethical (Tong, 1998; Blum, 1994) Following Foucault (2002), these criticisms64 of 
contextualization, connectedness and rapport did not mean that they were bad. 
Rather, they could be dangerous if they made the professional at ease with their 
practice and stopped them thinking. The critical engagement with 
contextualization, connectedness and rapport were calls to remain critical about 
professional practice (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; Pudlinski, 2005).  
 
The analysis suggested that, in the MWM, 02 employed a complex mixture of 
biomedical, care and virtue ethics to justify actions and as tools to present both 
EP and Client (Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1988; Tong, 1998). Through 
employing biomedical ethics 02 attempted to position his practice within 
traditional ethical principles of respect for autonomy, consent, concern about 
doing harm, confidentiality, promoting agency and choice (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000;  Rose, 1999; Wolpoe, 1998).  This was what Tong 
(1998) picturesquely called “… our public, professional, dress-for-moral-success 
                                                 
63
 This was because positive character traits are often considered to be virtues.  
64
 By criticism I meant providing the opportunity for reading against how the author perhaps intended the 
account to be read. I was aware that anything can be described negatively or made to seem sinister. This did 
not mean that they were. However, purposely reading against provided a metaphorical distance to look 
again at something that previously resisted challenge.  
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language” (Ibid, page 132). The appropriation of Care ethics also enabled 02 to 
portray himself as caring, empathic, virtuous and compassionate.   The co-
existing of biomedical and virtue and care ethic function like ideological dilemmas 
(Billig et al., 1988).   This enabled both care and biomedical positions to be 
enacted simultaneously and sequentially to achieve strategic goals.  
 
5.3.6. Ethical Discussion in the Focus Group 
 
The EPs in the FG also employed most of the major themes in ethics including 
Bioethical issues of consent, respect, causing harm and confidentiality. However, 
similar to previous research, the EPs’ references to professional codes of ethics 
were rare (Bennett, 2009; Guiney, 2009; Nash, 1996). The EPs also employed 
deontological, principled, virtuosic, care and particularist   rationalizations to 
justify and explain their actions.   
 
A deontological approach to ethics was evident when discussing the required 
duty to a Client in relation to duties to several other ‘stakeholder’ Clients. For 
example, 05, below, outlined the multiple duties he experienced: 
 
05 suggested that his duties were in tension. This tug between Clients was 
reflected in the reviewed literature (e.g. Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Gillham, 1999; 
Mackay, 2002).  While recognizing that the complexity derived from having 
multiple Clients presented additional challenges for EPs it might also have been 
beneficial.  For example, being responsible to everyone might mean being 
responsible for no one. In addition, framing the issues as conflicts of interests or 
competing duties avoided viewing the issues as being about commitments. In 
situations where an EP was be called by a Client to make a commitment to their 
“Can I say about split allegiance in the job?  For example the matrix, my duty 
to whom , my duty to the child,  to the family to the school to the Local 
Authority ( LA  to psychology), to psychology. So there are different 
stakeholder and that presents ethical challenges” (05, FG, lines 538-541). 
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wellbeing (stand up for them), reframing   these commitments as balancing 
duties could ease an abandonment of the Client.   
 
The conflicting duties also pointed to the nature of the context (discursive 
formation) in which EPs worked (Gillham, 1999). The multiple stakeholders 
pointed to the statutory, gatekeeper, administrative functions of the EP role while 
making visible how EPs were held accountable (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; 
Cameron & Monsen, 2005; MacKay, 2002; Newman, 1997). These multiple roles 
also existed in a discourse that emphasized the importance of the EP-Client 
relationship.  The competing roles and discourses challenged the autonomy of 
EPs and supported Guiney’s (2009) argument that EPs were semi-professionals.  
Following Araujo & Martuccelli (2010), the tension created between the EPs’ 
Local Authority Officer role and the discourse that suggested that professionals 
should be autonomous provided the opportunities for trials in which an EP could 
work on their professional identity.  Each time an EP negotiated between their 
Local Authority Officer role and their commitments to Clients they were engaging 
in practices that constructed their professional identity. The FG discussion also 
suggested that different EP emphasized different aspects of the EP-Client 
relationship and their relationship with Local Authority.  This perhaps explained 
the differences in interpretation of professional identity between EPs.    
 
The suggested entanglement of the EP role with administrative functions would 
make the call for a return to psychology problematic.  As stated in the literature 
review I find it difficult to imagine a neutral location for EPs to work from.  In each 
possible location (being employed by school, National Government, Local 







5.3.7. Particularism   
 
The EP’s discussion in the FG suggested a particularist approach to context and 
strategies.  For example; in the quote below 04 was discussing the utility of 
challenging teacher categorization of issues/children. 
 
In the above, 04 suggested that the contexts shaped what she could say. 04 
argued that although she might want to challenge a teacher she had to be 
strategic to achieve a greater goal.   
 
The subthemes of principles, particulars and consent were entangled.  09, below 
argued that context (age, gender, originator of the behaviour and Clients’ 
capacity to understand) was a factor that shaped practice: 
 
In the above quote 09’s approach was more akin to the casuistic approach 
described by Toulmin (1982).  09 was privileging particular features of the Client 
over universal principles (Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004; Dworkin, 1995).  These 
particular features both qualified practice and the application of principles.  
“It’s definitely context dependent, I, I’d had conversations with teenage girls 
about her personal hygiene.  I didn’t begin with going to do that but that is 
where the conversation went.  I knew that she had personal hygiene 
problems because I had been told about them.   I didn’t go in thinking that I 
was going to talk about them but they came up in conversation. I don’t think 
that there is anything wrong with that.  I do think that age plays a part in it.  I 
don’t think  I would be having that conversation with  7 year old.  But I think a 
teenage who , maybe or may be not able to understand. The child I had a 
conversation was able to understand the difficulties it caused her with the 
personal hygiene” (09, FG, Lines 146-154) 
“The drop in this morning the first teacher sat down, she sat there.  Went, 
he’s a naughty boy and that gets my back up , I want to say , want to say,  I 
don’t you… want to use that word. , or words to that effect.   But I couldn’t 
because the rest of the consultation would have been a right off because I 
would have got her back up.  So I had to king of right, right and kind of move 
on.” (04, FG, lines 621-625) 
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5.3.8 Principles  
 
The tension between particularism and principlism was further explored below.  
In the exchange below, 02 and 04 were having an exchange about consent.  
 
04, above, suggested that consent was one of the overarching principles. This 
was emphasized through the use of phrases such as “everything must be done” 
and “must”.  This view resonated with Beauchamp & Childress’ (2001) argument 
that there were universal, prima facie, culturally neutral ethical, principles.  
Establishing an action as a principle sets it up as something that cannot be 
challenged and was therefore a powerful rhetorical move (Dworkin, 1997; Lance 
& Little, 2006; Little, 2001). The extent to which consent remained an overarching 




The tension between principles and practice was exemplified in the extended 
quote below where 01 was discussing the issues of actualizing consent in 
everyday situations: 
LP: “I think that going back to your first em that, em,  analogies, think there it is 
the very basic of ethics is consent  (lots of agreement in room) . Em and 
everything must be done with the consent of the , who it is being done to.  
Obviously the parent in some, in terms of our referral system , but also we 
must have the consent of the person , of the lit…, young person that it is being 
done to.  
 
02: “Is that not context specific?...is it context specific or is it or it something 
bigger.  
 
LA: It might be one of the overarching ones”.   (04& 02, FG, lines 497-509) 
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The above account of practice suggested that there were tensions between 
recognising Client’s right to consent to involvement and the pressures  that 
disavowed the other’s right to consent.  01 suggested that she had to negotiate 
between her administrative function (to provide a service to schools) and the 
rights of the individual (Goodman, McElliot and Marks, 2003). 01’s portrayal 
therefore emphasized the messiness, social embeddedness of and emotional 
engagement with professional practice (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; Singer, 2004,). 
This was in contrast to the neutral, rational, distant scientific practitioner model of 
professional practice in and outside Educational Psychology (Holtum & Gobel, 
2006; Fallon, Woods & Rooney, 2011; Lane & Corrie, 2006; Lund, 2000; Moore, 
2005; Taylor, 2006 Webster, Hingley & Franey, 2000).   07, below, further 






“I was working with a child who has been in long-term care and she has seen 
various professions and she new into the school. , know you they are very 
concerned about her. And they want me to meet with her and she doesn’t 
want, wants me , wants to meet with me.  And the SENCO is literally trying to 
lure her into the room.  And I was sort of like look I don’t think this is going to 
work. Like even if we get her in her she is not going to talk to me.  This is not, 
you know helpful.  And the barrier for me was that the SENCO was so 
desperate for me to see, she was coercing in. In the end I had a chat with her 
and her friend.  Really informal environment cause I didn’t  feel more 
comfortable and then can she then move. I felt that we, we somehow tricking 
her into doing it, and I , it wasn’t helpful for her.  At that point she was new into 
the school.  So in terms of , I thinking, an initial barrier I thought is, is  
sometimes pressure on em, from other people and there is a pressure  from 
other people and resources sometimes.  You have got to have a certain 
environment to have an assessment with a child.  And often that is not 
available  in schools so sometime is, do , probably compromise my practice  to 
adapt, rather than have to pick a , and have to come back another day and 





07, above, also pointed to the difficulties of reconciling principles in everyday 
practice (Arras, 1990; Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004: Dworkin, 1995; Elliott, 1999; 
Singer, 2004; Toulmin, 1982).  This was perhaps most clear in the rhetorical 
question, “Can we ever get full consent” (07, FG, lines 503-511).  To pressure 
from others and limited resources 07 added the influence of 
charismatic/apotheosistic power of professionals in shaping Client’s agency. This 
was inferred by 07 linking her role as a   professional and “special person” to the 
Client’s capacity to consent. In other words, it was the “site” the professional 
spoke from that reduced the Client’s capacity to consent (Rose, 1999).    07 was 
identifying a type of micro relational power that operated in the EP-Client couple.  
This shifted the gaze from a Beauchamp & Childress’ (1989) presentation of 
bioethical jugdements, concerned with weighing competing principles, to one 
focused on the power relations in Professional-Client relationships (Arras, 1990; 
Singer, 2004). 
 
07 (07, FG, Lines 503-511) stating that she “found it difficult” and “it can be quite 
extreme”  pointed  to  the emotional work offered by  practicing in contexts where 
informed consent was problematic but demanded  (Water, 2008; Corrigan, 2003; 
Jallinoja, 2001; O’ Neill, 2004). Phrases such as “lure”, “trick”, “I didn’t…feel more 
comfortable” and “push” used by 01 (01, FG, lines 468-484) above suggested 
that she too found the complexity challenging.  The emotional work resulted from 
working in a situation there was no “ideal” outcome and then having to live with 
“And that’s difficult because sometimes they feel that they have got to see us 
because be are , we are the sort of special  person who is coming to see 
them.  And another area where I find difficult and were ethics is brought in, is 
when you are administering tests. And they are actually finding them quite 
hard, especially in something like reading tests.  And that I find difficult when 
they are struggling and they are coming, coming well quite distressed.  And it 
can be quite extreme and again  consent you know,  would they consent to 
doing that if they knew  they would become distressed but we as professionals 
(increased tone), the special person  coming in to see them , they have to see. 
I find that quite hard sometimes.  Can we ever get full consent?”  (07, FG, 
lines 503-511). 
 170
the consequences of decisions. The emotional work included being required to 
witness the suffering of Others (Water, 2008).    The emotional impact of working 
in messy contexts was also discussed by 05, below: 
 
 
The phrase, above, “And discussing them going on and go on and on discussing 
them we may feel they don’t feel they don’t get us anywhere so we may feel that 
we just need to the best we can within the context” suggested that 05 had 
adopted, what Water (2008, page 194) referred to as “learning to live with” the 
ambiguity approach.   The EP’s accounts, above, had passive and submissive 
tones. For example, 05 above stated that he felt “pretty powerless to do anything 
about it” and that discussion did not “get us anywhere”. 01 had also suggested 
that she felt pressure from others. The feeling that circumstances were beyond 
the control of a professional was identified by Water (2008) and Critchley & 
Bernosconi (2002) as common to practitioners and a source of distress.   The 
socially embedded and emotionally engaged accounts presented by the EPs 
supported Water’s (2008) argument that rational neutral choice was a fallacy in 
healthcare professional-Client relationships. However, passivity perhaps helped 
to mitigate 01’s responsibility. 
 
The analysis did not resolve the principle and particular debate. Rather, EPs 
appeared to make strategic rhetorical appeals to both principles and particulars.  
Constructs such as consent were both held to be absolute principles and 
mitigated and made problematic by contexts. The emphasis should not be on 
outing inconsistencies (about whether an EP says one thing here and another 
I would sometimes say that part of the time we sometimes have an awareness 
of  certain big structural  issues how we feel pretty powerless to do anything 
about that impact on our practice.  In on our preferred practice,  and 
discussing them  going on and go on and on discussing them we may feel 
they don’t feel they don’t get us anywhere so we may feel that we just need to 
the best we can within the context.  Even if not how we feel be ethically 
perfect. Because we feel we feel we have no other choice. Does that make 
sense? (05, FG, Lines 798-804) 
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there) so as to catch an individual out. Rather, it could be argued that the 
inconsistencies pointed to the flexible employment of   discursive resources to 
justify, rationalize and legitimise positions.   
 
5.3.10 Care Ethics 
 
In the quote below 06 discussed the difficulties of competing loyalties.  
 
In the quote above 06 was describing the (ethical) tug of being between two 
commitments. The tensions were between the responsibilities and obligations the 
EP owed to each party. This included whether to commit to or abandon the Client 
and the emotional consequences of those decisions. Verkerk (2001) described 
the choice as deciding whether or not to be there for the Client.  The quandary in 
that situation was not just a rational choice but one of emotional commitment and 
ethico-political action (Austin, 2007; Giroux, 1997). 04 stated the ethico-political 
action required an EP to “stand up and be counted” (04, FG, line 812).  This was 
ethics at the micro level because it was about personal commitment, particular 
situations and local engagements (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008: Komesaroff, 1995). 
02 added that it was important to “pick you fights” otherwise “you would fight 
everything to the dead” (02, FG line 815). 02’s intercession suggested that 
working as an EP could not only be compromising but also that there were lots of 





“I think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up.  And I am really caught, I 
have been discussing, discussing this with LA I think that the parent and the 
child, I’m on their side, well I think.  Well yeah I am on their side.  But when I 
sit in that tribunal  I  work for the  local authority.  And like I said to you I am 
really caught (ND caught between ) yeah. I am really struggling.” (06, FG, lines 
593-597)  
 172
5.3.11. Virtue  Ethics 
 
The recourse to virtue ethics was inferred when explaining ethics as a product of 
personal character.  In the discussion, there was debate about the extent to 
which ethical judgement was constant or adapted and grew with experience. For 
example, during a discussion on the source of ethics 03, see below, suggested 
that the ultimate ethical arbiter was the individual EP.   
 
In the above quote 03 appeared to be adopting a highly individualistic position. 
This position did not recognize that the Client had as much, if not more than, the 
EP to lose.  After all, the work of the EP could help determine the type of 
educational provision a child could attend and the amount and type resources 
that could be allocated to a child.   03’s rhetorical moved might both have made 
EPs accountable while sustaining the processes that required the EP to be 
accountable.  The EP being the ultimate arbiter facilitated EP’s seeing their 
problems as emanating from themselves and their individual processes. This 
directed the critical gaze away from issues such as the equity of the allocation of 
resources which required processes of categorization.  The processes of 
categorization required the EP to engage in practices for which they would be 
accountable to the Local authority and their Client. This individualism was 
echoed by 04’s in the quote below; 
 
 
I think even before you come into psychology training your ethics are being 
formed from your upbringing.  And how much that can change is variable.  I 
think you can change in terms of seeing things and thinking that I need to alter 
my practice in that way but I’m , I don’t think you can move massively  from 
where you are”  (general agreement) (04, FG, lines 669-673) 
We have a  saying at home which links to the first point, the personal thing and 
probable to contextual thing as well. “Its yourself you have to sleep with at 
night” (03, FG,  lines 740-741). 
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04 appeared, through emphasizing biography, to suggest experience rather than 
ethical codes were the source of ethics.  04 also appeared to suggest that ethics 
was something individualistic, constant and immutable to change. 03, below, 
while supported the individualist approach attempted to reconcile this internal 
individual approach with ethical guidelines:  
 
 
In the above quote, 03 expressed both anxiety about his beliefs and also that 
they were tempered by the Senior Management Team (SMT).  The discipline and 
governance of the SMT appeared to be balanced with the organisational 
protection he received from the SMT.  For 03 it appeared that ethical practice 
was therefore navigated between personal beliefs and professional 
requirements. 03 was therefore asking both for metaphorical and physical 
‘wriggle room’.  
 
However 05, below, suggested that ethical practice was something that changed 
with practice: 
 
“I must say that I have set of beliefs or values which is part of me that inform 
me but within that I look at the guidelines you know. But in a way my journey is 
the opposite way to you   I have got a very strong moral, I shouldn’t say that 
shouldn’t I.  We shouldn’t have that in this job.  I have a strong belief system in 
what is right and what is not. In my own little box.  The guides that 08 allows 
me or 04 allows me or 09 allows me.  To travel … some protection from Senior 
Management Team…You know what I mean within the organisation. Within 
the organisation how much I can do you know (MK then wiggles his whole 
body-some laughter)” (03, FG,  lines 669-676) 
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05 was asserting that through exploring ethics that his experience of being 
reflexive had increased the need for him to take personal responsibility for his 
practice. 05 positioned himself as a rational actor. This position also privileged 
the autonomous professional (Turner, 2009). 05’s description could also be read 
as a description of identity work.  05 suggested that his past resolutions to 
difficult ethical situations had shaped his current practice. 05’s identity work 
appeared to be shaped by both his biography, the nature of the issues and 
informed by theory. The themes of vulnerability, responsibilities and flexibility 
were also discussed by 02 in the quote below: 
 
The above quote also positioned the EP as a rational actor making important 
decisions.   It also suggests that being empowered to make decision was 
combined with an increased sense of responsibility for those decisions. The EP 
“I would say my ethical practice or how I think about my ethical practice has 
changed, well over the last 5 years since becoming a psychologist,  em, I think 
that  part of that is because I wrote in my doctorate. And initially and as a child 
and growing up  and pre psychology I was sort of  indoctrinated into having a 
morals and coming to psychology, into training I was quite happy to  BPS 
guidelines and the quite lousy based on Kant’s   imperatives  and feeling  safe 
to know my practice within that framework. I could think of as ethical.  I think 
that through writing my thesis and considering the more detailed ethics have 
become more and more aware to take personal responsibility for my actions.  
That goes beyond those basic framework, its made me, made my practice 
much more uncomfortable.  You know, I find every case a challenge a 
difficulty, perplexing and confusing.  You know, and the, that has become 
heightened through the doctorate and being exposed to conversation like this” 
(05, FG, lines 656-667) 
“I think I have become increasingly flexible. In that more pragmatic, so  I think, 
you’re right its more a morally vulnerable position. Then I have to say, if I am 
saying that then I have to take on the consequences, that is not going to 
happen or that is going to happen.  Then I have to accept it so  I used to write, 
in the beginning, things like  vague statements about children  and  then it is 
somebody’s else’s job to say if they go to special school. Right, but now I am , 
or I would do, now I am more prepared to say what my opinion is  and  say 
what that child needs … Whereas when I was starting I wanted to be  very 
prim and proper.” (02 lines 678-688) 
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was once again simultaneously the subject that knows and the object that was 
known (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).  The EPs (03, 05 and 02) were all privileging the 
individual decision maker who weighed up the costs and benefits before coming 
to a decision (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002).  
 
In the above examples the EP’s utilization of their biographies to explain their 
current ethical positions had some resonances with Araujo & Martuccelli’s (2010) 
and Pezé’s (2011) account of individualization work.  Individualization occurred 
as each EP worked on or resolved each of trials that Educational Psychology and 
other institutions presented. For example, the trail for 02 might have been “what 
can I say about a child that is ethical?”  The EPs’ solutions would have been 
individual or unique solutions because their biographies (resolutions to, or work 
on, past trials) would have been unique. This enabled the EPs to position 
themselves as more than, and additional to their, EP role.  The processes of 
individualization explained why EPs did not share identical professional identities.   
However, following Foucault (1979), the EPs might have only come to see 
themselves as individuals through engaging with individualizing practices.  These 
individualizing practices (e.g. normalizing self-examination) help individuals to 
understand themselves as individuals.  The difference between Araujo & 
Martuccelli (2010), Pezé (2011) and Foucault (1979) was that Foucault’s account 
included an additional emphasis on power that shaped the individual.   
 
5.3.12 Summary  
 
The analysis suggested that EPs regularly found themselves in difficult and 
problematic situation.  The EPs, although with some hesitancy, were able to 
understand these difficult situations as ethical situations.  These situations 
provided opportunities for emotional, ethical and identity work. The EP account of 
emotional work challenged the model of the neutral, rational and distant scientific 
practitioner. Rather the EPs’ accounts suggested that their practice was socially 
embedded and emotionally engaged. The EPs, through the utilization of their 
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biographies also suggested that engagement with past difficult situations shaped 
their current ethical identity.     The analysis of the ethical rhetoric employed by 
EPs suggested that the EPs utilized a highly eclectic, and unacknowledged, 
range of ethical themes and rationalizations. This pointed to a strategic use of 
ethics (Tong, 1998; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1988).  Different 
formulation of ethics appeared to be employed depending on the aims of the 
speaker and context. For example, when discussing the source of their ethical 
behaviours some EPs emphasized personal virtues and experiences but when 
discussing the proper relation with Clients the EP’s tended to employ biomedical 
ethics. In addition, principles tended to be privileged when speaking in the 
abstract about Clients but context and particulars were stressed when describing 
everyday practice. Ethics was therefore a flexible tool used strategically by the 
EP rather than just a regime imposed on the EP.   The next section further 
examined how the research participants were both presented by others and 
presented themselves. 
 
5.4 The Strategic Presentation of the EP  
















This section of the results analyzed how EPs were both   presented and 
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and presentations were argued to privileged a rational practice and alienated the 
EP from their non-professional identity and the EP from the non-client identity of 
the Client. Professionalism was the main rationalization employed to justify, 
legitimize and regulate practice.  The term apotheosis was used to describe talk 
where EPs privileged the positive aspects of their professional character, ethics 
or role.   The processes of apotheosis appeared to both sustain and construct the 
EP-as-Professional while warranting and authorizing modes of practice and EP-
Client relations. These processes articulated the charismatic authority of the EP 
which complemented their statutory authority. However, it was already suggested 
that EPs could not sustain this apotheosis in their own eye and attempted to 
locate its origin in the eyes of the Client. The EPs also balanced the theme of 
apotheosistic (hero)65 psychologist with a more anti-heroic (feet of clay) portrayal 
of their role.   
 
5.4.1 Meeting with M 
 
5.4.2 The Professional Rationalization of EP Practice 
 
In the account of the MWM the EP did not refer to himself as an EP or 
professional.  However, this was not necessary as the professional identity was 
made inferentially available through the use of professional specific jargon, 
technical language and formulating M’s story psychologically (Garfinkel & Sacks, 
1970: Jayyusi, 1982; Potter, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2003) As described above 
this professional identity was appropriated to warrant and justify the judgements 
made and advice given (e.g. 02, MWM, lines 20-28 and lines 37-43).  In the FG 
the EP referred to this formulation as doing the “psychology job” and employing 
psychological thinking (02, FG, line 121 & 124). 
.    
                                                 
65
 During the write up of the analysis I constantly vacillated between the terms hero and apotheosis. In the 
end I settled for  using apotheosis in homage to Foucault (1989) use of the term in Madness and 
Civilization.   
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In the FG the term ‘professional’ was frequently used and performed both 
regulatory and categorical functions, examples of which are provided below: 
• To regulate the talk between the EP and Client (04, FG, lines 45-47) 
• As a means to discipline practice (03, FG, line 185 and lines 377-388).  
• To sustain an emotional distance between the EP and Client (04, FG, 
lines 232 also 337 uses the word “distance” to describe the relationship). 
• To establish EP-Client boundaries (02, FG, lines 445-448). 
• A legitimization of behaviour in lines. For example, 06 legitimized her hug 
by saying it was done professionally (06, FG, lines 456-458). 
• As source of power (01, FG, lines 520-523). 
• Belonging to a larger family of Professionals (01, FG lines 478-481). This 
could be seen as a form of profession alignment where the EP was 
making the category of professional available to them (Potter, 2005). This 
alignment could then be used to establish speaking rights (Drew & 
Sorjonen, 1997).  
• To establish a binary between a professional and human relationships 
(line 304 and 317-319)  
• Alienating the Client from the non-professional identity of the EP (04, FG, 
lines 325-332). 
• Professional relationship as powerfully asymmetrical (03, FG, lines 307-
309). 
• Professional as a means to manage the emotional work involved in the 
role (06, FG, lines 321-323 also 09, FG, lines 334-338). 
• Professionals as emotional cold and clinical (03, FG, line 382-388).  
 
The analysis suggested that EPs made appeals to professionalism to justify and 
legitimize a wide range of positions or actions. EPs also used the constructs of 
professional/professionalism to regulate their practice. The analysis argued that 
the term professional was formulated as the source of the EPs’ authority and also 
disciplined and regulated EPs’ conduct and the EP-Client relationship. This was 
evident in the above examples of the types of recommended EP-Client 
relationship. The binary between human and professional relational was 
particularly interesting and pointed to the alienation present in the relationship 
(Benjamin, 2002, 2004; Foucault, 1989).  This included what they could say, how 
much they could say and who they could say it to.   Following, Wagner (2000) 
that while the EP’s were talking about their roles they were also actively involved 
in constructing that role.  In the FG this was a communal practice where the EPs 
negotiated and shared their professional identities with each other.   
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Betwixt and Between 
 
In the MWM 02 does not explicitly articulate that he was working within 
competing demands/stakeholders. However the demands had left a trace.  The 
trace was manifest in the unease felt in 02.   The tensions were between M’s 
demand to be recognized as more than a Client and the demands of the other 
stakeholders. For example, 02 placed himself betwixt and between M’s demand 
for care and the demands from others for test scores, clinical description and 
professional relations.  
 
The FUP66 meeting  reminded us that as well as Clients being characters in the 
professional stories of EPs  that EPs were also characters in the life stories of 
Clients, if sometimes only very minor character. During the FUP M was asked 
what he recalled about the meeting, M replied: 
 
 
In the FG the EPs discussed being betwixt and between parents and school and 
the Local Authority (LA) and the client.  
 
5.4.3 Betwixt and between  Parents and Schools 
 
In the quote below 03 described frequently working with conflicting accounts 
suggested by school and parents.  
 
                                                 
66
 See appendix 3 for notes on follow-up meeting with M and his mother.  
“To be honest I had forgot. It was only when you rang I remembered, lots of 




5.4.4 Betwixt and Between the Local Authority and Clients. 
 
In the quote below 06 was explaining feeling pulled between her Local Authority 
role and duty to Clients: 
 
The locating of the EP as being betwixt and between works to provide a space in 
which the options are the autonomous, rational and the neutral professional and 
the caring practitioner. 06 was suggesting that being betwixt and between felt like 
having to take sides and challenges the supposedly neutral space inhabited by 
EPs. The above quote echoed the finding from the DCSF Lamb Enquiry (2009) 
which argued that EPs’ were fettered by their Local Authority role.  
 
The EPs’ descriptions of the ethical tugs resulting from be caught betwixt and 
between resonated with the finding from the national and international research. 
(Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; Jacob-Timm, 1999; DCSF, 2009) The EPs in the 
FG presented themselves are working in complex situations (Schön, 1987). 
These ‘swampy lowlands’ were comprised of uncertainty, risk, interdependence 
and multiple interconnecting parts. This complexity was shaped by working in 
situations where there was multiple demands for multiple and sometimes 
multidisciplinary Clients (Carter et al., 1994; Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; Jacob-
Timm, 1999). While managing these human relationships EPs were expected to 
perform varied tasks.  Fairchild (2010) argued that complexity resulted in 
“In most cases, in any case we get conflicting narrative for different actors in 
the same, same kind of line.  I certainly come across cases where parents 
might say one thing but school might say, report something different” (03, FG, 
lines 206-208). 
I think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up.  And I am really caught, I have 
been discussing, discussing this with LA.  I think that the parent and the child, 
I’m on their side, well I think.  Well yes I am on their side.  But when I sit in that 
tribunal I work for the local authority.  And like I said to you I am really caught 
(06. FG. Lines 593-596) 
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decreased work motivation and increased ethical dissonance in practice. 
However, complexity also demanded personal, individualized, responsibility. This 
privileged the rational decision maker who was expected to negotiate the 
complexity while making judgements for which they were accountable (Turner, 
2009).   
 
The next section analysed how the authority of the EP was enmeshed in the 
privileging of the character of the Professional.  
 
5.5.6 Apotheosis of the Psychologist 
 
In the MWM, 02 gave an account of his efforts to care,  listen, reflect, be 
balanced, considerate, ethical, to weigh in the balance the competing demands, 
show patience (when discussing beliefs). For example, 02 presented himself as: 
• Caring  (MWM, line 26) and  where the EP asked M to reflect on what was 
positive in his life (MWM, lines 96-99), 
• Rational (MWM, lines 37-40),  
• Empathic (awareness of M feelings, how he looked and sounded, noticing 
details (MWM, lines 20-28), 
• Respectful (MWM, lines 62-64), 
• Evidence based (MWM, lines 25-26) 
• Keeper of secrets  (MWM, lines 45-46: 56-58) 
• Ethical through obtaining consent (MWM, lines 17-18) 
• Hardworking (giving up lunch-time to speak to a Client (MWM, lines 15-
19),  
• Holder of special/technical knowledge (MWM, lines 20-28).   
 
02’s self-presentation resonated with the romantic characterization of 
professionals (Arnold, 2002; Francis, 2009; MacDonald, 1995). The inclusion of 
personal characteristics such as caring emphasized the ethical nature of the 
work. However, the above examples of apotheosis (self-aggrandisement) needed 
to be balanced against the more critical account of the EP-Client encounter given 
above.  In the FG the participants also presented themselves positively.  EPs 
were: 
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• Powerful (01, FG, lines 292-294, 03, FG 307-319). 
• Emotionally disciplined (04, FG, lines 54-63, 01 FG, lines 249-251). 
• Autonomous (03, FG, lines 689-694 and 04, FG, Lines 740-741).  
• Source of ethics (FG lines 358-361; 377-387). 
• Concerned about consent and what they did was so significant that it 
required consent (01, FG, line 6). 
• Opening up spaces where people can come to know or speak the truth 
about themselves (01, FG, lines 16-18).  
• Protector of children (01, FG, Lines 23-28). 
• Listener to personal stories (08, FG, lines 172-177). 
• Someone Clients have a special and unique relationship with (03, FG, 
lines 409- 441). 
• Speaker of challenging truths. For example, reporting that a child has 
“severe” learning needs (01, FG, lines 635-640). 
• Maker of important decisions such as the severity of a special educational 
need (02, FG, lines 646-648). 
• Carrier of the emotional burdens of Clients and stoically not disclosing 
personal feelings (04, FG, lines  57-63, 01, FG,  lines 249-259, and 01 , 
FG, lines 255-25). 
• Empathic (01, FG, 250-251). 
• Respecter of other’s views (04  FG, lines 74-78). 
• Analyzer of problems and provider of solutions (02, FG, lines 121-127). 
• Empowering others (06, FG, line 136-137).  
 
The above statements again resonated with the romanticized view of 
professionals (MacDonald, 1995; Arnold, 2002). The above positive 
characterization of the EPs amounted to apotheosis of EPs’ personage because 
it privileged the EPs’ personality and character. This emphasis of the character 
and personality of EPs established their ethical superiority.  Foucault (1989) 
argued that it was this apotheosis that the practitioner derived their 
authority/power.  However, EPs also presented themselves negatively, see 
below:   
• struggling with the asymmetry (03, FG, lines 304-309) 
• Having limited capacity to solve problems (06, FG, lines 135-136).   
• Empathy having to be tempered with reason (03, FG, 263- 264) 
• Being unable to know Clients sufficiently (01, FG, lines 285-286) 
• Being moved by the stories of others (01, FG, lines 325-332) 
• In need of protection (04, FG,  Lines 334-338) 
• User of deficit and reductive language (05, FG, lines 545-547) 
• Governed by ethical guidelines (03, FG, lines 385-388) 
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• Limited by time (01, FG, 563-565)  
• Limited in what can be said (04, FG, lines 575-577) 
• Limited by bureaucratic  thresholds and procedures (05, FG, Lines 528-
536) 
• Subject to pressure from others (01, FG, lines 477-495) 
• Someone clients might not want to work with (04, FG lines 477-495) 
• Requiring clients to do difficult things  (02, FG,  lines 514-523) 
 
The analysis suggested that the EPs acknowledged that they had power but also 
felt powerless. This challenged the crude argument that Professionals were 
straightforwardly powerful and Clients were vulnerable (Gabe et al., 1991; 
Hoeyer, 2006; Kleiuman, 1999; Laidlaw, 2002).   The analysis suggested the 
more subtle argument that the EPs were both subjects that knew and objects of 
knowledge (Benjamin, 2004, 2009; Foucault, 2001). The power flowed from the 
epistemological site (Educational Psychology) from which they spoke. However 
this was not power that they possessed and were equally influenced by it 
(Foucault, 1979).  
 
Foucault (1989) argued that the apotheosis of the professional alienated the 
professional from the client or as Benjamin (2004, 2009) argued the 
professional’s non-professional identity from the Clients, non-client identity.  
Evidence for this alienation was perhaps seen in the discussion about what sort 
of relationship EPs should and could have with Clients.  The discussion was 
started by the question “Why can we not have that human relationship with, with 
the people we work with, the children and the parents” (02, FG, 280-281)67.  The 
reply was: 
 
                                                 
67
 It was noted that the questioner’s use of the phrase “human relationship” already established a binary 
between human and professional relationships.   
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01 was clear above that the Professional and non-Professional relationships 
were different not least because the EP did not, and could not, presume to know 
Clients.  01 (line 292-294) further suggested that the power asymmetry in the 
relationship already made it different. 06 was very clear about the differences 
between personal and professional relationships: 
 
06, above, suggested that Clients were intentionally alienated from the non-
professional identity of the EP because it was “our job”.  The rationalization given 
appeared to be the need for self-preservation. 01 added to this by saying: 
 
01 suggested the reason for alienating the Client from the non-professional 
identity of the EP was to enable the EP to perform their role. 04 added that the 
EP-Client relationship was different because it occurred in an ethical framework: 
 
“We haven’t got the background relationship with you friends, with some 
friends you say “you stink” to, they would be completely up in arms. It’s who 
you say things, even if you met them two or three times.  You cannot presume 
to know them enough to how to ( you haven’t got that history with them have 
you RJ)” (01, FG, lines 283-286) 
“One is personal and one is professional. It our job isn’t it. When it come down 
to it you are supposed to leave your work at work because if we took home 
every single case every single parent, every single parent we worked with…” 
(06, FG, Lines 321-323) 
“Well.. if you walk into a room with somebody else you can’t not bring some of 
you own personal  stuff is there but I think that part of our, our training is skills 
should be  about knowing what is appropriate to bring  forwards and be, you 
know what would, be  keep  back if something touches or provokes in you  and 
not to be emotionless at all in, in saying that  at all, but I don’t want to use the 
word usurp, because it bring that thing about sitting there very stern, it ,, a 
child tell you about being hit, well I was like that as a child , da de da de da . 
the difference between that and say You tell me some more about  being 
empathic and listening” (01, FG, lines 325-332). 
“I have, I was thinking around that  a professional relationship is a human 
relationship with ethical boundaries.  But human relationship don’t necessarily 
have to be professional ones.  They’re greater” (04, FG, lines 350-352) 
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As discussed above, the processes that fabricated the Client’s clienthood also 
alienated the EP from the non-Client identity of the Client.  This suggested that 
the EP-Client relation was the location of multiple alienations (Benjamin, 2004, 
2009).  
 
5.6 Independent and Autonomous  
 
In the MWM 02’s frequent use of ‘I’ could point to the utilization of the myth of 
independence and autonomy (Harré, 1989). Using ‘I’ enabled 02 to perform the 
ethical act of claiming responsibility for the choices he made (Harré, 1989).  By 
appropriating the myths of independence and autonomy 02 did not discover their 
independence and autonomy but produced it.  Following Foucault, (1979, page 
123) this was an ‘affirmation’ of an aspect of the EP’s professional identity.   The 
myth of independence and autonomy needed to be balanced with the numerous 
micro-processes in the EPS that held the EP accountable (see appendix 11). Not 
all of the micro-process came immediately to mind and were collected over 
several months68. This suggested that the micro systems largely went 
unchallenged as disciplinary tools; however, they were also frequently useful. 
The next section examined the strategies employed by the Client (M) to resist the 
epistemological power and normative processes of categorization in the EP-
Client relationship.  
 
5.7 The Impossible Profession 
 
The impossibility of 02’s agenda, in the MWM, was played out in the interaction 
between the Said and Saying (Levinas, 1981). The tension between the Said and 
Saying can be perceived as a type of tension, agitation or resistance.   M’s 
resistance took three forms. The first was to verbally suggest an alternative 
hypothesis, the second, was not to respond and the third was to unsay what was 
being said about him by being a living contradiction.  
                                                 
68
 This is perhaps an example of the ethnographic nature of the study.  
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5.7.1. Resisting by Providing an Alternative Category/Story 
 
During the discussion there were several examples of M resisting categorization 
by offering alternative categorizations. This form of resistance had been 
recognized by Austin & Fitzgerald 2007. For example, M resisted 02’s medical 
categorization of his appearance   by suggesting that it resulted from poverty and 
having a coal fire (MWM line 42-43).   In the discussion about attendance 02 had 
framed the problem as poor attendance. However, for M the problem was one of 
bullying.  M also refused the family System Theory approach to understanding 
his situation and the EPs’ formulations by pointing out that: 
 
M further challenged the Systems Theory formulation by suggesting that his 
actions were simply “something that needed to be done” (MWM, line 80).  
Therefore, M was offering common sense as an alternative explanation for his 
behaviour. M’s re-authoring of his account was akin to what Billington (2002) 
called user’s stories. M’s common sense presentation normalized (as opposed to 
pathologized) the account and challenged the deficit story suggested by 02.    
 
5.7.2 Resisting by Not Engaging 
 
The second form of resistance offered by M was non-responding to questions or 
changing the subject.  For example the account of the MWM stated: 
 
“I asked M why he had said “we” instead of “his mother” but he did not 
want to answer” (02, MWM lines 50-51).  
and  
“M did not answer directly and changed the subject” (02, MWM, line 94). 
“…although his brother had difficulties with spelling and reading he did not 
have a problem with his speech and that his sister was good at reading.” (02, 
MWM, lines 91-92)  
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The above examples of non-compliance could be seen as attempts to refuse 
their categorization by a dominant other (Austin and Fitzgerald, 2007). M was 
resisting the professional’s story (Billington 2002). The analysis therefore 
challenged the passive description of Clients (Gabe et al., 1991; Hoeyer, 2006; 
Kleiuman, 1999; Laidlaw, 2002) 
 
5.7.3 Unsaying by Being a Living Contradiction 
 
The phrase ‘living contradiction’69 referred to M resistance of being made 
thematic or labelled by being beyond (not reducible to) labels and themes 
(Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002; Benjamin, 2000; Buber, 1959; Levinas, 1981).  M 
presented 02 with a dilemma. This was not a dilemma in the classic sense where 
the professional had to choose between interventions, weighing the needs of M 
against other children or even a clash of traditional ethical principles. Rather, the 
dilemma was, “was my practice ethical?” M did not explicitly question the 
ethicality of EP’s practice. However, the consequence of encountering M was a 
prolonged period of ethical reflection by 02.  The ethical reflection was a 
response to the way M’s vulnerability was both acknowledged and avoided in the 
MWM.  M’s vulnerability was continually pointed to in the account of the MWM. 
For example, the quote below suggested that M needed care by referring to his 
appearance: 
 
M’s vulnerability was even more explicit in the use of the  story of the canaries 
used by miners was used as a metaphor  to understand  M’s behaviour as a 
consequence of being particularly vulnerability to the stress his family had 
experienced. (MWM line 87-94).  
 
                                                 
69
 The term was borrowed form Whitehead (1989). In Whitehead (1989) living contradiction 
referred to a contradiction between values and practice.  
“M is 14 years old. I noticed that M was unkempt and that his long finger nails 
were dirty, his hair looked unwashed and there was a slight smell.” (02, MWM 
lines 2-3) 
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The account of the MWM attempted to present 02 as an ethical practitioner 
where the arrow of ethics flowed from the EP to M.  The EP’s role was to respect 
and M’s role to be respected, the EP provided opportunities to consent and M 
consented, the EP cared and M was cared for and it was M who needed 
empowering/liberating and it was the EP who liberated/empowered. However,   
reading with Levinas (1981) challenged the above asymmetry. In the MWM and 
in the subsequent FG, 02 claimed that the encounter with M had had a significant 
impact on him.  For example, in response to 03 question “why has this case 
raised such a strong feeling in you?”  (03, FG, lines 99-100,).  02 said: 
 
 
02, above, rationalized his continual engagement with M as resulting from the, 
almost visceral, impact M had on him. Later in the same discussion 02’s 
described M’s story as “tragic”, “very powerful” and “provocative” (02, FG lines 
226-230).   It was, as if, M had haunted him. Following Levinas (1981) it was M’s 
vulnerability that touched 02.  M’s vulnerability had asked previously 
unarticulated, questions of the 02’s practice. 02 framed this question as “what do 
we do?” (FG line 108).    M’s vulnerability had reversed the asymmetry. The 
arrow of ethics was no longer from the EP but from M because it was M that was 
calling 02 to be ethical.    Rather than accepting that call 02 continually attempted 
to (re)write what M was saying using the language of the Said. That is, the 
bioethical/classical ethical language (of competency, confidentiality, respect of 
autonomy and consent) and to make M understandable through framing M as a 
case, as having special educational needs and as a subject of knowledge.  
Positioning M in the language of the Said attempted closure and avoided the 
I don’t know,  that is one of my puzzles , I just know that I found him very 
evocative he was dirty,  that was the first thing I noticed about him, that I was 
ashamed to admit  I noticed how filthy he was and how much he smelt, I am 
sure I cannot be the only one who comes across  children with hygiene 
problems. The dilemma is what do you do. So what do you do? If you are 
sitting beside a 14 year old boy whose fingers are black, his hair was 
unwashed. He actually smells very bad.  What do we do?”  (02, FG, lines 102-
108). 
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relenting experience resulting from the ethical demand that recognizes the 
radical otherness of the other in their vulnerability (Levinas, 1981). The number 
of stories provided by the FG participants about troubling encounters with 
Clients, above, suggested that this was not an uncommon event.   The MWM 
had been hazardous to 02’s understanding of their practice and made him 
uncomfortable in that practice. This was achieved by making 02 aware of the 
tensions between ontology and epistemology of Educational Psychology and the 
experience of enacting/living that practice.  This was a tension between ontology 
and epistemology informed by bioethics and the infinite ethical demand 
presented by the impossible to know Other (Derrida, 1995).  
 
Analysis of the FG also suggested that it was the Otherness of the Client that 
unsettled EP’s practice. For example, below 03 told a story about how a toddler 
disrupted the EP-Client relationship: 
 
03, above, emphasized the intervention of the child and how his response to the 
child “humanised” him and therefore facilitated a more productive relationship 
with the child’s parent.  The tension expressed in humour around 03’s story could 
point to the recognition of the transgression of boundaries.  A similar 





“…In fact.  that helped me a lot last Thursday because I was doing a parent 
drop in session  at (deleted) and prior to those  I know that one of the parents 
is going to be a very tough meeting she was coming in and she was, brought 
her toddler with her. And all the staff warn me  be careful this is a very difficult 
thing, when they came in the toddle rush at me because I am very attractive to 
kids. Don’t know why though, how come on it happen outside as well.  (lots if 
laughter). So he sat on my knee, ( RJ, clarify that MK) Ho I don’t mean it like 




In the quote above it was another young client that disrupted the Professional-
Client boundaries. The above quote suggested that professional’s touching of 
Others required a confessional tone or needed to be excused or explained.  Both 
03 and 06 emphasized that they did not invite the touch. In addition, 06 apologies 
for hugging the pupil back. The confessional tone was reinforced by the inclusion 
of the phrase “I put my hands up” highlighted in the quote below: 
 
The confessional tone pointed to the transgression of boundaries. However, 
acknowledging those boundaries also reinforced them (Hepburn 2003). The 
tension was between a relational space that was demarcated by procedures that 
establish emotional distance, objectivity, and authority and the collapsing of the 
space by the present of the Other (Levinas, 1981; Mellow, 2005; Paternelj-
Taylor, 2002). It was interesting that the arrow of ethics was again pointed back 






“But I had a situation where,  this year 7 I had worked with recently run up to 
me in a corridor in a high school and flung his arms around me. He forgot that 
he was in a middle of a corridor in a high school. Em in that case …. Sorry but 
I did give him a hug back.  Because I had just of kind of done this (gestures to 
show she was withdrawing) he would have thought that he would have done 
something to upset me and it was just so nice , to have that relationship, he 
has not done it before. It just that he had seen me and he had done that” (06, 
FG,  lines 421-427) 
“I think that it is also about personalities I’m like you I am very tactile, and I 
have got people that I work with, I put my hands up, professionally, I will give. 
if I have not seen then after the hol…, after the summer holidays  they will give 
me a hug and I will give them a hug back.  I, I know of other people in the 
room who are similar” (06, FG, lines 447-450) 
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5.8 Conclusions from the Third Cycle of Research 
 
The analysis suggested that the research participants both were positioned and 
positioned themselves using the rationalization of professionalism.  These 
positionings were entangled and facilitated by with the presentation of a complex 
work environment where EP’s constantly were caught betwixt and between 
competing agenda and Clients.    These positionings and presentations also 
privileged rational individualistic practice which alienated both EP and Client. The 
positioning of EP-as-professional was sustained and fabricated through 
emphasizing the EP’s moral and charismatic authority, which warranted and 
authorized modes of practice and EP-Client relations. However, these positive 
positionings of EP’s simultaneously existed with more negative statements that 
limited and made the EP’s authority problematic. The analysis rather than settling 
the romanticised/sceptical debate about professional roles suggested a more 
subtle argument. That is, that both the romanticised and sceptical positions were 
available to the EPs and that the positions functioned liked the binaries in 
ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). This enabled EPs to engage in acts of 
categorization and objectification while continuing to present themselves as 
progressive.  The FG members did not state that they experienced identity crises 
or role ambiguity (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009). However, the analysis suggested 
EPs’ practice was frequently challenged by Clients and the complex and 
challenging situation they worked in.  This resonated with research that identified 
EP’s complex relations with Clients (Ashton & Roberts, 2006: Farrell et al., 2006; 
Fox, 2003; Love, 2009; Mackay, 2002). The analysis therefore added weight to 
Gersch’s (2009) arguments that EP’s tensions were a consequence of tension in 
the environment in which they practiced, and challenged Boyle & Lauchlan’s 
(2009) assertion that role confusion resulted from a narcissistic questioning of 





5.9 Summary of Results 
 
The analysis argued that EP practice was complex, socially embedded and 
emotional engaged.  This challenged the emotional, neutral, distant, abstract and 
rational portrayal of Professional-Client relationships (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; 
Singer, 2004).  The EPs’ and Clients’ identities were argued to be constructed 
using processes that objectified and categorized both EPs and Clients. These 
processes also wove the participants into a web of responsibilities.  While 
expressing anxiety about the asymmetry the EPs also fabricated and regulated it.  
 
The analysis suggested that EPs employed a range of ethical constructs 
rhetorically to justify, authorize, legitimatize and discipline how they were 
positioned. This thesis argued for a socially embedded and emotionally engaged 
depiction of Educational Psychology. The ethically challenging situations 
encountered by EPs also provided opportunities for emotional and identity work.   
 
The analysis suggested that the EPs’ positively positioned themselves as 
professionals working in complex situations negotiating betwixt and between 
Clients.  However, the positive presentation of EP was balanced by talk that 
positioned the EP as being subject to power. The construct of professional was 
employed to authorize, legitimize, justify, and regulate EP’s practice. The 
analysis challenged the portrayal of the passive client by suggesting that Clients 
resisted and challenged EP practice.  This was achieved by transgressing the 
boundaries, challenging categorizations, refusing to engage with categorisation 
and by being a living contradiction. Finally, it was argued that the processes that 
fabricated and sustained Clienthood, the ethical rhetoric used and the 
presentation of the EP, were entangled. The next chapter discussed the themes 




Chapter 6.  Discussion of Research Questions 
 
This chapter discussed the research findings in relation to the research 
questions.  The discussion, building on the analysis of results, critically examined 
how EPs were positioned and positioned themselves as ethical professionals. 
The processes that enabled these positionings were argued to be entangled and 
provided opportunities for ethical, emotional and identity work. Foucault’s (1990) 
concepts of ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activities and 
telos were also employed to examine how EPs constructed themselves as ethical 
subjects. The chapter also explored what the ethically difficult situations 
experienced by EPs said about the nature of Educational Psychology.  
 
6.1 First Research Question 
 
The analysis suggested that EPs employed a range of rhetorical resources to 
position themselves and Clients in the EP-Client relationship. Professionalism 
was used to justify, authorize, regulate, and rationalize what was said and what 
could be said by EPs about EPs and Clients. To position themselves as ethical, 
the EPs employed a varied and sometimes conflicting range of ethical 
rationalizations and justifications. The opportunities provided by this verity were 
also examined. The discussion argued that the relationship between ethics and 
professionalism was entangled so that to be professional was to be already 
ethical and to be ethical was to be professional.   Finally, the discussion argued 
that EPs, both constructed and regulated, the EP and Client asymmetrical 
How do EPs position themselves as ethical professionals in the EP-Client 
relationship?  
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relationship and identities.  The positions given and received were therefore 
argued to be fluid rather than fixed.  How the EPs positioned themselves in the 
EP-Client relationship, how they constructed themselves as ethical and ethical 
professionals was further delineated below. 
 
6.1.1. The EP-Client Asymmetrical Relationship 
 
Not lonely did asymmetry appear to be a given of the EP-Client encounter it was 
also something that was achieved through the EPs’ practices (Garfinkel & Sacks, 
1970; Kurri & Wahlström, 2001; Sacks, 1995; Have, 1991). The analysis 
suggested that 02 in the MWM and the EPs in the FG also worked to regulate 
and resist the possibility of a Non-EP and Non-Client identity relationship. This 
was evident in the FG discussions about the difference between professional and 
other relationships and the need for the relationship between the EP and Client 
to be professional.  
 
The analysis suggested that processes of Clienthood began before the EP-Client 
encounter; M arrived as a set of quasi clinical descriptions. The EPs continued to 
construct Clienthood by producing more documents and through processes of 
formulation, objectification and categorization. These processes occurred in an 
institutional setting that was underpinned by normalization (e.g. the Matrix).  
 
The processes that fabricated clienthood and sustained the EP-Client 
relationship attempted to objectify the Client while making them responsible for 
the categorizations offered to them. While worrying about the asymmetry in the 
EP-Client encounter, the EPs also continued to establish and maintain 
boundaries between the EP and client. The boundaries work between the EP 
and Client were evident in the utterance used to maintain a clinical distance. For 
example, in the discussions of whether it was appropriate to give a Client a work 
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mobile phone number, the utility or appropriateness of EP’s disclosure and risks 
of becoming emotionally involved in clients stories.  
 
The EP-Client boundaries did not just regulate and discipline their relations they 
defined the relationship. This was because the practices that were used to 
formulate and construct clienthood also inferentially made available EPs’ 
identities (Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996).  It was important to remember that the 
presentation of asymmetry was not a hidden truth revealed by the analysis.  The 
HPC (2010) Standards of Proficiency recognized Professional-Service User 
asymmetry and   stated that the practitioner psychologists should “understand 
the power imbalance between practitioners and service users and how this can 
be managed appropriately” (HPC, 2010, page 6). Rather the analysis of result 
was an intensive engagement and critical examination with that asymmetry. It 
was interesting that resistance to the asymmetry or the EP-Client relationship did 
not always originate from the EP. Educational Psychologists however worried 
about labelling and attempted to collude with parents to mitigate the power of 
labels (e.g. 01, FG, lines 634-641). Colluding with parents could be read as an 
attempt to position themselves as progressive. Resistance also originated in 
encounters with Others (often a child, occasionally a teacher or parent). The 
possibility of ethical practice therefore developed from a combination of EP’s 
attempts to be ethical and being called to be ethical by the Other. 
 
The analysis suggested that EPs presented themselves as making difficult 
decisions in complex situations with multiple clients and competing relationships. 
This was something that was present in the literature (e.g. Bennett, 2008; Guiney 
2009).  The EPs recognized that these conflicts of interest were problematic.  
From the Client’s perspective these conflicts of interest might become something 
even more troubling. The Client might even perceive balancing their rights and 
best interests against others as acts of abandonment or betrayal.  In addition, 
directing the EP’s gaze towards conflicts of interest could divert it from the 
 196
governance and disciplinary function of the EP (Goodman, McElliot & Marks, 
2003).   
 
While finding Benjamin’s (1998, 2004, 2009) Web of Identification a persuasive 
framework for examining the EP-Client encounter I did not utilise the explanatory 
concepts of transferences and projection. Rather, taking a genealogical 
perspective the multiple alienations suggested by Benjamin were seen as flowing 
from cultural and historical processes (Foucault 1989). The EP-Client asymmetry 
was a possibility presented by the clinical encounter.  Benjamin (1998, 2004, and 
2009) and Levinas (1981) described the relation with Others as a non-relation. 
However, they both referred to different aspects of relationships. Benjamin (1998, 
2004, and 2009) focused on the tendency for Professional-Client relations to be 
object-to-object relations rather than subject-to-subject. Benjamin (1997, 2004, 
and 2009) hoped that a non-alienating space could be created in Professional-
Client relations to enable subject-to-subject relations. Whereas, Levinas (1981) 
argued that the relation between the self and the Other always remained a non-
relation. This was because the Other was unknowable and always remained 
radically Other. In keeping with the post-structuralism sensibilities of the thesis it 
was not necessary to say whether Benjamin or Levinas was correct. Rather, I 
would emphasize the theories rhetorical utility.  Benjamin’s construct provided a 
useful tool to examine the EP-Client professional relationships. Whereas, 
Levinas (1981) provided a useful construct to establish professional ethics and to 
examine non-cognitive resistance. I think it was possible to maintain Benjamin’s 
hope for a less exploitative relation with Clients while recognising that this aim 
was problematic. However, just because something was difficult and problematic 
did not mean that it should not be attempted and even if something was 
ultimately achievable the journey to that goal can be very worthwhile70.  
  
                                                 
70
 An example would be a friendship. It is perhaps not possible to have a perfect friendship. People, are 
after all, not perfect. However, if two people strive and work towards this unachievable goal the  effort can 
be worthwhile because it can produce a good friendship.  In the same way, no one can be a perfect parent 
but trying hard to be a parent can produce parenting that is good enough.  
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6.1.2 How EPs Constructed Themselves as Professionals 
 
The analysis suggested that both the romantic and cynical portrayal of the 
professional was available in the three cycles of research. This enabled the 
individual EPs to position themselves fluidly towards professionalism. The 
apotheosis of the EP in the form of the hero psychologist provided an ethical 
location through which the participants could produce and sustain the moral 
order of the situation. However, the vacillation between apotheosis71 and ‘feet-of-
clay’ discourses made available an ambivalent professional identity (Billig et al, 
1988; Bhabha, 1994).  For example, the EPs could position themselves as both 
subjects who had power and objects of power.  This created instability in the 
authoritative function of Educational Psychology and created the potential for 
multiple EP-Client relations. The instability in the authoritative function suggested 
an additional source of EPs’ role confusion. The accountability of EPs perhaps 
supported Guiney’s (2009) argument that EPs were semi-professionals. 
However, this would require detailed research to establish if other ‘professionals’ 
were any more autonomous than EPs or if autonomy was a universal myth. 
 
The EPs’ vacillation between the discourses also suggested that they were 
actively articulating/navigating the extent to which they both identify and 
distanced themselves from the dominate discourses of professionalism.  This 
was another in-between (liminal) space not completely or straightforwardly 
subjected to the professional discourse. The vacillation meant that EPs 
positioned themselves as both the subject that knows and the object that was 
known. For example, this was suggested in talk about being subject to regulation 
and administrative demands and in anxiety about the EP-Client asymmetry (e.g., 
03 & ND, FG, lines 559-566).   
 
                                                 
71
 The opposite of apotheosis is damnatio memoriae which literally means ‘condemnation of memory’. In 
ancient Rome  this  involved attempting to wipe away all official record of a person so that they become a 
non-person. I do not think that the EPs were attempting to obliterate their EP identity and that damnation 
memoriae was too strong. I have therefore chosen instead to use the phrase ‘feet-of-clay’. This phrase has 
conations of a flawed hero which seemed to fit better.   
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The EPs did not seem to be aware of the source of the power they exercised. 
Several of the EPs attempted to make the Client responsible for the EP’s 
charismatic authority (e.g. LA, FG lines 304-309).   It was almost as if the EP 
could not sustain the myth of the hero psychologist in their own eyes and needed 
to make the Client responsible for it. Following, Foucault (1989) it was argued 
that the Client was able to admire the EP because this had been made available 
through the discourses that emphasized the moral authority of professionals (e.g. 
HPC, 2008). The apotheosis of the EP was therefore facilitated by professional 
discourses and (re)produced in the encounter through talk.  The client was in 
effect reflecting back what the situation had made available. 
 
6.1.3 How EPs Constructed Themselves as Ethical Professionals 
 
The analysis of results suggested that EPs found themselves in difficult 
situations. Not all of the EPs in FG readily saw these difficulties as ethical 
challenges.  This finding was similar to previous research into EPs’ perceptions 
(Bennett, 2008; Guiney 2009). Three possible causes of the EPs’ difficulties 
perceiving the challenges as ethical were considered. Firstly,   ethics as an 
explanatory construct was inappropriate and was externally imposed for 
normative reasons. Secondly, ethics was considered by the participants to be 
about large ethical dilemmas rather than the microethical challenges encounter 
by professionals. Thirdly, the concept of ethical choice appeared to be 
problematic in the EP’s practice. The choices EPs most frequently made tended 
not to be about large ethical dilemmas but about micro commitments. The 
question was often how do I respond in the situation where I know what the right 
thing to do is but doing it will have a high cost?  This question was (re)framed as 
taking sides and might not have readily presented itself as an ethical dilemma.  
This suggested that further research was required to explore these options.  
Regardless of the reasons why some participants did not readily consider issues 
as ethical, they were able to employ the language of ethics to talk about 
difficulties they encountered. Furthermore, presenting the issues to the EPs was 
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a double edged sword; framing issues as ethical, provided a new and creative 
way to examine issues but it also had the potential to facilitate reductive, 
predictable and instrumental discussions (Allan, 1999; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; 
Water, 2002).   
 
Some of the ethically difficult situations appeared to result from having to 
negotiate between the demands of different clients (e.g. schools, parents, 
children, Local Authority). This finding echoed similar arguments in the literature 
review (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; MacKay, 2002) 
These conflicting demands occurred within discourses that positioned the EP as 
an autonomous professional and emphasized the importance of the EP-Client 
ethical relationship. The simultaneous demands from stakeholders, the call to be 
autonomous and demand for an ethical relationship with Clients created 
tensions.     
 
Ethical rationalizations were employed rhetorically to establish, warrant, justify, 
regulate and legitimize positions. Bioethics was a significant source of 
rationalizations (interpretative repertoires).  However, the EPs also employed 
deontological, virtue, consequential, particularist, and care ethics. The literature 
review suggested that there was a tension between principlism and particularism 
(Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale 2008; Popke, 2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 
1998; Wendell, 1996). However, the analysis argued in EP talk that this tension 
did not appear to exist. The EPs appeared able to move freely between 
principled and other ethical rationalizations.  Rather the binary functioned more 
like an ideological dilemma which provided the participants with rhetorical 
resources they could use strategically Billig et al., (1988).  
 
The next section employed Foucault’s constructs of ethical substance, mode of 
subjection, self-forming activities and telos to critically examine how EPs 
constructed themselves as ethical subjects.  
 
 200
6.1.4 Ethical substance 
 
The analysis suggested that the ethical substance (the aspect to be worked on) 
was the EP-Client relationship, specifically, the problematization and regulation 
of the EP-Client relations. This was manifested in the awareness of the 
asymmetrical power relations and the desire to make the relationship 
professional,   while regulating and managing the EP-Client asymmetry.  
 
6.1.5 Mode of Subjection 
  
The action and practices of the EPs were rationalized by EPs being appropriate 
because they were professionals (e.g. LA, FG, lines 43-49). This established 
professionalism as both an aesthetic and political practice. Aesthetic, because it 
was rationalized as ‘people like me behave in this way’ or ‘to be a good 
professional I have to behave in this way’. In addition participants rationalized 
their behaviour in the form of ‘if I want people to accept me as a professional I 
have to behave in this way’ (ND, FG, lines 182-190). The practice was political 
because the exercise of power was linked to being a professional. That was, to 
have authority (to be listened to/be worthy of being listened to) I must behave 
professionally. The effect was that the aesthetic and political were therefore 
entangled in a moment. ND also invited the reader to recognize the EP’s moral 
obligations as mode of subjection arising out of M’s special educational needs by 
privileging descriptions of strangeness and deficit.   The EP was in effect saying,  
‘I can work with M because he was a legitimate subject of educational 
psychology practice because  of his  bizarre behaviour, learning needs, 
communication and interaction needs and emotional wellbeing needs’.   
 
6.1.6 Self-forming Practices 
 
Elaboration and deciphering of Self were the two main processes of self-
formation. The practices of elaboration involved problematizing the relationships 
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and reflecting on how EPs regulated and disciplined themselves in the 
relationships with clients. This was a relationship that the EPs both established 
and regulated in their talk and practices. The EPs were both subject to a 
normative gaze and were incited to put themselves within a normative gaze. The 
analysis suggested that EPs involved themselves and were incited to be involved 
in acts of purification (Foucault, 2001). This included EPs being tested and 
testing themselves against an ideal of professionalism. To facilitate this EPs 
problematized their relationships with clients. This could be considered a 
masochistic practice where the EPs held themselves to account (Butler, 2005).  
EPs presented themselves as working in complex/messy contexts caught betwixt 
and between clients. This rhetoric functioned to privilege a rational account of 
practice.   
 
The EPs in the FG did not appear to readily turn to ethical codes to provide 
support in navigating the complexity. The relationship the EPs had with ethical 
codes appeared to be complex. The EPs were aware of the existence ethical 
codes but did not appear to be overly familiar with their contents. The regulative 
and disciplinary function of ethical codes was therefore not straightforwardly 
linear. This provided the opportunity for ethical work where the EPs adopted 
positions of accepting, resisting and/or interpreting ethical codes. This ethical 
work was part of the processes of individualization (Foucault, 1990). Foucault 
(1986c) called the process by which subjects came to recognize themselves 
deciphering practices.  This included trying to establish the type of EP one was in 
relation to the context (discursive formation) in which they worked. This included 




The aim of ethics appeared to be the formation of a rational, autonomous, 
independent decision maker. The relation was to have power over others one 
must regulate the self (Foucault, 1986c) 
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Although the above modes were independent there were also relations between 
them. For example: 
• There was a desire to make the relationship professional,  
• Professionalism was provided as the rationalization of action,  
• Professionalism acted as a normalizing ideal and  
• The telos was to become an ethical professional.   
 
The literature review suggested that ethics and professionalism were entangled 
(e.g. Nixon, 2004; Marrow, et al., 2011).   The entanglement between ethics and 
professionalism resulted in the moralization of EP practice. The entanglement 
between professional practice and morality was not self evident or necessary 
(Foucault, 1986c, 1990). Other forms of rationalization could be possible.  For 
example, there is no mention of ethics in the core professional standards for 
teachers (TDA, 2007). The association between behaviour and ethics 
established a set of disciplinary relations and provided a set of normative 
judgements for governing and regulating performance and development.  For 
example, the HPC-SCPE (2008) included guidance on the correct and ethical 
way to file information. The second research question was considered below.  
 
6.2  Second Research Question 
 
 
The introduction argued that examining the EP-Client relationship provided 
insights into the nature of Educational Psychology. The analysis of results argued 
that EPs’ work provided frequent ethically troubling situations.  The thesis 
suggested that these troubling situations could be analogous to trials (Araujo & 
Martuccelli, 2010).  The trials appeared to provide opportunities for emotional, 
identity and ethical work.  For example, in the  trials the EPs were concerned with 
What do the ethical trials experienced by EPs while working with clients 
say about the nature of Educational Psychology? 
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how to manage the emotional work of making commitments to Clients, keeping 
professional distances and  managing the  ethical tugs in workplaces where there 
never appeared to be enough time and too much work. The thesis argued that 
these trials were a response to the discursive formation in which EPs worked. 
Clienthood was argued to result from processes of objectification, categorization, 
rationalization, responsibilization and case formulation. However, these 
processes also inferentially objectified, categorized, formulated and rationalized 
the EP. The processes of clienthood therefore acted like a reflexive 
epistemological and ontological mirror in which the EPs constructed their 
professional selves. The FG discussion suggested that different EPs emphasized 
different aspects of the EP-Client relation and their relationship with Local 
Authority.  This, perhaps partly, explained the differences in professional identity 
between EPs.   That was, although the discursive formation of Educational 
Psychology provided opportunities for trials how each EP resolved, failed to 
resolve or avoided those trials individually shaped  their professional identity.  
 
As discussed above, the EPs were also concerned with the EP-Client 
asymmetry, promoting inclusion, working correctly, doing the right thing and 
defending the rights of the vulnerable. Resistance to asymmetry also appeared to 
come from the Client, for example, by offering alternative formulation of issues. 
The processes of clienthood fabrication and regulation when combined with the 
apotheosis of the EP, worked to establish a set of alienations between the EP 
and Client. Therefore, tautologically, Educational Psychology invited questions 
about power because power was problematic in the EP-Client relationship.  In 
addition to the rational, neutral, scientific practitioner the analysis of results also 
suggested the possibility of a socially embedded, partisan and emotional 
involved Educational Psychology.  This thesis could be guilty of suggesting that 
scientific, rational, neutral, socially abstract and emotionally disengaged practice 
was inherently unethical. This would be making a truth statement and was too 
simplistic and strongly polemic an argument. Rather, this thesis attempted to 
agitate against, trouble and act as a corrective for that dominant discourse.  
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The analysis therefore suggested that the relationship between Educational 
Psychology, EP and Client was not straightforwardly hierarchal or linear. Rather 
they were complex and recursive. This was suggested using the examples of 
apotheosis (relating to professional identity) and categorization (relating to 
practice).  The romanticized professional identity was available in the discourse 
(Arnold, 2002; MacDonald, 1995). The apotheosis of the personage of the EP 
was also constructed in the EP-Client relationship. However, this apotheosis was 
not sustainable in the eyes of EPs.   Similarly, categories were available in the 
discourse (e.g. SEN, Autism, etc) and were (re)produced in the EP-Client 
encounter. However, categorization was also resisted by both EP and Clients.  
This suggested that Educational Psychology practice was in tension caused by 
the collision of theory and practice. The multiple and micro acts of resistance and 
collusion in the EP-Client relationship appeared to both sustain and undermine 
the epistemology of Educational Psychology.  This suggested an additional 
source of EP role confusion.  
 
The analysis of results provided support for the descriptions of Educational 
Psychology outlined in the literature review.  This included ambiguity about who 
the client was, competing demands from different clients, epistemological variety 
within Educational Psychology, gaps between theory and practice, tensions 
between the statutory and psychology functions (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Boyle 
& Lauchlan, 2009; Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 2005; Farrell, et al, 
2006; Fox, 2003; Gersch, 2009; Gillham, 1978; Kelly & Gray, 2000; Love, 2009; 
MacKay, 2002; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001). Educational Psychology rather than 
being a fixed construct was therefore argued to be fluid. This fluidity provided a 
range of, often conflicting and inconsistent rhetorical tools, positions and 
rationalizations that EPs could employ strategically.  The fluid nature of 
Educational Psychology resonated with Foucault’s (1997) description of the lack 
of unity in discursive formations.  This was not the same as saying that the 
constellation of practices and theories of Educational Psychology were arbitrary 
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or random. Rather they were the result of historical and current relations between 
discursive formations and EPs practices.  Further research on the relations 
between Educational Psychology and other educational, medical and legal 
discursive formations would therefore be interesting.  
 
The analysis of results also suggested that Educational Psychology acted like a 
site from which EP’s justified, disciplined and warranted their formulations of 
cases and Clients. This included establishing the speaking rights of the 
participants and regulating and permitting what could be said (Benwell & Stoke, 
2010).   Educational Psychology therefore had a normative function acting as a 
benchmark of legitimization and verification of practices and decisions.   
  
6.3 Chapter Summary 
 
This section argued that EPs were positioned and positioned themselves   as 
ethical professionals in EP-Client relationships. The EPs employed a range of 
ethical positions to position themselves as ethical professionals. The relationship 
between ethical and professional rationalizations was entangled so that to be 
professional was to be ethical and to be ethical was to be professional.   Finally, 
the analysis argued that EPs both constructed and regulated the EP-Client 
asymmetrical relationship and identities.  The ethically challenging situations 
experienced by EPs were argued to be analogous to trials that provided 
opportunities for emotional, ethical and identity work.  The analysis argued that 
Educational Psychology was a highly fluid construct that provided authority to 
EPs. However, the fluidity also enabled a   multiplicity of inconsistent and 
conflicting positions which, in turn, provided opportunities for resistance. 
Educational Psychology also appeared to be concerned with pastoral power with 
its aims of categorization, normalization, standardization and discipline.  However 
these processes appeared to apply both to EP and Clients.  Finally, the analysis 
suggested three additional sources for EPs’ role confusion: 
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1. Instability of the authoritative function enacted in the vacillation between 
the apotheosis and feet-of-clay discourses. 
2. The resistance and unsaying  of EP practice that occurred in EP-Client 
encounters 
3. The fluidity of discourses and practices within Educational Psychology that 
facilitated both pastoral powers and allowed EPs to present themselves as 
progressive.  
   
The next section reflected on the impact of the research on my professional 



















Chapter 7. Reflections 
 
I began this thesis with a description of M. However, at the end of this thesis I no 
longer felt confident in writing about M. I no longer believed that I understood M 
or that M was reducible to a set of categories or labels no matter how complex. 
Therefore, when ‘understanding’ meant applying preconceived categories/labels 
to a particular client, resistance was always to be on the way to co-understanding 
but never ultimately understanding. Resistance also meant postponing, 
suspending or deferring knowing. Permanently deferring knowing was not 
possible because even not knowing was knowing that I did not know.  
 
The initial impact of the face to face encounter with M had reduced me to silence. 
How could I speak when speaking was an act of violence? However, there was 
also the paradox that silence perceived as abandonment could also have 
enabled violence or injustice. The tensions in the MWM were therefore between 
abandonment and commitment and curiosity and knowing. M’s impossibility also 
reminded me of the impossibility of all the children I worked with. I was painfully 
aware that even saying this was making M instrumental.   
 
In the MWM I was aware72, retrospectively, of an event or nodal moment. The 
event did not empower the Other but was a (re)realisation of my responsibilities. 
Ethics manifested itself in how I could respond to the event. It was M’s ability to 
unsay what my professional practice had said about him that facilitated this 
responsibility (Levinas, 1981). M’s unsaying was not only a rational 
argumentative engagement but also resulted from the inability of my professional 
discourse to bind him. Before M I had always thought that empowerment was a 
product of the methods employed by the psychologist, e.g., the non-expert 
                                                 
72
 I am also, only too aware that I have reintroduced the thinking and feeling subject that I have worked so 
hard to postpone and defer.  
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professional model. However, it was not the psychologist or the approach that 
resisted categorization in the MWM. Rather, it was the Client as Other.  
 
The disruptive event was singular because it occurred in a specific context with 
particular individuals and hence the ethical response also needed to be singular. 
To apply ready made solutions or categories would negate the event and make it 
part of everyday practice and changed the unique encounter with M to just 
another encounter. Ethical practice in response to a disruptive event was 
therefore always a unique response to a particular situation (Badiou, 2001, 
2005). This made providing general ethical advice problematic. The demand 
placed on the EP by the Other enabled the potential for a shifted praxis. The 
analysis of results had not produced a truth but raised the question “How do I 
have fidelity to the preliminary understandings I had arrived at?”   
 
I frequently wondered why my dilemmas and concerns were not shared in the 
same way with all of my colleagues. Following Araujo & Martuccelli (2010), the 
thesis suggested that the processes of individualization were just that individual 
and that the processes of recognition, disposition towards the normative systems 
and relation with oneself as an ethical subject would have different relevance for 
each EP.  In Short, Educational Psychology provided the opportunities for identity 
work but how EPs responded to these opportunities was highly contingent and 
unique.   
 
In this thesis I was both the subject of what I am saying while being the one who 
said it. I therefore established my legitimacy by belonging to a community. 
However, I was also aware that being critical about my community could have 
presented a risk to my professional identity.  This, in part, arose out of belonging 
to two communities (researcher and researched) and produced a type of 
diaspora associated with hybridity (Bhabha, 1990). Undertaking the research 
required splitting myself between the roles of researcher, EP practitioner and 
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work colleague.73 These roles were separate and interconnected and occurred 
simultaneously. For example, in peer supervision I could be discussing an issue 
a colleague was having and come to realize that it had resonances with the 
issues I was examining in the research.  Compartmentalizing the roles was, at 
times, confusing and perplexing. For example: 
• “Was I seeing M because of his needs or because he was a case study in 
the research?”  
• Should I tell my colleagues during the conversation that our conversation 
has veered into an area relevant to the research and risk stifling the 
discussion or should I wait to the end.   
 
However this temporary displacement provided the creative opportunity to 
experiment with my professional identity. The aim was not to renounce or 
achieve a permanent detachment from Educational Psychology but to establish a 
new relationship and full engagement with Educational Psychology.  Critical 
approaches to Psychology tended to treat the discipline of Psychology as part of 
the problem and being complicit in the continued domination and exclusion of 
groups and individuals (Hepburn, 2003). I may have been guilty of perpetuating 
of this perception. However, I also acknowledge that Psychology can be part of 
the solution.  Educational Psychology was open to critique by being ‘critiqueable’. 
This was self evident given the large amount of literature which manifested 
Psychology’s individual and cognitive bias (Hepburn, 2003). In addition, I was 
able to hold a position in the discipline of Educational Psychology and take a 
critical stance.   
 
There was also a danger that the position of insider researcher meant that I could 
have presented myself as someone who spoke the truth regardless of the risk. I 
was not suggesting that I had produced the truth or that the interpretation was 
the only possible one. Rather the aim was a local reading of and reading 
against the EPs’ accounts (Friedman, 2000).   
 
                                                 
73
 I could have added the binaries of researcher and father and partner because undertaking 
research involved sacrificing time (weekends and holidays) and trying to balance these roles. 
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The second research question presented the potential trap of essentializing 
Educational Psychology in order to out Educational Psychology. This would have 
meant that somehow I had managed to discover and delineate the true nature of 
Educational Psychology.  This would have been highly problematic given the 
post-structuralist aspirations of this thesis which assumed a difference between 
essence and existence. Following Levinas (1981) all I would have exposed was 
my exposing of Educational Psychology and aspects of my relationship to 
Educational Psychology. Educational Psychology like the Other would always 
remain more than, and other to, what could be said about it. I have attempted to 
mitigate against this trap by making my language highly contingent and 
recognizing that I have constructed what I might have claimed to have found. 
However, I argued that the constructions were available and my reading (against) 
of Educational Psychology was a defendable reading. 
 
My concern (and perhaps guilt) about the power of Educational Psychology and 
attempts to formulate a resistance could be also seen as a continued 
conversation with Educational Psychology.  Furthermore, resisting or submitting, 
acknowledges, reiterates, (re)invokes, and confirms that there was something to 
resist or submit to (Butler, 1995). This was not an argument for pessimistic 
determinism. Rather, Butler (1995) argued agency was not only possible but 
necessary for the operation of conditioning power. By resisting a particular 
discourse, e.g. labelling, I therefore both did and did not escape the games of 
power. This is very much a Foucauldian critique of power which argued that 
resistance was a device used by power to increase its hold on subjects but also 
recognized that power could only be exercised on the free (Foucault, 2001). This 
dynamic description of identity work suggested that identity work provided 
opportunities for both agency and submission.  Each act of resistance provided 
opportunities for disciplinary power to adapt and develop new strategies.  This 
did not mean that it is useless to revolt (Foucault, 2002)    Revolts might not lead 
to the final liberation but could lead to something different.  Hence, “against 
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power it is always necessary to oppose unbreakable laws and unabridgeable 
rights” (Foucault, 1999, page 134). 
 
As disused in the introduction, this thesis was also intended to be a response to 
Allen’s (1999) call for professionals to undertake ethical work on themselves.  I 
undertook ethical work on myself through problematizing my practice. This 
included problematizing the rhetoric that EPs used, the processes through which 
they categorized clients and the apotheosis of the EP.   In critically engaging with 
Educational Psychology and how it constructed those that both practice and were 
practiced on, there was an opportunity to “expose and account for the inhuman 
ways in which the human continues to be done and undone” (Butler, 2005, page 
133).     Critically, engagement therefore required undertaking a reflexive 
process.  
 
Outing myself to work colleagues as a researcher was a first move that enabled 
the reflexive process.  This was done at a team meeting where I explained, as 
best I could at the time, my research ideas and methods.  I said that I would be 
making notes on my practice and of conversations with colleagues. However, it 
would be insufficient to assume that it was enough to forewarn my colleagues 
and after each conversation in which I discussed the research with a colleague I 
asked them if it would be OK to make notes.  Even though I have attempted to 
give my colleagues anonymity I knew that if they read the research they might 
recognize themselves and others. They would then be able to read what I said 
about what they had said. In the EPS there was an expectation that EPs 
presented their thesis to the team.  This helped to engender a respectful 
approach to what others have said but it could also have been censorious. 
However, the fear remained that my colleagues would discover what I “really” 
thought. This discomfort was caused by the knowledge that the personal would 
be made public (Parker, 2002).  
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A key aim of the research was to improve my practice but this was neither a 
neutral or unproblematic aim. Butler (1995) argued that “The more a practice is 
mastered, the more fully subjection is achieved” (Ibid, page 45). This was 
because of the paradoxical way in which the process of subjecthood (subjection) 
was achieved. For example, the subject must work (engage in acts of self-
discipline) to obtain mastery in a practice. In this thesis this included obtaining 
knowledge about how EPs practiced and experimented with their EP identity. 
Therefore, while I was mastering the disciplines of Educational Psychology I also 
risked becoming subjected to those disciplines.   
 
The introduction identified eight possible traps to be avoided in this thesis. This 
section reflected on whether I have been successful in avoiding those traps. I 
had attempted to avoid being normative by not generating a new set of meta-
rules or guidelines that would deliver ethical professionals. Rather, the thesis 
explored how EP’s constructed themselves as ethical professionals. However, 
there was a large gulf between dictating universal rules and saying nothing. 
Future research on the attitudes, dispositions, relationships, capacities, contexts 
or support mechanisms that supported ethical practice could be useful in 
providing support to EPs.  I had also made some specific suggestions below.   I 
had attempted to avoid sounding to sanctimonious. I was aware that when 
discussing bioethics that I perhaps came close to falling into this trap. However, 
there could also be a place for indignation as long as it was not too righteous.  
The narcissistic and vainglorious traps have been mitigated through adapting a 
dialogueic approach to research and triangulating the individualist account of the 
MWM with the results of the FG. I was also aware that there was still a lot of “I” in 
the thesis. I endeavoured to postpone closure by avoiding simple descriptions of 
the research participants and processes. The complexity might have made the 
thesis frustrating to read at times. Through the use of qualifying language (could, 
might, suggest, perhaps, etc.) I have attempted to work against the warranting of 
my “insider account”. On reflection, I was perhaps too quick and perhaps too 
pejorative to consider personal therapy as a trap. Personal therapy could well be 
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a legitimate aim for a thesis. However, in my opinion, a thesis should be more 
than just personal therapy. I would not call the journey I was on therapeutic 
rather I would call it useful.   
The next chapter examined the both the methodological and epistemological 





















Chapter 8. Limitations 
 
This chapter focused on the limitations that flowed from employing a post-
structuralist (Foucauldian) epistemology and a bricolage approach to 
methodology.   
 
The ancient paradox of whether an eye could see itself was relevant to and a 
possible limitation of this thesis’ methodology (Plato, 2001). Specifically, could I 
be both researcher and researched. The solution was to see oneself in he eyes 
of another. This made having a relational ontology important because it was 
through the call of the Other that I was able to observe Educational Psychology.  
 
The thesis employed a bricolage approach to methodology so as not to privilege 
a particular methodology. It could be argued that Foucauldian approaches had a 
privileged position in this thesis. However, I hoped by positioning the Foucauldian 
approach as a method of  data analysis, in relation to the other methodologies 
(AR, S-S and autoethnography) and employing constructs from other discursive 
approaches that this agitated against the privileging of the Foucauldian 
approach.  
 
I was aware that in what was ostensibly an exercise in professional identity work, 
which borrowed from autoethnography, that my biography was absent. In 
addition, I have managed to hide behind erudition and grammatical convinces of 
the third person past tense.   This was only partly intentional and it was 
something that I came to realise rather than being fully planned. This perhaps 
worked against the propensity for narcissism but also kept me hidden74. The 
process of professional identity work therefore occurred through employing 
writing as a tool to reflect on my and colleagues’ practice (Delgado-Gaitan, 1993; 
Grafanki, 1996; Richardson, 2000).  
                                                 
74
 It was perhaps more like a game of hide and seek or a series of strategic and contingent revealing.  
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It was possible that the aim of professional self-development was just another 
example of the romantic and narcissistic myth of self-fulfilment (Taylor, 2006).  
However, to ask “who am I?” was also to ask “where I stand?” The critical 
examination of positions I took, the commitments and identifications I made 
provided the opportunity for an analysis of the grounding from which I made 
judgements. The review of self was therefore embedded in the community in 
which I worked.  
 
The self-imposed Foucauldian discipline was very difficult because I continually 
wanted to internalize my experience and reintroduce the thinking and feeling 
subject who stood outside of discourse. However, the methodologically and 
metaphorical distance facilitated by the Foucauldian approach was useful. After 
all, “the spectator can sometimes see more of the game”.  Conversely, like all 
good metaphors it’s opposite, “standing on the sidelines” also had truth.  The 
erasure of the emotional self also presented an ontological problem. The 
research could not account for the emotional investment or attachment I or the 
other participants had with their subject positions (Willig, 2003).  Foucault (1997) 
was aware of this issue but did not feel the need to invoke emotion as a cause 
but was rather attempting to “define the positions and functions that a subject 
could occupy in the diversity of discourse” (Foucault, 1997, page 200). The 
extent to which a subject adopted a position depended on how they resolved the 
dilemma or trial. Presenting the results as discourses that could be described 
and analyzed had the risk of reifying those discourses and statements (Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009). However, I attempted to make clear that the 
discourses are not things but rules and procedures.   Foucauldian approaches 
are often argued to be deterministic and engendering compliance (Schutz, 2004) 
However, I attempted to show that resistance was present, for example M’s 
resistance of the categorization offered by the EP.  In addition, the Foucauldian 
approach to discourse suggested that participants frequently presented 
inconsistent positions suggesting, at least, partial agency.         
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Balanced against the Foucauldian epistemological discipline was flexibility 
inherent in Foucauldian data analysis. This flexibility provided the opportunity to 
develop creative insights.  However it was also very time consuming when 
compared to some quantitative methods. The findings produced by a 
Foucauldian approach to data analysis were messy and overlapping.  It was 
therefore difficult to reduce the results to a set of neat bullet points. However, this 
messiness reflected the complexity inherent in the EP role and of being an 
“insider” researcher.   
 
I have attempted to challenge Foucault but I am aware that this has frequently 
appeared like a defence. However, I do not consider the question; “did Foucault 
speak the truth?” relevant. Foucault (2002, page 242) had already described his 
work as a “fiction”. I was more interested in the work that Foucault enabled me to 
do. This was to trouble power and asks challenging questions. Perhaps even to 
ask questions about the questions I was asking.  As Derrida (1995) below stated 
that asking questions can be part of a political and ethical engagement: 
 
My reading of Foucault did not provide a set of truth statements about the nature 
of human relations or reality but a set of attitudes, strategies and approaches. 
The strength of a Foucauldian approach was that it enabled analytical attention 
not just to be given to the problem but also the type of discourse and practices 
that made the problem possible and continued to make it problematic.  
 
The inclusion of extensive analytical and explanatory constructs from other 
branches of discourse could point to a weakness in a Foucauldian methodology. 
“Asking oneself questions, including ones about the questions that are 
imposed on us or taught to us as being the right questions to ask, even 
questioning the question from critique, and not only questioning, but thinking 
through commitments, the stake, through which a given question is engaged 
perhaps this is a proper responsibility, and a precondition of commitment. On 
its own not enough of course, but it has never impeded or retarded 




However, I was not striving for purity in method and hence adopted a bricolage 
approach which encouraged this magpie strategy. Employing a bricolage 
approach also created a tension between adhering to the values, perspectives 
and techniques of a particular methodology and utility of being able to selectively 
appropriate strategies from those methodologies while recognizing that this 
selective appropriation modifies the methodologies (Bazeley, 2004). The reader 
can decide weather the bricolage methodology provided data that could answer 
the research questions (Howe & Eisenhardt, 1990).  
 
To analysis the data I borrowed constructs from more than one discursive 
tradition such as positioning (Foucauldian, Psychoanalytic and NI) and 
categorization (Foucauldian, DP, CDA, and CA). Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine 
(2009) argued that Foucauldian approaches would benefit from “importing the 
linguistic tools from conversation, rhetorical, or positional analysis so long as  
analysts never take their genealogical eye of the problem” (Ibid, page 106). 
Foucauldian approaches have also informed other approaches to discourse I 
have borrowed from and I took a Foucauldian reading of those alternative 
discursive approaches.   
 
I found the results difficult to write up because of the dislocated but essential 
relations between sentences and a statement. This was because several 
sentences constituted a statement. For example, in the FG analysis chunks of 
texts were provided as examples of statements. However in these chunks of text 
multiple simultaneous positions could be presented. In addition one utterance 
could make several statements (Foucault, 1979, page 83).  
 
The thesis was open to the challenge that it was not EP practice that was 
analyzed but how EP talked about practice. In addition, there can be a gap 
between practice and how one talked about practice (Savage, 2000).   
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During the data analysis I sensed that employing a Foucauldian approach 
involved adopting a perversely cynical and overly suspicious attitude towards 
what was being researched. This included describing what could be considered 
appropriate actions (e.g. seeking consent) in a negative way. There are two 
arguments that could be employed to support this apparently negative approach. 
Firstly, adopting a suspicious disposition was necessary if the familiar was to be 
made unfamiliar and to challenge the taken for granted in my practice. Secondly, 
describing something considered positive in a negative way enabled possible 
dangers to be shown. This did not mean that confidentiality, respect, or consent 
were bad. However, following Foucault (1983/2003), they had the potential to be 
dangerous.  Accepting that these constructs could be dangerous meant that had 
I to be vigilant and presented “ethico-political” choices (Ibid, page 343).   
 
In keeping with a post-structuralist epistemology I did not use structures such as 
class or economic systems as explanatory constructs. It was therefore possible 
that I was missing the opportunity to employ useful analytic tools.  After all, there 
was evidence of a relationship between Special Educational Needs and social 
deprivation (e.g. Croll, 2002).   In addition, Fairclough (2003) had demonstrated 
that it was possible to undertake interesting discursive research that included 
structures as explanatory constructs. However, following Foucault (2003) I did 
not consider the EP-Client relationship as a straightforward representation of the 
State-Subject relationship where the EP represented the State. This did not 
exclude the possibility that State structures had a role to play or that the EP had 
a State function. Rather the thesis was interested in the micro relations between 
EP and Client and how power was exercised in that relation. Foucault (1977) had 
called this the analysis of the ‘micro-physics’ of power. 
 
The area for research and research questions were not neutral. Staying within 
relational research I could have examined the EP relations with school staff, 
parents, and Local Authority officers, other professionals in and out of the Local 
Authority, the Trade Union, and other EPs. Choosing to focus on the EP-Client 
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relationship could be critiqued for privileging one form of practice and presenting 
Educational Psychology as clinical disciple.  However by locating the EP-Client 
relation in the broader discipline of Educational Psychology and using the trials in 
this relationship to illuminate the nature of Educational Psychology I hoped to 
mitigate this criticism.  
 
There was also a possible tension between attempting to work with what 
Foucault (2003, page 6) had called “subjugated knowledges” while applying 
meticulous scholarly methods.  This included “insufficiently elaborated 
knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges 
that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” (Foucault, 2003, 
page 7). For Foucault (2003) these knowledges were singular, particular, and 
different from common sense. In essence it was what people knew at a local 
level. However tension could be creative and was, to a degree, required to 
facilitate thinking and consideration of experience.  
 
This thesis has been ambitious, and possibly over ambitious, in scope. For 
example I was unable to include the analysis of the HPC-SCPE in the main body 
of the research.   It might have been desirable to further reduce the amount of 
data by only including results from the FG or the MWM. This could have enabled 
a more detailed and possibly richer analysis of the results. However, there would 
not have been the possibility of triangulation provided by including both cycles of 
research.  In addition, the aim of the thesis was to reflect on personal practice 
while enlisting my colleagues as an epistemological and ontological mirror. The 
amount of data therefore flowed from the research design; in particular AR.  It 
would have been possible to employ alternative research designs that did not 
include a cyclical approach.  However, the research design was chosen because 
of its appropriateness to the way this thesis developed out of actual practice.  
 
The next chapter outlined the implication for practice that arose from the analysis 
of results and suggested areas for possible future research.   
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Chapter 9. Implication for Practice and Future Research 
 
This thesis examined how EPs talked about and reflected on their practice. It 
would interesting to analyse EP-Client encounters more directly through videoing 
or recording EP-Client meetings.  The analysis of the MWM was based on a 
written account. It would useful to record EP-Client interactions to further explore 
the regulation and production of asymmetry. Future research into the 
complexities of making particular judgments would also be of interest. Although it 
would not be possible to repeat this study in the strict positivist sense it would be 
interesting to read future accounts of EP’s practice by EP. It would be particularly 
interesting to read a history of the problemization in Educational Psychology.  
 
This thesis has been exploratory. In addition, researching issues at the micro 
(local) level in relation to an individual EP’s practice and at the level of a single 
and particular EPS meant that making generalization would be problematic. 
However, Foucault (2002) argued that the problems examined at a local level 
were just as general as those analyzed at the macro level. After all, the 
asymmetry in Professional-Client relations was a general problem.    Foucault 
(2002) said that his role was not to provide solutions but to “raise questions” 
(Ibid, page 288).  The type of problems Foucault was interested in did not have 
easy solutions. Foucault (2002) added that “Critique doesn’t have to have the 
premise of a deduction that concludes this is what has to be done”; rather it was 
an “instrument for those who fight those who resist and refuse what is” (Ibid page 
236).  Whilst this thesis could not confidentially identify specific solutions, it was 
suggested that the solutions were not: 
• A return to psychology. This is just a continuation of a desire for a 
psychology that never was.  It also fails to sufficiently acknowledge the 
relationship between Heath Care Professionals and the State and the 
normalization functions of EPs. EP practice was born out of the need to 
assess and categorize children (Mackay, 2002) 
• To find a neutral place from where EP can practice (e.g. working directly 
for the State, working for schools, working directly for parents, etc). There 
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was no neutral place (Foucault, 2002). Each new context would present 
new tensions and conflicts. 
• Liberation from the Local Authority. This is because the charismatic 
power, process of alienation, authority to categorize would all still be 
present.  
 
The emphasis on negatives could be seen as pessimistic and perhaps 
engendering apathy. Foucault (1983/2003) suggested that the aim of his 
approach was to inculcate a “hyper- and pessimistic activism” (Ibid page 343). If 
EPs after reading this thesis “don’t know  which way to turn, this just goes to 
show that they’re looking and, hence, are not anesthetized or sterilized at all” 
(Foucault, 2002, page 236).  
 
The analysis suggested that ethics was not just a personal issue for EPs but that 
there were implications for psychology services in terms of ethical training and 
supervision. Although, I was unable to provide universal solution I do feel able to 
make some particular suggestions, outlined below.  
   
Existing EPs could benefit from training that provided awareness of the wide 
range of ethical approaches that they appropriated in their practice.  Regular 
training that enabled opportunities to collectively discuss and explore challenging 
situations could also be beneficial for existing EPs. It would be interesting to 
explore the extent to which relational and microethics issues were incorporated 
into the Doctoral training programmes for EPs.   
 
Clinical supervision could have a crucial role to play in developing ethical 
practice. This would include: 
• Supporting individuals in navigating between worrying about practice and 
getting on with the job.  
• Providing a space for ongoing personal ethical reflection. 
• Identifying the ethical dimension of troubling situations. 
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• Providing a safe space to engage with and resolve ethically challenging 
situations. 
 
The analysis implied that, as well as a set of overarching and universal 
guidelines, a set of dispositions was required for ethical practice.  These included 
humility, respect, reflexivity and being open to the ethical demand of the Client. 
However, the emphasis on the personage of the EP had the potential to further 
the apotheosis of the EP75. To agitate against this apotheosis there would also 
need to be an emphasis on the relational aspects of practice.   
 
 
This could have implications for recruitment. Universities and Educational 
Psychology Services might need to consider the kinds of persons and 
experiences conducive to ethical practice.  
 
Educational Psychologists would benefit from debating the ethical frameworks 
which inform their practice. The aim would be to construct a more coherent and 
unified narrative of ethical practice in order to critically challenge, where 
appropriate, institutional processes which work against Client’s wellbeing.  
 
This thesis argued that examining how EPs made sense of their practice, their 
ethical tensions and their Clients lives, provided access to the institutional 
rationality of Educational Psychology.  This type of analysis could therefore 
suggest a possible basis to build future policies and guidelines for practice to 
accommodate and extend the heterogeneity of clienthood.  
                                                 
75
 While writing this thesis I was struck by the high number of paradoxical binaries. The example above was a case in point. The steps 
in the  paradox were:  
1. The apotheosis personage of the professional was a source of authority and asymmetry.  
2. Rebalancing of the asymmetry required the professional to adopt particular dispositions and attitudes.  
3. These attitudes could be perceived as being positive and could therefore further the apotheosis of the EP and hence the 
asymmetry.  
4. The relational solution was to be open to the ethical demand of the other.  
5. This could enable the EP to position themselves as being progressive and therefore provided further potential for the 
reinforcement of the apotheosis of the EP.   
I do not think that there was a way out of the paradox but I hope that engaging with it provided the opportunity for creative tension. 
Furthermore, awareness of the paradox could become a source for change.  
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The thesis showed how abstract and theoretical concepts such as professional 
and professionalism can be studied in action. Studying specific practice could 
provide insights into how decisions are made and actions taken. This in turn 
could provide both understanding of EPs practice and theoretical models. 
 
The analysis of results argued that ethical tensions in practice provided 
opportunities for ethical work (Water, 2008). Water (2008) suggested three 
possible responses to this emotional work: 
1. Learned to live with the ambiguity 
2. Seek forgiveness to finding peace 
3. Become desensitized and inured to the distress of others 
 
The first two responses could be achievable.  However, while recognising that 
there was a possibility for the third to occur it appeared too cold and clinical.  
Rather, I would suggest the following aphorism: 
 
The literature review argued that the EP-Client relationship was located in a web 
of alienations.  There was therefore scope for future research on the possibility of 
protected but less alienating relations between professional and clients. If 
alienation proved to be a fixed feature of the EP-Client relationships then 
perhaps research might explore how alienation could be employed as resource, 
e.g., something to be acknowledged and agitated against. 
 
The transcript (and tape recording) of the FG and the account of MWM were rich 
sources of data that could be mined using other research methodologies or 
tested using different research questions.  For example, the FG transcript could 
be used to answer the research questions: 
• During speaking turns how did the EP in the FG negotiate their identities? 
“If you are going to survive as an  Educational Psychologist  you have to learn 
to accept that there are things you cannot change but if you are going to 
survive as a person then you cannot stop trying to change things that you 
cannot accept” (Anonymous EP).   
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• How did EPs narrate and understand their identity work? 
 
This thesis emphasis towards problems rather than solutions might be an 
additional limitation of the thesis because it could create the negative impression 
that Educational Psychology was just an ethically problematic area. Shifting the 
research focus to how EPs resolved ethically troubling situations could have 
facilitated the examination of EPs’ problem solving strategies, support 
mechanism and provided a more balanced picture of Educational Psychology.   
Future research could therefore focus on what was in place in the EPS to support 




















Chapter 10. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this thesis was twofold: to critically examine how EPs constructed 
themselves as ethical professionals and to examine what it was about 
Educational Psychology that made EP-Client’s relations problematic. This thesis 
challenged the emotional, neutral, distant, abstract and rational portrayal of 
Professional-Client relationships (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; Singer, 2004). 
Rather, the analysis argued that EP practice was complex, socially embedded 
and emotional engaged. The analysis of results suggested that EPs frequently 
found themselves in ethically difficult situations that produced ethical tensions. 
The most common tension was the tug between wanting to do what was right 
and experiencing barriers to doing it. These ethically challenging situations, 
acting like trials, therefore provided opportunities for emotional, identity and 
ethical work. These three processes were entangled. For example, emotional 
work appeared to result   from the processes by which EPs constructed 
themselves as ethical professionals. The processes by which EPs constructed 
Clienthood (e.g. processes of objectification, categorization, responsibilization, 
normalization and formulation of cases) inferentially also positioned and 
constructed EPs identity. This suggested, tautologically, that EPs’ professional 
identities were problematic because the processes by which professional 
identities were made available were problematic.  The emotional work offered by 
the ethically troubling situations was another potential source of role insecurity. 
This was because it made the EP uncomfortable or diasporaic about their 
practice.   However, this uncomfortableness provided opportunities for hybridity 
and new relations with their practice (Bhabha, 1990). 
 
Clients were argued to provide an epistemological and ontological mirror for EPs. 
This suggested that rather than the power in the EP-Client relationship being 
straightforwardly hierarchically and linear that it was complex and recursive. 
Therefore, EPs and Clients were both objects of knowledge and subject who 
were known (doers and done to). In addition, both the EPs and Clients appeared 
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to resist the offered identities to be more than and other to what they were being 
called to be.  This thesis took the position that there was no unproblematic 
escape from the power; however EPs’ awareness of this power provided the 
opportunity for an ethical-political responsibility.  
 
The thesis challenged the view of the EP as the sole source of ethics. Rather the 
EP was also argued to be called to be ethical by the Client, as Other. The good 
news was that EPs’ work seemed to provide multiple and frequent opportunities 
to be critical. Each time EPs worked with a Client the Client demanded that the 
EP was both what they were and more and other than what they were. To hear 
this call it was necessary to use embodiment as a resource. This included 
questions such as, “Why am I feeling uneasy?”, “Why am I persisting with this 
line of questioning when the Other was not interested?”, “Why am persisting with 
this categorization when the Other does accept it?” “Why am I becoming 
frustrated?”    
 
This thesis did not resolve the debates about whether: 
• EPs were scientific practitioners or more humanist pragmatic practitioners,  
• The romanticized or sceptical of professional was more appropriate, or 
• EPs employed bioethical principles or particularist ethics. 
 
Rather, the analysis suggested that EPs vacillated between, and rhetorically 
employed, a wide variety of theoretical traditions and positions strategically. 
 
Foucauldian studies by EPs that examined Educational Psychology were still 
quite rare and this thesis has added to them. This thesis also appeared to be the 
first to have employed Levinas’s (1981) ethical approach to Educational 
Psychology Practice in Britain. In addition, no other published study in Britain 
was located that employed Araujo & Martuccelli’s (2010) construct of trials to 
examine Educational Psychology practice.  
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Finally, was I the same EP that began this process? I believed that I had a better 
understanding of the nature of ethically challenging situations experienced by 
EPs and I obtained a new perspective on the pastoral power of EPs. In addition, I 
think I had achieved Foucault’s goal of no longer being secure about my role 
while still loving my job. However, by critically engaging with, and making my 
practice problematic, I have opened a space for me to be not what I was.  This 
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Appendix.1 Definitions and Key Concepts 
 
Amphibology: Levinas (1981) used the term amphibology to describe the 
rational effort to determine what things were, through the neutralization of the 
ambiguity of the other. 
 
Apophansis:  The term apophansis was used by Levinas (1981) to describe the 
disruptive refutation of amphibology through the presence of the other and their 
inability to be reduced to a set of statements. Apophansis was not a rational 
refutation but a kind of sceptical unravelling of the said. 
 
Apotheosis: this was a term used by Foucault (1989). It means to make divine. 
This included the glorification of a subject to the divine level. It was associated 
with hero worship.  
 
Autonomy: Originally this principle was phrased as respect for persons 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1979). Respect for autonomy places a duty on the 
practitioner to both preserve and promote the autonomy of the client. This duty 
usually applied to clients who already had autonomy based on capacity to think, 
decide and act freely and independently (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). This 
was a very individualist and cognitive approach to autonomy and the person that 
privileges autonomy over cooperation and interdependence. Respect for 
autonomy required disclosure by the practitioner because withholding information 
or providing false information could impair the capacity of the client to choose.  
This extended to the practitioner making their values transparent so that the 
client could be aware of bias.  
 
 
Beneficence and Non-malfeasance: Beneficence meant taking steps to 
promote the best interests and wellbeing of a client so that they were better off 
than they were before the action was taken or more crudely to “do good”.  This 
term has feudal and religious entomology.  It means both a good act and a 
positive act or gift by a lord to their vessel.  Non-malfeasance was a negative 
requirement not to take steps or refrain from actions that would harm the client. 
Non-malfeasance was more commonly articulated as “first do no harm”.  In fact, 
both Beneficence and non-malfeasance were frequently conflated into the single 
phrase “do no harm” (Sim, 1997). Beneficence and non-malfeasance could be 
achieved though acts of commission or omissions. Sometimes not intervening 
could cause harm and at other times intervening caused harm. 
 
Bricolage: Bricolage typically meant to put things together in a haphazard 
fashion. In research it meant employing, non-hierarchical, sometimes diverse 
methodologies and methods to disrupt the authority of methodology (Steinberg, 
2006).  Bricolage was employed in post-structuralist research designs that were 
nonlinear, complex and utilized a range of theoretical approaches (Berry, 2006).  
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Casuistic: This is a method of applied ethics that attempts to evaluate each 
ethical dilemma case by case. Casuistry emphasizes the unique nature of 
particular cases over general principles.  
 
Consequential ethics: Consequentialism was a branch of normative ethics that 
actions should be evaluated on their outcomes rather than what happened before 
the action or the nature of the action. Crudely, the ends justified the means.  
More subtle versions of consequentialism added that for an action to be ethical 
the consequences must also be good and the action must not cause 
unnecessary harm (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011).   
 
Deontological ethics: Deontological ethics was a branch of normative ethics 
that held that action should be guided by duty. Action cannot therefore be judged 
by their effects. It is the adherence to a moral norm that makes an action right.  
Therefore the rightness of an action had priority over its goodness. Again 
crudely, the means outweighed the ends (Alexander & Moore, 2008).  
 
Diaspora: The concept was borrowed from Bhabha (1990) and was intended to 
encompass the feeling of unease, displacement and strangeness for living and 
working in a community but not be a part of it. It is sometimes employed in 
cultural studies to examine the experiences of minority ethic groups living in 
communities. Diaspora is associated with challenges to existing boundaries and 
divided loyalties.   
 
Educational Psychologist:  The Educational Psychologist role has been the 
subject of a great deal of debate both within and from outside Educational 
Psychology. This was examined in the Literature review. However, it was 
possible that this thesis could be read by Non-Educational Psychologists.,   A 
description of how the Department for Education understood the EP role was 
included below:  
 
“Educational psychologists work in a variety of different ways to address the 
problems experienced by children and young people in education. They have a 
central role in the statutory assessment and statementing procedures for children 
with special educational needs (SEN). They work directly with children and young 
people individually or in groups and with a wide range of other professionals to 
deliver their work. 
Part of the educational psychology role is to work at a strategic level, carrying out 
research and advising on educational policy development. Other areas of work 
include delivering training on issues such as behaviour and stress management. 
Direct work with children and young people includes assessing their learning and 
emotional needs using methods such as interviews, observation and test 
materials. Interventions are then developed to support the child or young person 
with the problems they are experiencing. “(DfE 
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http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/careers/careeropportunities/b00201184/edu
cational-psychology downloaded on the 27/07/2012) 
 
Ethical substance:  This was the aspect of the self or behaviour that required 
ethical work. In this thesis the ethical substance could be understood as the 
relationship with the client. Specifically, how the EP negotiated the EP-Client 
asymmetry.      
 
Ethical Work: This was understood as the reflexive relation the self had with its-
self and/or Others in which the aim was to construct and understand the Self as 
an ethical subject/professional.  
 
Ethics of responsibility:  Levinas (1981) argued that the opacity of the Other 
and their vulnerability was troubling and disrupting to the Self. How the Self 
responded (consciously or unconsciously) to the opacity of the Other Levinas 
(1981) referred to as the “ethics of responsibility”. This responsibility was 
inescapable and demanded a response even if that response was ‘no’.  The Self 
was not only responsible to the Other but also for oneself.  Self responsibility was 
a product of having to give an account of oneself in the face of the demand from 
the Other.   
 
Institutional talk: Institutional talk was typically characterized as having goals, 
agenda, being predictable, generic and being less open ended than ordinary talk. 
 
Justice: Justice was understood as the processes in which the needs of a 
specific client are weighted against the competing claims of clients in general or 
the needs of society.  Justice implies that clients were treated fairly and that 
similar clients are treated similarly.   
 
Hybridity: The concept of hybridity was borrowed form Bhabha (1990). Hybridity 
pointed to a heterogeneous identity composed of incongruous elements.  It also 
suggested the possibility of identity neither being one thing nor another but a 
process.  
 
Hypomenemata: This was a way of preserving the memory of things that were 
read, thought, or heard... It could be a type of dairy. However, it was also more 
than a record it was also a technique by which the individual grew through 
reflecting on  and assimilating what they had preserved (Foucault, 1986).   
Liminality:  Derived from the Latin word limen, meaning "a threshold”, liminality 
refers to the experience of being betwixt or between. It was developed by Turner 
(1969, 1992) who used liminality to examine the unstable and renewing 
experiences that occurred during rites of passage.  
Mode of subjection: This was the rationalisation which underpinned ethical 
behaviour and could be framed as, ‘I behave in such and such a way because I 
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am a rational being’, ‘human beings are all the same under the skills’, etc.  
Modes of subjection function like rules of conduct and justifications for conduct. 
The mode of subjectification can be established by examining the reasons 
individuals give for their action.  
 
‘Other’, ‘other’ and ‘just another other’: In the thesis the term “other” was spelt 
with either a capital or lower case “o”. This was to signify different ontological 
positions towards the other. The capital letter “O” was used to acknowledge that 
the Other was unique and beyond crude classification. This Other was 
transcendent and ultimately unknowable. The lower case letter “o” was used to 
signify that the other was not seen as unique but as an example of a category or 
label.  The phrase ‘just another other’ signified that the Other had been reduced 
to and considered as a faceless object. 
 
Self forming activities: These are acts of self regulation and discipline designed 
to transform the individual so that their behaviour matched their identity 
aspirations (Hofmeyr, 2006).   The self engaged in activities/exercises designed 
to train and shape itself. These exercises were not designed to make the 
individual free from power but to achieve freedom through power (Hofmeyr, 
2006) The individual was not free from their contexts, this would be an anathema 
for Foucault, but could recognise the limits and forces in their contexts. In the last 
analysis, even if someone was defining themselves in opposition to their 
prevailing milieu they were still being shaped by that milieu. Self forming activities 
were therefore both enabling and constraining (Taylor, 2003). Foucault (1984) 
suggested that self forming activities were social because:  
 
“Care of the self requires a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of 
the self requires listening to the lessons of the master. One needs a guide, a 
counsellor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you” (Foucault, 1984/2003, 
page 30).  
 
Said:  Levinas (1981) used the term “said” to describe the theme that was 
intended to be understood in a dialogue. This included rational acts such as 
naming, describing, comprehending, analyzing, rationalizing and thematizing  
 
Saying:  Levinas (1981) used the term “saying” to describe what was 
meaningfully expressed in a dialogue and was therefore concerned with the non-
semantic dimensions of meaning.   Saying was not present in the words but the 
intention behind them. For example if I said “hello” this addressed myself to the 
other and acknowledged their proximity. Hello as well as addressing the other 
also says “here I am”.    Saying reminded us that there was always more than 
can be said by a word or proposition.  
 
Telos: This was the ultimate aim of the self forming activities and could 
understood as the type of subject the individual aspired to be.  The telos was 
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historically and culturally shaped by the possible available identities in that 
culture or period.  
 
Unsaying: This was central to the relation between the said and saying. Levinas 
(1981) introducing the concept of unsaying  was resisting the western rational 
tradition to know, understand, categorize, synthesize, thematize, analyze, utilize 
and be reductive (Hutchens, 2008). The aim of the western tradition was to make 
everything transparently intelligible so that any form of difference or 
uniqueness could be reduced to the same. This relentless drive to know what 
things were (their essence) and that they are (exist) had been applied to the self  
leaving no aspect of the self (emotions, beliefs, attitudes, hopes dreams etc.) that 
has not been colonized  by a totalizing  rationalism (Levinas, 1981).   However, 
there was also an irresolvable tension between the above totalizing reason that 
sought to illuminate and the Other which remained foreign and opaque.  The 
Other person was always more and other than what was said about them.  In this 
sense the Other unsays what reason said about them thematically without the 
Other offering it own themes. This antagonism between the said and unsaying 
was continuous because the self continually tried to make the other thematic 
while the Other continually resisted thematization by being Other.  
 
Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism can be understood as the view that the right action 
was the action that produced the most good. Utilitarianism was therefore a form 
of consequentialism (Driver, 2009)  
 
Virtue Ethics: Virtue could be understood as an approach to normative ethics 
that emphasized the virtues or moral character of the individual rather than duties 
and rules (Deontology) or consequences (consequentialism).  Virtues can include 

















Appendix.2 Meeting with M 
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I had a meeting with a boy (hereafter M) which was ostensibly to do an exam 1 
concession. M is 14 years old. I noticed that M was unkempt and that his long 2 
finger nails were dirty, his hair look unwashed and there was a slight smell.  I 3 
remember feeling a sense of unease about noticing his lack of personal hygiene.  4 
 5 
I was aware of M through JCM (Multi-agency meeting in the school). M was 6 
finding school attendance difficult so he was attending school part-time and was 7 
seeing CAMHS. M described himself as having depression and very low self-8 
esteem. M lived at home with his mother, an older brother who is 15 and a 9 
younger sister who is 12. I noted that M mostly had appropriate eye contact, 10 
demonstrated appropriate non-verbal gestures such as nodding and smiling.    11 
M’s mother had been seeing adult mental health services but had not found it 12 
useful and stopped attending.  On the reading and spelling tests M’s 13 
performances were below the 2nd centile.  14 
 15 
M started a lot of conversations and it was very clear that he wanted to talk so we 16 
had a wide ranging conversation. It was lunch-time and my next child was not 17 
due until much later in the afternoon. I noted that it was lunch-time and said that 18 
he should go for something to eat. M said that he had already eaten and would 19 
prefer to talk.  20 
 21 
I found M very interesting.  M spoke in a soft whisper and I noticed that he 22 
pronounced his “th” sound as “d”. There was also an indefinable affectedness to 23 
his gestures.  I asked M if he ever had Speech and Language Therapy. M 24 
explained that he had. I said that it was very common for young people who had 25 
persistent Speech and Language difficulties when they were younger to later 26 
have problem with reading and spelling. I further explained that there was very 27 
little connection between reading and spelling and intelligence. This was to make 28 
him feel better (after all I had just made him do something he found difficult in 29 
front of a stranger) and also to dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have 30 
about the meaning of his difficulties with spelling and reading.  31 
 32 
During the meeting M made several disclosures.  33 
 34 
M told me that his family had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move 35 
house several times. I shared my feelings about this and asked him why he 36 
thought this was. M said that he did not know but that people did not seem to like 37 
them. I wondered if M had taken on the mantel of victimhood.  38 
 39 
I then asked M about his fingernails and M explained that he had a bath every 40 
night but that his fingernails, because they were long got dirty, very quickly. I 41 
explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been badly 42 
bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their hygiene, 43 
adding if M knew what hygiene meant. M added that of course he did as his 44 
sister had been bullied by being called smelly. M said that his family was poor 45 
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and had a coal fire and that this could make someone’s hair and cloths smell. 46 
Again I shared my empathy with him.   47 
 48 
M then added that his father had “walked out on us” and had taken £XXX pounds 49 
that was to going to be used to pay a bill. His father now lived miles ways and did 50 
not contact the family very often. M then said that things had moved on as “we 51 
now have a fiancée” and that his father did not know about the fiancée. M said 52 
that the fiancée was a professional boxer but that he was really nice. I asked M 53 
why he had said “we” instead of “his mother” but he did not want to answer.  54 
 55 
I noted that when M talked about his father that he appeared conflicted. He would 56 
be angry that is father had walked out and also angry that his father had not been 57 
in contact. M both missed and was angry at his father. I reflected this back to 58 
him.  59 
 60 
M then said he was going to tell me something about his family that no one 61 
knows and that he couldn’t believe that he was going to tell me. I said that he did 62 
not have to tell me and if there was something that was causing him harm I would 63 
have to tell. M said that he and his family were spiritualists. M then proceeded to 64 
explain his beliefs in an afterlife the ability to talk to people that had died and that 65 
we have all had past lives. During the conversation I explained that I tried to 66 
adopt a respectful approach to faith traditions and that I would try to be respectful 67 
of his beliefs and asked if he could respect my disbelief. M said that “we are all 68 
entitled to our beliefs”. I added that we were as long as they did not cause harm 69 
to ourselves or others. M told me the story about a friend of the family who had 70 
died and how his mother had spoken to the dead person in the after life who had 71 
told the family that they would soon be visited by someone who needed 72 
consultation so they would soon have some money. I asked M why it was a 73 
secret that his family were spiritualist and he explained that people would not 74 
understand and bully the family more.  M explained that because he had a past 75 
life he would have chosen this present life, he would have chosen to be 76 
depressed and poor to see what the experience was like. I said that it sounded 77 
as if he was saying that all the bad stuff that had happened was his fault. Again 78 
M did not answer. I said that I found this too difficult to believe and that he was 79 
not responsible for his poverty or the bullying. 80 
 81 
M changing the subject said that when something was not right or someone was 82 
going to make the wrong decision he would let them know. I asked if this was his 83 
job in the family but M said that it wasn’t and that he had to let them know. I tried 84 
to explain how everybody in a family could have a role and perhaps he saw his 85 
as stopping bad things happen. M did not get this idea at all. M did not see what 86 
he did as a role or a job but something that needed to be done (common sense).  87 
 88 
M explained that his brother and sister were not going to CAMHS and were not 89 
having the same problems as him. I asked why this was. M explained that his 90 
bother and sister did not worry as much as he did and did not think so deeply 91 
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about things. I asked which was better worrying or avoiding. M explained that 92 
avoiding problems was pointless because they will always be there.   Perusing 93 
this line of thought and knowing that M had a pet Finch I used the analogy of the 94 
canary.  I explained that how miners would take the birds down the pit to warn 95 
them of the presence of poisonous gas. I explained the view that there was a 96 
theory that sometimes children with difficulties were thought of as canaries which 97 
showed that there was problem in a family and asked him for his view. M did not 98 
like this idea and said that although his brother had difficulties with spelling and 99 
reading he did not have a problem with his speech and that his sister was good 100 
at reading. I tried again and explained that the more difficulties a young person 101 
had then this could make it harder to cope. M did not answer direct and changed 102 
the subject.  103 
 104 
As the meeting was coming to an end I asked M to think of three things that were 105 
positive in his life as this would help me after all the sad things we had talked 106 
about. M said that there was nothing positive in his life. After another long 107 
discussion where I attempted to get M to reflect on positive things we came up 108 
with the following: 109 
His pet finch 110 
M’s relationship with his mother  111 
The two dogs 112 
His faith  113 
 114 
I ended the meeting by saying that if M wanted to chat again that he should 115 
contact school. 116 
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Follow up meeting With M and his Mother 1 
 2 
I had a follow meeting with M and his mother. Neither M nor his mother wanted 3 
the meeting recorded.  I was allowed to make detailed notes about the 4 
conversation which I read back to them after the meeting. I gave M and his 5 
mother a copy of my write up of my first meeting with M and then asked them for 6 
thoughts. Did they think it was fair and accurate?  7 
 8 
M said that it was a fairly accurate account of our meeting adding “I am going to 9 
say things without getting angry”. M did not remember telling me about how much 10 
money his dad had taken with him and he wanted the amount removed. The 11 
majority of the talk is about the accuracy of the detail, age of his sister and him. 12 
M said that it was a good description of him and that he thought that I was being 13 
very positive.  14 
 15 
I wasn’t angry with my father, 16 
Right about the bullying 17 
Right about CAMHS 18 
“God, you go on about concerns don’t you” 19 
 20 
M had remembered the reading assessment and our talk about life about telling 21 
me about him and his mother being a spiritualist medium. 22 
 23 
I asked M what he thought about me. 24 
 25 
“Well at the time I didn’t know what you do. I knew that you were something to 26 
help me about exams but nothing. When you informed me that you is a child 27 
psychologist. I think I am better off talking and I did.  To be honest I had forget 28 
forgotten. It was only when you rang that I remembered, lots of stuff happens to 29 
me. 30 
I was a bit nervous at first. I had no idea what he wants, what he was talking 31 
about…it is not everyday somebody pulls you out of lessons, I had no idea”  32 
 33 
Well it’s Ok to know personal stuff about that. I felt alright telling you personal 34 
stuff, some people might not it depends on the person. 35 
 36 
I asked if I could discuss M with other people. It would be fine to talk to 37 
somebody else. I felt confident to talk to you. You said that it was confidential as 38 
long as nobody finds out my stuff I’m all right. 39 
 40 
I asked if I could write about M: If you did and it was anonymous then it would be 41 
“alright” I would prefer no name. If it helps other people as long as my name is 42 
not on it, it will be all private and confidential. 43 
 44 
I said that the meeting was about Exams but we talked about other stuff:  M said 45 
“that is just the way I am about things” 46 
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 47 
M’s Mother 48 
 49 
“I was reading it with interest to see what you had to say. I felt that you 50 
understood some things but …M is so complicated, it would take you years and 51 
years to work out anything, analyze him. I have been with him from birth, I don’t 52 
even know” 53 
 54 
After M told me about an incident in which the family was being harassed by the 55 
community M’s mother says 56 
 57 
“It doesn’t seem to worry V or J but I have seen M rocking and crying and getting 58 
extremely upset and uptight about it” 59 
 60 
On my account of M 61 
“I would say that you didn’t get anything wrong and that it was very accurate 62 
about the family.”  63 
 64 
When I discussed sharing M’s information and writing about him and the 65 
possibility of having it published: it would be OK if they don’t know who he was.  66 
 67 
On the discussion being wide ranging: 68 
It was good to say and let him speak, not stop, M speaks as things come into his 69 
mind. He cannot always concentrate on any two things, you know what I mean. 70 
He’s an extremely friendly little chap, Simple answers cannot explain M. 71 
 72 
I don’t know what Educational Psychologists are supposed to do so I don’t know 73 
if it was OK… I assume that your job would be to find out ways to help M to learn 74 
in the way he thinks... sort of, find ways, how can I say it without it sounding awful 75 
… M  feels and sees things differently from all other people in the family. Your job 76 
would be to say the type of education and job that he wants and needs, Am I 77 
right.  78 
 79 
What would working ethically with M Look like? 80 
 81 
Respect for individuals, try and understand what he is saying, not just hear the 82 
half of it, people do not always listen to what he is saying.83 
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Appendix 4. Transcript of the Focus Group Discussion 
 
 
The data analysis adopted a Foucauldian approach; however, I was unable to 
turn to Foucault for any guidance on transcription because he never addressed 
this issue in his work (Fairclough, 2003). As stated in the Methodology Chapter 
the transcription was produced using a simplified version of Gee’s (1986) 
method. Transcribing the talk in the FG was difficult because I often had to make 
subjective decisions about the appropriateness of punctuation.  This was made 
more complex because of the high number of pauses, non-words, incomplete 
sentences and repetitions in natural speech. I have endeavoured to keep these 
aspects of the talk in the transcript. In the transcript commas, full-stops, question 
marks and semi-colons were all used according to standard punctuation practice. 
I have generally not overlapped the speakers and each new speaker was started 
at a new line. The only exception was when a secondary speaker or speakers 
interjected while someone was speaking. In these instances their comments 
were put in parentheses.   
 
The transcription of the FG could therefore be characterized as ‘denaturalized’ 
and, as such, included only a minimum of intonation, non-verbal communication, 
laughter, emotion, etc. (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). This meant that a rich 
source of data was possibly absent. However, the intention was not to do a fine-
grained naturalized analysis focusing on the mechanics of the conversation 
(Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Rather, the aim was to focus on what was said 
(the statements) rather than how it was said.  In addition, Fairclough (2003) 
reminded us that “no system could conceivably show everything, and it is always 
a matter of judgement, given the nature of research questions, what sort of 
features to show and in how much detail” (Ibid, page 229).  Furthermore, Roberts 
(2007) suggested that if the focus was on the “overall structure or grammar of 
discourse” then “getting the words down on the page, with some fairly basic 
intonation features noted may be enough” (Roberts, 2007, page 4). The 
denaturalized transcript was therefore perceived to be appropriate for the 
research questions. Table 2 below provides guidance on the transcript notation. 
 




… Nonverbal pause or disruption 
Bold The speaker gave extra emphasis to what they were saying 
f() Text inside parentheses states that someone spoke while the main 
speaker was speaking 
Em  Short verbal pause 
Emmm Longer verbal pause 
XXX This was used instead of a person or name of a school 
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The first question is what ethical issues were raised by the account of the 1 
meeting with M, if any? 2 
 3 
The first thing that comes to mind that is that you went into do one thing, an exam 4 
concession and it has become a completely different thing, and if you got...???. 5 
And his age comes into play as well because if you have got consent from 6 
parents to do something did they realise that it was going to develop into this.  7 
But actually do they need to realise, is it up to him to use the session as he 8 
wants? Which is actually what I think he did, he used it as a space to talk and say 9 
what was on his mind, that was the very first thing that stuck out to me.  10 
 11 
OK I’ll do another one the other thing that is sort of missing out the whole middle 12 
section.  But almost at the end. Emmm you have put, obviously you have had this 13 
very in-depth  talk with this child and then said if you want to talk again you know 14 
, contact school emmm,  and I just wondered whether,  I don’t know if you open 15 
up the …  how personal that was to him something seems, it is very personal he 16 
has never told an adult some of the things  he told you  em and it has just sort of 17 
be left on the , it up to him to do something,  next and I almost thought for myself 18 
in my practice  that of that had happened , perhaps, if for you to offer and to be 19 
turned down , you know, em at another point if you offered another appointment 20 
as such , maybe it is up to him to come along or not em,  in that respect, but I 21 
don’t know whether its ethics or practice I don’t know whether it is the difference 22 
between ethics and practice. This is what I am struggling with. Also when I think 23 
about a doing session with children it is always child protection, it could just be in 24 
my mind, that what I kept thinking about child protection procedures.  And then I 25 
am thinking well there are ethical things within child protection procedures, well is 26 
that, the two, two separate things as well and I think that it is all kind of messy in 27 
my head. 28 
 29 
He has to go through the sch... Not only does he need to contact you he has to 30 
contact school… school to get to you.  31 
 32 
I don’t, Do we give our number, I don’t give my number to children so it makes it 33 
more difficult, I know , that he is at the sort of middle age but I still wouldn’t feel 34 
comfortable about giving my number  my mobile to a 14 year old boy. 35 
 36 
But is that what L .., you have another appoint for him to turn down. 37 
 38 
Emmm that would have been good. I wish I had thought of it.  39 
 40 
That’s great, laugh. 41 
 42 
 I pick put, picked up, on the first page the first page of narrative that he had 43 
experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several times.  You said I 44 
shared my feeling about this and I wonder (YEA) and I wondered about your self 45 
disclosure (right) of the of, the em professional in the situation in a situation like 46 
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this and the ethical boundary of that is.   You don’t actually say what was said. I 47 
didn’t quite understand that bit you said that you shared your feeling but I didn’t, 48 
didn’t understand quite. 49 
 50 
 I shared that I thought that it was very unfair, for those awful things to have 51 
happened (your judgements). Do you have a view on self disclosure 04  52 
 53 
Em my view and my practice I admit are probably quite different. My view is that 54 
we shouldn’t self disclose and that has probably come from a person centred 55 
counselling training that we shouldn’t self disclose but then there are times that 56 
you do and, and it has a very strong effect. In a relationship and it’s you know a 57 
session.  But there are ethical for the want of a better word ethical parameters to 58 
the level of self disclosure.  For instance has he said em I  my dad beating me up 59 
or something like that  it would not be within the realms of ethical disclosure  to 60 
say  my dad beat me up as well. Em but then to say… there is a line that one has 61 
to establish cause where you are coming form in your personal practice.  We 62 
exactable how much you disclose. 63 
 64 
Interesting it is interesting cause in some of the parenting groups, they, they tell 65 
you, suggest that you do disclose. 66 
 67 
I think you and I have had that discus… (Yea) in some of your supervision where 68 
I, I felt (Yea) that, that is ….  Em (em) 69 
 70 
 Did you, did you have any comment, thoughts about his em … religious 71 
disclosures.  72 
 73 
That was going to be one of my, my second points about,  I though that you were 74 
giving him some, reassurance ,  that you would respect his views em,  em ah…  75 
and that too is another difficult one.  Because it is about mutual self regard.  Our 76 
mutual regard rather.  Em but without letting him know that you yourself have any 77 
religious beliefs 78 
 79 
I found the most difficult thing was to hide my incredulity.  80 
 81 
Right, in this, because of it was spiritualism em. 82 
 83 
Yea I  and I found, find that I had to fight very hard not  to want to undermine his 84 
beliefs,  I am not sure in my account I disclosed how far I went  down the line, it is 85 
a long time since I read  and I tried not to read it before today session.  About 86 
asking him about his beliefs, because you could, you could, say that it wasn’t 87 
relevant, or you could say, I wanted to know whether or not he was delusional,   88 
or whether or not it was his faith system.  Or I just have been intrigued because it 89 
is an unusual thing for people to say to say I see… talk with dead people.    90 
 91 
You did, though, didn’t you, you asked him to respect my disbelief.  92 
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 93 
Em that assumes that there is a power equal there, (em)  and as 05 said to me 94 
before  it was OK me coming in being cleaver being  a university educated boffin 95 
arguing with a 14 year old boy with learning difficulties.  About who is right about 96 
their faith 03 97 
 98 
I just wanted to know, one ethics that comes into, through for me, is that why has 99 
this case raised such a strong feeling in you.  100 
 101 
I don’t know,  that is one of my puzzles, I just know that I found him very 102 
evocative he was dirty,  that was the first thing I noticed about him, that I was 103 
ashamed to admit.  I noticed how filthy he was and how much he smelt, I am sure 104 
I cannot be the only one who comes across children with hygiene problems. The 105 
dilemma is what you do. So what do you do? If you are sitting beside a 14 year 106 
old boy whose fingers are black, his hair was unwashed. He actually smells very 107 
bad.  What do we do?  Do we mention that, do we let it go, do we leave it to 108 
someone else.  We, we carry on with our reading assessment or whatever, we 109 
were doing, it’s a genuine question.  There is now a brief pause 110 
 111 
Em rightly or wrongly I don’t address it, or I would address it outside the, but yes 112 
he is a young person and in that sense, one should address it with him rather 113 
than talking about it to somebody else. I think that is probably what I would do.  I 114 
would try to gather more information. Em and see what school may have done 115 
about it. Because that is the context he is in every day.  Em so actually, you know 116 
I would em maybe would you have addressed it if you hadn’t went on to have 117 
your wide ranging conversation?  If you were just doing his reading and his 118 
numeracy testing and that sort of stuff.  And you didn’t to talk more or not. 119 
 120 
I don’t know. We started with him being bullied. I started do the psychology job I 121 
started thinking is it a presentation thing that stops him, it is it a defence 122 
mechanism. Is this smelliness a way of him saying ‘world go away’?  Exploring, 123 
so I am using that sort of psychological thinking to see, so I feel empowered to 124 
ask him about it.  Then I go away and I do exactly what you did.  Should I have 125 
brought it up? Would he have been embarrassed? Should I have gone through a 126 
different channel…? 127 
 128 
But you do say in your second paragraph I was aware of M through the JCM (that 129 
right?) so you, you didn’t actually come to this case without any background 130 
knowledge. (Knew that he had been with CAMHS for a while) Yea em it may be 131 
that there was a subconscious part of yourself saying well people are dealing 132 
with (Yea). 133 
  134 
Isn’t there a point were we cannot, not fix everything can we?  Our role is not to 135 
go in and fix things.  Do you know what I mean? We support people don’t we?  136 
We sort of try and empower them.  To, em. so if you’re  a complete stranger 137 
going to, to talk to a 14 year old boy  would he have been embarrassed, like you 138 
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said and less likely to speak to you, if you had commented on it? It’s a judgment 139 
call isn’t it?  140 
 141 
 Em, if you, maybe if you had known him before and had a relationship then 142 
that’s a different sort of relationship, different scenario.  I think I would be like 09, 143 
I’d address it out of the meeting, with somebody like the SENCO, or  head of 144 
house or something  like that rather than.  145 
 146 
It’s definitely context dependent, I, I’d had conversations with teenage girls about 147 
her personal hygiene.  I didn’t begin with going to do that but is where the 148 
conversation went.  I knew that she had personal hygiene problems because I 149 
had been told about them.   I didn’t go in thinking that I was going to talk about 150 
them but they came up in conversation. I don’t think that there is anything wrong 151 
with that.  I do think that age plays a part in it.  I don’t think I would be having that 152 
conversation with 7 years old.  But I think a teenager who, maybe or may be not 153 
able to understand. The child I had a conversation was able to understand the 154 
difficulties it caused her with the personal hygiene. 155 
 156 
Em, with the issue about gender, the adult and child would have play (01 AW I 157 
see).  158 
 159 
It is likely that gender would have influenced the whole conversation.  Because 160 
maybe would not have that, that sort of relation with this very clearly very, very 161 
softly spoken middle aged man.  162 
 163 
 Where do we stand on the issue of belief?  In believing in what he is telling. 164 
That’s the other thing.  I found it difficult to, I  found that thing where  I choose to 165 
say, Well I am listening to what you are saying   I am nodding  but I am 166 
wondering ‘is it true?’  167 
 168 
Look at that point that doesn’t matter I would say.  It doesn’t matter because he is 169 
talking to you because he has, kind of, developed a rapport or that, a kind of 170 
sympathy and you just have to kind of accept what he is saying.  171 
 172 
I’ll take 03’s view, it doesn’t really matter whether you believe him or not or 173 
whether you approve of what he is saying or whether you find it credible or not.  174 
That’s the point, the point is that he is a boy, a boy who is, has some difficulties in 175 
his life. I can see that from of the stuff you have written. Em and he is talking to 176 
someone, that someone being you and I think that is the important element here.  177 
 178 
My ethical point is that it almost feels at times that you don’t accept you find it 179 
difficult that you are finding it difficult writing his story (Yep).  180 
.  181 
I admit this. I admit that I had difficulty with his story.  I had difficulty accepting his 182 
story was factually accurate.  Because school had said something different, then 183 
I recognise that everybody has a different perspective.  So I have to say, what’s 184 
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my point, what is the professional way to behave?  When you are presentenced 185 
by someone who is telling you a story, like, it’s like you know,  a mum who’s 186 
telling you that they put the child to bed every night at 6:30  ( lots of yeses from 187 
the team) So how do you behave in that situation.  Situation if a parent is sitting 188 
there in front of you, do you challenge their story or do you accept their story as 189 
being what is   reality and that is what you work with. Well what do we do?  190 
 191 
I think it depends what you are there for. If you are there to collect information in 192 
a medical history sort of way. I would accept that there behaviour would be 193 
important you would be more challenging in that situation.  So again its context 194 
specific, dependant. I think. 195 
 196 
How relevant is it to what you want to do?  197 
 198 
Do you think that there are no big rules it is all dependant on what happens in a 199 




In most cases, in any cases we get conflicting narrative for different actors in the 204 
same, same kind of line.  I certainly come across cases where parents might say 205 
one thing but school might say, report something different.  206 
 207 
One last point before we move on to the more general questions. How do you 208 
respond when someone tells you a very tragic story. This idea that we have 209 
emotional work to do. Someone comes in and tells you a very, very sad story… 210 
and then you go away with it.  How do you respond to that when someone tells 211 
you a sad story?  212 
 213 
In the session or when you walk away from it? 214 
 215 
No, no either, how much empathy do you show someone when they tell you a 216 
sad story and when you go away how does that impact on you? I think that is an 217 
ethical question.  218 
 219 
I think that I am slightly confused by your definition of empathy meaning you 220 
shared your empathy with him.  Was it necessary does it have to be shared for it 221 
to be empathy?  222 
 223 
Well that me being telegraphic in my interview with him. Basically I am letting 224 
him, him know that I am acknowledging that his story is tragic his dad steals the 225 
last few 100 pounds he has in the house.  Runs away and doesn’t tell any body 226 
he’s coming back and his mum is left without any money, he is constantly being 227 
bullied, having stones through his window.  I could sit there and be all cold and 228 
say nothing or I try to show him in either speech or gesture that I am recognising 229 
that is a very powerful provocative story so I am asking what would, what would 230 
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be practice, would you, stay very professional and say thank you yes or be more, 231 
would you let him know that you thought his story moved you? 232 
 233 
You mean you are defining professional as detached as cold? 234 
 235 
I’m not, I saying that that is the option. 236 
 237 
No you said would you be professional.   238 
 239 




Didn’t notice that.  244 
 245 
I think a way of feed back to heard he said is to paraphrase what he said and 246 
leave it almost at that and not to rescue and in term of that… 247 
 248 
If something has touched you and you are telling him it has it’s touched you for a 249 
particular reason for your background or whatever.  Well I don’t think that that 250 
child needs to know that. That doesn’t mean that you cannot be empathic and 251 
listen.  And then reflect back like, like LA was saying, but to go as far as saying 252 
your story has touched me or that kind of terminology. I don’t think that that is 253 
appropriate and I think that if you walk away and he has touched you in some 254 
way that is what we have supervision for… to reflect on, you do, everyone . You 255 
certain children particularly here and there is something about him that has 256 
touched something raw in you. And that’s something to go away and reflect on 257 
and you may never get to the bottom of it but that is something for you to take 258 
away and not to leave with him.  259 
 260 
I think that is a mixture. I think empathy is really important and a powerful  tool 261 
and in counselling they call it reflection feeding back but if, in my practice anyway 262 
you have to show empathy but not to such extend that you stop you from making 263 
other action.  264 
 265 
Would you treat your friends like this would, would you, if your friend came along 266 
and told you a sad story or told you something, would you behave in the same 267 
way if you were working with them, with a client in a school.  268 
 269 
No me because, I have a different relationship with my friends.  My relationship 270 
with my friends is very personal and I much more personal than my work.  271 
 272 
If this were your friend you would probably say, beginning by saying you stink.  273 
 274 
Go on and have a shower.  275 
 276 
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For god sake where have you been with your finger nails? The relationship from 277 
the very beginning is very different. You cannot actually... 278 
 279 
Why can we not have that human relationship with, with the people we work with, 280 
the children and the parents 281 
 282 
We haven’t got the background relationship with your friends; with some friends 283 
you say you stink to they would be completely up in arms. It’s who you say things 284 
to, even if you met them two or three times.  You cannot presume to know them 285 
enough to how to (you haven’t got that history with them have you 06?). 286 
  287 
Just to add, just to add to what 01 was saying I think there will be ethical issues. 288 
If your relation to that boy was similar to that boy was similar to your relation with 289 
you friend. Because the shared history is not the same.  290 
 291 
And that power dynamic that 05 mentioned earlier was very different, an adult 292 
and a child, even an adult and a parent. Is very diff… they have all have 293 
preconceptions about you coming into that relationship 294 
 295 
And the levels of trust will be different, with a friend well hopefully well establish 296 
so you have, have different sorts of conversations, whereas in this situation I 297 
assume that was at the same level that you had with your friends. I think that 298 
that, that is a difference.  299 
 300 
So this persona, this, I use the name again a professional persona, is it that what 301 
we are describing, how we are professional with people?  302 
 303 
It doesn’t have to be professional it is about human relationships that is why I say 304 
a while ago that , professional is part of it,  human relationship, even in certain 305 
circumstances that I don’t know well enough   that I , have, a relationship with 306 
them that I have with my close friends. So the relation between you and this boy 307 
there is a power dynamic, it might be possible that this young guy is looking up to  308 
you, he might he might  I am not saying he does, he might be looking up to you.  309 
 310 
As I said the soft spoke middle age man is, is.... 311 
 312 
What is the idea of this human relationship, is the, is the difference between, 313 
between, i.e. the difference between a human relationship and, and professional 314 
relationship. 315 
 316 
There is and there isn’t. I think there is and there is isn’t. There is a yes and no in 317 
both. Cause we have a human relationship which is different from the human 318 
relationship we have with close friends. 319 
 320 
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One is personal and one is professional. It our job isn’t it. When it comes down to 321 
it you are supposed to leave your work at work because if we took home every 322 
single case every single parent, every single parent we worked with… 323 
 324 
Well... if you walk into a room with somebody else you can’t not bring some of 325 
your own personal  stuff in there but I think that part of our, our training is skills 326 
should be  about knowing what is appropriate to bring  forwards and be, you 327 
know what would, be  keep  back if something touches or provokes in you  and 328 
not to be emotionless at all in, in saying that  at all, but I don’t want to use the 329 
word usurp, because it brings that thing about sitting there very stern, it, a child 330 
tell you about being hit, well I was like that as a child , da de da de da . The 331 
difference between that and say ‘you tell me some more’ about being empathic 332 
and listening. 333 
 334 
I think the other thing is the element, the element, em that you mitigate against 335 
self disclosure is actually protecting yourself for anything that you might share 336 
with a child or young person which could then be misconstrued em so I think   337 
that the distance you, that you maintain is, is for your own protection as well as 338 
for the protection of the young person.  339 
 340 
Very good that first bit was excellent.  341 
 342 
Can I just say that the professional and the personal I wouldn’t make that, I would 343 
define the two different types of relationship that way.  I would define the 344 
relationship I have at work as personal and I would describe the relationships I 345 
have outside in my home life as personal.  But the one in work where I relate as a 346 
psychologist have certain characteristic which places certain ethical duties on 347 
me.  They are characterised by a certain power dynamic in which I have to take 348 
responsibility for but they are both personal.  349 
 350 
 I have, I was thinking around that a professional relationship is a human 351 
relationship with ethical boundaries.  But human relationship doesn’t necessarily 352 
have to be professional ones.  They’re greater, does that make sense.  353 
 You have just given me a quote that is brilliant.  So on to the questions. Do you 354 
think about, it’s more a general thing, do you think about ethics in your everyday 355 
practice?  Is that something that you actually think about.  You’re nodding you 356 
can go first.  357 
 358 
All the time. I cannot think about a time when I don’t if I am doing a WISC 359 
(general laughter) I thinking is there an ethical way to do this.  When I am writing 360 
a report, when I am behind with my report, I am thinking is it ethical to keep… to 361 
be doing that and so on.   362 
 363 
It is a very unfair question because I would have difficulty saying what, can you 364 
say what ethics mean to you mean in your everyday practice. I know that it is a 365 
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horrible question.  But when you are thinking about it other people can be 366 
thinking about giving answers.  367 
 368 
Long pause  369 
 370 
It links strongly; it certainly has a very strong link to what is moral, to what is 371 
correct … em … what within the law but also within.  Not just the law in terms of 372 
legitimacy but a moral code I think.  A moral code.  It’s just off the top of my head 373 
I could work on that if you want. 374 
 375 
Does anyone else think about ethics in their everyday work?  376 
 377 
All the time, all the time yea, in fact that’s the whole point of my, I would say.  378 
When I meet parents when I write report it’s always at the back of my mind. A 379 
little light that keeps flashing.  Who am I? What right do I have to make so many 380 
different judgements?  Just in terms of what ethics means to me I see it as a set 381 
of guidelines.   But guidelines sound very officious very formal  well I don’t mean 382 
it like that  the guideline for me , my own personal human personal guidelines 383 
and my own professional, using professional in a cold way, guideline, so I have 384 
my own guideline.  As a human being I also have a set of guideline as an 385 
educational psychologist.  And the two always mesh together.  There are certain 386 
things I know that I can’t do because the job doesn’t allow me to do.  But there 387 
are certain things I won’t do because emotionally or culturally I will not be able to 388 
do.  389 
  390 
Anybody else? 391 
 392 
I just think 03 put that very well. Wouldn’t have put it as well myself.  But I can 393 
totally identify with what he has said. 394 
 395 
What I was thinking about in the earlier part of the conversation, it was 01 said 396 
that she was very, everything was context specific.  And I think we all agreed with 397 
that. and then  04  said things to do with like moral,  Laws those things tend to be 398 
very de-contextual  in that you apply , there is a law where you apply to the 399 
context,  where the context, where you assume , where you see what is right in 400 
this condition.  So is that connection between the moral, the guideline and the 401 
principals and the context I am interested if any body has any views on that.  402 
 403 
One of the things that comes to mind that is contextual is touch (02 right) 404 
practically, we don’t touch.  But there are times when we all, well I certainly do, its 405 
not beyond the thing a parent who I have been working with for a long time would 406 
embrace me and I would  reciprocate that embrace.   That is a particular ethical 407 
thing that we change in the context …. Of the situation.  408 
 409 
In fact, that helped me a lot last Thursday because I was doing a parent drop in 410 
session at XXX and prior to those I know that one of the parents is going to be a 411 
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very tough meeting she was coming in and she was, brought her toddler with her. 412 
And all the staff warn me be careful this is a very difficult thing, when they came 413 
in the toddle rush at me because I am very attractive to kids. Don’t know why 414 
thought, he come on it happen outside as well.  (lots if laughter) so he sat on my 415 
knee, (06, clarify that 03) Ho I don’t mean it like that, The toddler sat, I was 416 
pulling my face and all like this, it was amazing how my relationship with the mum 417 
changed and afterwards the social worker who is the daughter of XXX, she came 418 
to be said I don’t know what you did. But you really pacified her and, and what I 419 
did I didn’t say anything to her, that was pacifying her I think it was the whole …. I 420 
am careful with who I do it with and who I can do it with. Sorry to everybody here 421 
if you every see me do that to you, it just me it me, I need to do something like 422 
that (lots of understanding no’s) just that me it helps me. 423 
 424 
We also know that, that was nice touch.  (03, Yea, Yea) but we all, we all, there is 425 
something within our code that allows us to know what is good touch and, and 426 
what is, it is a procedural thing given…  427 
 428 
But I had a situation where, this year 7 I had worked with recently run up to me in 429 
a corridor in a high school and flung his arms around me. He forgot that he was 430 
in a middle of a corridor in a high school. Em in that case …. Sorry but I did give 431 
him a hug back.  Because I had just of kind of done this (gestures to show she 432 
was withdrawing) he would have though that he would have done something to 433 
upset me and it was just so nice, to have that relationship, he has not done it 434 
before. It just that he had seen me and he had done that.  435 
 436 
It is an issue but if we are going to tell stories, yesterday I was interviewing this 437 
kid with autism and his mum was sat over there and the kid was sat with and I 438 
am doing some drawing and talk.  And next thing he knows, I have a head on my 439 
shoulder and his arm on the other shoulder. And I’m thinking HO that feels a bit 440 
uncomfortable. So I am sitting there going, so I had to say, well you need to be 441 
there  442 
 443 
It’s about being the recipient of a touch that you know is not right.  444 
 445 
It seems to be that part of the boundaries when people, you are not going to like 446 
this, when people impinge your professional boundaries.  And treat, treat us, 447 
maybe coming in a giving us a hug.  Or somebody touches us.  Because that is 448 
not normally something we encounter in our everyday professional life … no…? 449 
 450 
Yea but, no, it depends on, its contextual one of our colleagues was going 451 
through a difficult time last week and I gave her a hug, it was very relevant, 452 
because the person, that person, person was having a really difficult time and I, it 453 
was very contextual from you know what you were saying 06.  Which was very 454 
nice.  455 
 456 
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I think that it is also about personalities. I’m like you I am very tactile, and I have 457 
got people that I work with, I put my hands up, professionally, I will give… if I 458 
have not seen them after the hol…, after the summer holidays  they will give me 459 
a hug and I will give them a hug back.  I, I know of other people in the room who 460 
are similar.  461 
 462 
That’s individual difference isn’t it (06 yea). Some of us wouldn’t do it. I don’t find 463 
anything uncomfortable about people who, that do, but it just would be me, not 464 
my practice (06 yea it about personalities isn’t it).  465 
 466 
When people are leaning sometimes (gestures someone coming in for a hug), O 467 
my god what am I supposed to do? (Lots of loud laughter).  468 
 469 
Like MT hated anyone touching him, it was weird he didn’t like it.  Did he?  Even 470 
if you did that he would be …  471 
 472 
That’s a person thing isn’t it.  (Lots of verbal agreement) 473 
 474 
What about the next one is eh...  what barrier do you experience to your actual 475 
practice?  What do you think stops you being ethical in your everyday practice?  476 
 477 
When you were talking earlier about do you think about ethics in your everyday 478 
practice I was thinking, I was working with a child who has been in long term care 479 
and she has seen various professions and she is new into the school. You know 480 
you they are very concerned about her. And they want me to meet with her and 481 
she doesn’t want, wants me, wants to meet with me.  And the SENCO is literally 482 
trying to lure her into the room.  And I was sort of like look I don’t think this is 483 
going to work. Like even if we get her in her she is not going to talk to me.  This is 484 
now, you know not helpful.  And the barrier for me was that the SENCO was so 485 
desperate for me to see, she was coercing her in. in the end I had a chat with her 486 
and her friend.  Really informal environment cause I didn’t feel more comfortable 487 
and then can she then move. I felt that we, we somehow tricking her into doing it, 488 
and I, it wasn’t helpful for her.  At that point she was new into the school.  So in 489 
terms of, I thinking, an initial barrier I thought is, is sometimes pressure on em, 490 
from other people and there is a pressure for other people and resources 491 
sometimes.  You have got to have a certain environment to have an assessment 492 
with a child.  And often that is not available in schools so sometime is, do, 493 
probably compromise my practice to adapt, rather than have to pick a, and have 494 
to come back another day and another time.  It the external pressure on you that 495 
push that.  496 
   497 
I think that going back to your first em that, em, analogies, think there it is the, 498 
very basic of ethics is consent (lots of agreement in room). Em and everything 499 
must be done with the consent of the, who it is being done to.  Obviously the 500 
parent in some, in terms of our referral system, but also we must have the 501 
consent of the person, of the lit…, young person that it is being done to.  502 
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 503 




 Is it context specific or is it or it something bigger.  508 
 509 
It might be one of the overarching ones  510 
 511 
Where you use the word ethics in medical ethics or em   what have you, think, 512 
you know, the overarching thing is the consent.  513 
 514 
And that’s difficult because sometimes they feel that they have got to see use 515 
because we are, we are the sort of special person who is coming to see them.  516 
And another area where I find difficult were I find difficult and where ethics is 517 
brought in, is when you are administering tests. And they are actually finding 518 
them quite hard, especially in something like reading tests.  And that I find difficult 519 
when they are struggling and they are coming, coming well quite distressed.  And 520 
it can be quite extreme and again  consent you know,  would they consent to 521 
doing that if they knew  they would become distressed but we as professionals 522 
(increased tone), the special person  coming in to see them , they have to see. I 523 
find that quite hard sometimes.  Can we ever get full consent? 524 
 525 
The ethics is always to let people know that we can that they can withdraw. (Lots 526 
of agreement) 527 
 528 
Another barrier em to ethical practice, I have another example of that was doing 529 
yesterday, is thresholds. I was at a meeting where, where,  an ,an , extremely 530 
high level of anxiety about a young child and , and yet  the threshold for going to 531 
child protection  was so high em that I felt that the kind of view of most of the 532 
people present were not being adequately expressed because of the threshold.  533 
Em social worker wanted to see reach. That sort of left big questions for me, but 534 
fortunately it was only one I was em stepping in for.    It was Child protection case 535 
and I know that there are Child protection anxieties. Em, about actually stating 536 
your case and then what to do about it if thresholds are em are proposing a 537 
barrier to you.  538 
 539 
Can I say about split allegiance in the job?  For example the Matrix, my duty to 540 
whom, my duty to the child, to the family to the school to the Local Authority (04  541 
to psychology), to psychology. So there are different stakeholders and that 542 
presents ethical challenges. 543 
 544 
Like what 05? 545 
 546 
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Writing about children, speaking about children, how I do that, that’s intelligible to 547 
others. So if speak if I write in a child in a way demanded of me by the local 548 
authority, how am I re-creating this child how am I shaping that child?  549 
 550 
08 once said that she was never going to describe a child as an I4 or whatever 551 
the words were.  552 
 553 
Yes, yes that what I think, is that want you’re on about (yea, yea).  554 
 555 
What about time, do you feel squeezed by time?  556 
 557 
Yea yes 558 
 559 
Because you can define ethics as a quality relationship between you and the 560 
child, between you and the parent. Do you find that time stops you providing, 561 
being in, the sort of relationship with a child or parent that you would like to have?  562 
 563 
Yea, I was going to say that.   Was going to bring time to the table. Sometimes  564 
going back to writing reports  we see children or we get exposed to the family  565 
only two or three times but we write such a huge report as if we know them. 566 
 567 
Sometimes less! 568 
 569 
Yes if it’s like pre-5 so that, that creates a huge challenge. The other thing is our 570 
own personal prejudice   because there are times when I go a case and I want to 571 
say to the boy or girl, get yourself together!  Because that’s the, the thing, but I 572 
cannot do that.  Because that’s, you know “come on”! , that behaving you cannot 573 
do that; I want to say that I know I can’t say that. 574 
 575 
 But I feel that it is ethical to challenge and challenge is apart some of the work 576 
we do, we do it in a very careful way with teacher, we, we, we, might not say get 577 
yourself together but we might say,  you really do need to get this…  we do, do it.  578 
 579 
When we were training we did this whole thing on elegant challenging.   It was 580 
what you were saying it was and that was the phrase we would use and that, how 581 
you phrase it, it’s OK to say, it how you say it isn’t it.  Rather than going and 582 
saying “your rubbish” and you have got to be doing it in a slightly….  583 
 584 
I am talking about inelegant challenging, I don’t mean.  The challenging where I 585 
frustrated, where I know  look  if you don’t , you know, look I know, I find,  if I get 586 
clip round my ear.   I were your age, I, I did it, I won’t say that. 587 
 588 
Do you ever find yourself caught between? I’m constantly caught between, 589 
caught between my local authority role and my EP role. My relationship with the 590 
SENCO and what the parent might want.  Caught between what I think I need to 591 
do for this child and what I think I need to do if I had more time.  592 
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 593 
I think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up.  And I am really caught, I have 594 
been discussing, discussing this with 04.  I think that the parent and the child, I’m 595 
on their side, well I think.  Well yes I am on their side.  But when I sit in that 596 
tribunal I work for the local authority.  And like I said to you I am really caught 597 
(ND caught between) yea. I am really struggling.  598 
 599 
Yea, do you every find yourself ( I agree) Do you every find yourself caught 600 
between you and your SENCO, like you can know someone, like know the 601 
SENCO very well and you can feel friendly with them and you find yourself, I 602 
wonder if I collude you see. If I didn’t know this person as well, hence why I am 603 
looking forward to working in a cluster.  No, is that just me.  604 
 605 
Colluding in what way 02, colluding to get, get something you want or get out of 606 
something you don’t want to do.  607 
 608 
A SENCO might say something about a parent, it’s a horrible thing to be 609 
admitting isn’t it, or about a child rather than challenging them on it.  I have a 610 
longer term view of what I want to achieve in that relationship so I let it go.  611 
 612 
See I am the opposite. See if I knew them long enough. If I knew them pretty well 613 
I will challenge them more than when I have only just met them,  614 
 615 
I was about to make exactly the same point, comment you made. I’m finding it 616 
easier to work with SENCOs that I have a good relationship with.  Because I am 617 
much more able to say to them come one you can’t or you can’t say that.  But the 618 
ones that I don’t have a relationship, colluding because I don’t have a 619 
relationship.  620 
 621 
The drop in this morning the first teacher sit down, she sat there.  Went he’s a 622 
naughty boy and that gets my back up, I want to say, want to say, I don’t you to 623 
use that word, or words to that effect.   But I couldn’t because the rest of the 624 
consultation would have been a right off because I would have got her back up.  625 
So I had to kind of right, right and kind of move on.  But yea, yea it is hard in that 626 
respect.  627 
 628 
What about when we are writing statements, any ethics issues when were are 629 
involved, when we write statements. That good I think we are relaxed about it. 630 
 631 
Well I have voiced my thought on that. 632 
 633 
I think that sometimes to get the wording on the matrix.  It almost like, your report 634 
is slightly skewed because the wording is, the words you have to use (08 your 635 
right) and I struggle, I struggle with that, sometimes. I just think, it the whole thing 636 
about significance, de, da, de, da, and you have to put it down (02 what have 637 
you) so they get the right kind of support.  But then for a parent to read that.  So 638 
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the child has made some good progress with all the interventions they are having 639 
and for them to see SEVERE. It’s a slap in the face.  I think sometimes. It a 640 
shame we have to use them. 641 
 642 
There a whole ethics around the Ethics of labelling,  now we have moved on our 643 
labels  but we no longer  use retard  and goodness know what but we have found 644 
a new set of words  mean the same thing. 645 
 646 
Do you often, I have found that I have a conversation with mum, I am going to 647 
write severe but that is so the child gets the money. Is that just me (Lots of Yeas 648 
from the team). 649 
 650 
No. When you get my report it may sound  really negative  I will put some positive 651 
in about Johnny  but it  you know in order for the school to get , to do what he 652 
needs and..  653 
 654 
Do you think we are caught between what we would like to say and what we 655 
need to say for resources to be put in place 656 
 657 
Definitely (lots of nodding and agreement) 658 
 659 
Where do your views of ethics come from. I think 04  comes form a sense of   660 
morality, a sense of what legal what do you think, for example has anybody read 661 
the,  or recently taken on board the  HPC’s views on ethics, or the BPS view on 662 
ethics or AEP view? 663 
 664 
Some laughter.  665 
 666 
I want to know if that’s at the forefront of our thinking or if it’s something more 667 
subtle going on. Like how useful do we find them?    668 
 669 
I think even before you come into psychology training your ethics are being 670 
formed from your upbringing.  And how much that can change is variable.  I think 671 
you can change in terms of seeing things and thinking that I need to alter my 672 
practice in that way but I’m, I don’t think you can move massively from where you 673 
are.  (General agreement) 674 
 675 
 I would say my ethical practice or how I think about my ethical practice has  676 
changed, well over the last 5 years  since becoming a psychologist  em I think 677 
that  part of that is because I wrote in my doctorate. And initially and as a child 678 
and growing up and pre psychology I was sort of indoctrinated into having a 679 
moral, moral and coming to psychology, into training I was quite happy to  BPS 680 
guidelines and the quite loosely based on Kant’s   imperatives  and feeling  safe 681 
to know My practice within that framework. I could think of as ethical. I think that 682 
through writing my thesis and considering the more detailed ethics have become 683 
more and more aware to take personal responsibility for my actions.  That goes 684 
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beyond those basic frameworks; it’s made me, made my practice much more 685 
uncomfortable.  You know I find every case a challenge a difficulty, perplexing 686 
and confusing.  You know and the, that has become heightened through the 687 
doctorate and being exposed to conversation like this.  688 
 689 
I am opposite 06, on this point. I must say that I have  set of beliefs or values  690 
which is part of me  that inform me  but within that I look at the guidelines. You 691 
know but in a way my journey is opposite way to you   I have got a very strong 692 
moral, I shouldn’t say that shouldn’t I.  We shouldn’t have that in this job. I have a 693 
strong belief system in what is right and what is not in my own little box.  The 694 
guides that 08 allows me or 04 allows me or 09 allows me to travel. 695 
 696 
Some protects from Seniors Management Team,  697 
 698 
You know what I mean within the organisation, within the organisation how much 699 
I can do you know. (03 then wiggles his whole body-some laughter)  700 
 701 
I think I am more like that (pointing to the wiggling). I Think I have become 702 
increasingly flexible. In that more pragmatic, so I think, your right it more a 703 
morally vulnerable position. Then I have to say if I am saying that then I have to 704 
taken on the consequences, that is not going to happen or that is going to 705 
happen.  Then I have to accept it so I used to write in the beginning things like 706 
vague statements about children and then it is some bodies else’s job to say if 707 
they go to special school. Right but now I am , or I would do, now I am more 708 
prepared to say what my opinion is  and  say what that child needs or  another 709 
example if were I would have followed rules strictly I’m more likely to say let see 710 
how that works out in this situation.  I would be more flexible.  Then If I thought 711 
about it I would think about it afterwards and then think why I behaved like that.   712 
Whereas when I was starting I wanted to be very prim and proper.  713 
 714 
So 06 going back to what you were saying just now 02 has just given some 715 
example of how it actually changed his practice.  Form your comment I was 716 
thinking was it sounds like what you’re taking away more internally and thinking 717 
have you also seen changes in you practice as well because of, because of the 718 
kinds of reflection you have made since doing you thesis. Or is you are just 719 
personally struggling with it more.  720 
 721 
I think yes I would say that there have been changes in practice I suppose and 722 
its, its making sense of why I have always found practice so difficult. I, I have 723 
always found certain kind of practice so difficult. And I think the at I probably did 724 
my thesis was to try and really think why am I finding , so times I even look up  725 
and wonder maybe they are or they don’t seem to . Maybe I’m  just a freak , 726 
maybe I’m just trying to make sense of that. I think that it is impacting on my 727 
practice.  I only practice only 50% of the time now for example. So I think it has 728 
some real effects on my, on what I do for my job and how I do it. 729 
 730 
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Are some types of practice more ethical than others, like if someone’s a 731 
behaviourist or someone’s a cognitivist or someone’s a psychoanalyst or some 732 
are more eclectic, is there, are one type of practice more ethical than others. Like 733 
some say ABA is unethical because it is behaviourist or. 734 
 735 
No because it depends on how you are applying it doesn’t it.  If you’re tying to 736 
apply it in the completely wrong situation then it can be unethical.  But in other 737 
situations it can be ethical if that child needs. Breaking down into small steps but 738 
if you are trying to use one thing and apply it to everything that when it becomes.  739 
 740 
We have a saying at home which links to the first point, the personal thing and 741 
probable to contextual thing as well. “Its yourself you have to sleep with at night”.  742 
  743 
And I think that that can be one of the biggest massive barrier as well. Its draining 744 
I get a letter sometimes from a doctor saying something and I think right, I could 745 
just file that and give in but I know that it will go though my head and I will, I will 746 
have to make a phone call and follow up just to rectify what they have put. One 747 
just particular example that 09 knows about then I think that is part of my morals 748 
though, I could just leave it, put a quick note to say actually, school say da,de,da, 749 
well actually school can do that. But I can’t do it.  750 
 751 
 I see it as a car journey you are travelling down this road there are some traffic 752 
lights, you have got to stop when it is red. That’s the law of the land, that’s what 753 
you do, but within that, in the car you can, can be on gear number 2, gear 754 
number 3, it may wrong, you might be driving the clutch too much you might drive 755 
a bit faster when orange goes to red.  Or but you make you make those 756 
judgments, but within that there are certain things that, like the traffic light you 757 
stop  even if there are no other cars going by because if you don’t  what will 758 
happen the system will break… that’s the system we have created for us .  759 
 760 
Why don’t we have more discussion about ethics?  761 
 762 
We haven’t got time.  763 
 764 
This feels like a luxury, doing this. 765 
 766 
I’m wondering, whenever I have supervision we really discuss ethics.  Or I have 767 
lately because of this boy with anybody that will listen to me.  But I think normally, 768 
I think we normally tend to talk about other things.  But maybe they are ethics. 769 
Perhaps that’s what I am trying to get at. Maybe it is about ethics if ethical is 770 
about having a quality relationship about someone or if it’s about having a quality 771 
relationship or it’s about having a relationship that’s effective.  One that does no 772 
harm or one that is beneficial, one that does good then maybe then we are 773 
having them all the time.  774 
 775 
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And examining your own belief systems does that come into it? Which can be 776 
part of supervision; does that come into it as part of the broad umbrella of ethics?  777 
Examining your own belief systems? 778 
 779 
And being challenged.  Because you are challenged in supervision aren’t you 780 
and that that can link to the ethics can’t it? 781 
 782 
We don’t call it ethics do we? 783 
 784 
No you’re right.  785 
 786 
No we tend to call it something else, in my view it is all ethics, what I should do in 787 
this situation.  If the SENCO saying this and the mum is saying this what should I 788 
do? Or I am saying I need to writing something in this report and how do I write it 789 
and feel good about it and its ok I have written it? How do I describe a child as 790 
not SLD which I know bugs 06 all the time. So I think those are ethics. So why 791 
don’t we call it ethics or am I just being semantic?  792 
 793 
No I think you are right, so when you said do you think about ethics in your 794 
practice. I’m thinking I never think of the word ethics.  It not a word that pops in 795 
my head but I am always aware but I never… But I never think ‘that not ethical’ 796 
but I am aware of what I am doing. 797 
 798 
I would sometime say that part of the time we sometimes have an awareness of 799 
certain big structural issues how we feel pretty powerless to do anything about 800 
that impact on our practice.  In our preferred practice. And discussing them  801 
going on and go on and on discussing them we may feel they don’t  get us 802 
anywhere so we may feel that we just need to the best we can within the context.  803 
Even if not how we feel be ethically perfect. Because we feel we feel we have no 804 
other choice. Does that make sense? So I know I picked up on the Matrix and I 805 
know I bug FL about going on about it but I try not go on about it too much. 806 
Because what can FL do, FL is part of a chain and someone else and someone 807 
else is there.  So there is certain pragmatic realities that to discuss it further just 808 
because I feel it’s an ethics issue probable isn’t doing anybody any good.  So I 809 
chose not to. 810 
 811 
But, I think it probably fits in with my ethical code as well there are times when 812 
you know you just have to stand up and be counted.  So you stand up and say 813 
this is wrong and em, em, em,  814 
 815 
Would you pick you fights? … You would fight everything to the death! 816 
 817 
No because you want to survive, it about survival isn’t, which is probably inherent 818 
in some of the questions you asked because we do. 819 
 820 
OK thank you very much.  821 
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Appendix 5. Do Personal Pronouns Matter? 
 
As discussed in the introduction I found the issues of tense problematic. 
Qualitative research tended to be in the first person while quantitative research 
tended to be in the third person past-tense. The use of the first person appeared 
to be almost a defining feature of qualitative. However post-structuralist theorists 
had made the concept of ‘Self’ problematic. This section of the appendix 
presented argument for and against the use of the first and third person.   
  
Nietzsche (1998) argued that the self-determining “I” was analogous to “the ruling 
class” who “identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth” (Ibid page 
49). The establishment of the synthetic “I” was an expression of pleasure of 
mastery by recognizing oneself as the source of the command to resist but not 
the call for obedience. This was tantamount to an act of ontological violence by 
the self to the self.  
 
However, Billington (2009) asked that practitioners not hide behind the 
anonymity of the third person and become accountable symbolically through 
making themselves present through using “I”. Billington (2009) explained this 
position below:   
“The elision or indeed denial of the ‘I’ will be resisted in this paper, however, for 
all such rhetorical ploys constitute a deceit, both scientific and pragmatic. There 
can surely no longer be any pretence that the author, of whatever ideological 
persuasion, does not exist.” (Billington, 2009 page 5) 
For Billington (2009) the use of “I” was a corrective to the dehumanizing and 
pathologizing language of science in which the author writes in the third person 
as a rhetorical device to claim political neutrality and objectivity. Billington was 
asking for an outing of the EP to make them accountable. Billington’s (2009) 
arguments were intriguing and challenging especially to someone who enjoyed 
the incomplete anonymity that writing provided.     
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However, the third person had been used in a different way in Memory Work and 
Narrative Therapy. In Memory Work writing in the third person was argued to be 
an opportunity for the researcher to “observe aspects of themselves” 
and to “release people from the tendencies towards self-justification” and “enable 
the researcher to embrace the possibility that the experiences could be lived or 
experienced differently” (Stephenson & Kippax, 2008, page 132).  Using the third 
person was also analogous to the Narrative Therapy practice of externalizing 
conversations.  In Narrative Therapy externalizing conversations were used to 
create a disruption or separation between the person and the problem that 
facilitated creative thinking (White & Epston, 1990). Following White & Epston 
(1990) it was hoped that the process of externalization would separate the 
professional practice from the dominant stories that have been shaping practice.  
 
For Foucault (1969/2003) there was not a binary between presence and 
absence of an author but an analysis of the different ways authors were 
present and the work/functions that the presence did.  The author function 
enabled a discursive practice that had rules about status, the right to speak and 
who should be heard. Barthes (1986) suggested that the author played a 
strategic game of hide and seek and was present even when the author was 
adopting an objective, realistic style to persuade the reader of the text’s truth and 
independence. Use of third person past tense was therefore an example of a 
game in which the author pretends not to be present so that discourses were 
able to speak for themselves. However, it was a rhetorical device that was laid 
bare by the balancing emphasis on plagiarism. This served to highlight the 
judicial right of the author and illustrated how the author was woven into a system 
of rights and obligations.   
 
Writing was therefore not innocent but had a rhetorical function both to 
interpolate and persuade the reader to believe the writers account (Barthes, 
1986; Billington, 2009; Foucault, 1969/2003; MacLure, 2003). Insider accounts 
could be particularly seductive because they appeared “straightforward” and 
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plausible (MacLure, 2003). However, readers need not be passive and had the 
capacity to interpret.  As Stanley (2002) pointed out, “We may be textually 
persuaded, cajoled, led and misled; but we can, and we do, also scrutinize and 
analyze, puzzle and ponder, resist and reject’ (Stanley, 1992, p.131). 
 
The call for a general appearance of the author could also have the effect of 
privileging particular authors (Foucault, 1969/2003). This reinforced the ranking 
of authors and evaluating texts by asking who was speaking. The truth of what 
was being said was therefore derived from who was speaking (Foucault 
1969.2003).  
  
Following Foucault (1969/2003) the “I” in texts was never unproblematically 
present and there were multiple selves present in texts. In addition, the act of 
writing was the accumulation of the interactions between the “I” and discourse 
(Aldridge, 1993; Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1991). I was very aware that as I wrote, 
new ideas and ways of seeing emerged that did not exist before the dialogue 
with writing. However, the writing Self was always already compromised because 
“The subject of the speech-act can never be the same as the one who acted 
yesterday: the I of the discourse can no longer be the site where a previously 
stored-up person is innocently restored” (Barthes, 1986, p. 17).  Derrida and 
Ewald (1995) further argued that: 
 
“There is not a constituted subject who engages itself in writing at a given 
moment for some reason or another. It exists through writing, given [donné] by 
the other: born [né] . . . through being given [donné], delivered, offered and 
betrayed all at one and the same time”. (ibid page 279) 
 
This section of the appendix argued that the use of the first person was 
problematic because it could suggest an oversimplified and non–contingent 
construction of the self. However, it was also accepted that the use of the third 
person could suggest and reproduce an emotional disengagement and 
abdication of responsibility. The solution to this dilemma was not to adapt an 
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either or approach but an also approach.    Therefore the choice to use either the 
first or third person will be strategic. A reader may find this disconcerting. 
However this mild discomfort might point a reader to the author’s function in the 






































Appendix 6. Quality Research (Validity and Reliability) 
 
Positivist research was frequently grounded on validity, reliability and objectivity. 
There has been considerable debate the about utility of quality assurance in 
qualitative research and disagreement about what would produce quality 
qualitative research amongst the proponents of the different qualitative research 
methodologies (Seale, 2002; Wainwright, 1997). Alternative to “validity”, 
“reliability” and “generalizability” have been widely suggested including: 
• Trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1981) 
• Goodness ( Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) 
• Dependability, Transferability and Comfirmability  (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) 
• Soundness (Marchell & Rossman, 1989) 
• Triangulation (Creswell, 2002) 
• Authenticity (Ariminio & Hultgren, 2002) 




The above review suggested that Lincoln had been responsible for the 
development of a significant number of concepts. These frequent attempts to find 
increasing nuanced ways of saying the same thing or to  establish a position 
perhaps reflects the problematic nature of validity in qualitative research (Tobin & 
Begley, 2004).  This could be summed up as the desire to make truth and the 
real, problematic but also wanting to be read has having said something true or 
real.  In addition, the multiplication of terms could be seen as yet another 
symptom of the “consumerism of methodology” (Tobin & Begley, 2004). This 
section of the appendix critically examined the above evaluative constructs.  
 
Lincoln & Guba’s (1985) constructs of credibility, dependability, transferability 
and comfirmability perhaps deserve special mention as seminal and frequently 
appear in the qualitative research literature. Dependability, credibility, 
transferability and confirmability developed from the earlier constructs of 
“trustworthiness” and established whether the research was “worth paying 
attention to” (ibid page 290).  The concept of trustworthiness and it underpinning 
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concepts of credibility, dependability, transferability and comfirmability have been 
criticised for too closely overlapping the  quantitative research concepts of  
validity, reliability and objectivity (Tobin  & Begley, 2004). In response to criticism 
about the utility of trustworthiness as a construct, Lincoln (1995) introduced the 
concept of “authenticity”. Schwandt (2001) argued that unlike the underpinning 
concepts of trustworthiness, authenticity was unique to qualitative research.  
Authenticity was strongly associated with ethical research and can be shown if 
the researcher demonstrated fairness in the representation of different realities 
including their issues values and concerns.  Lincoln & Guba (1994) suggested 
that there were four different elements to authenticity which are listed below: 
• Ontological authenticity – showed by the researcher having  had 
developed an in-depth understanding of the constructs being researched 
• Educative authenticity – demonstrated by the research having had 
developed an understanding and appreciation of the constructs of the 
participants.  
• Catalytic authenticity – achieved when the research is prompted to take 
some form of action. 
• Tactical authenticity- - achieved by establishing that the research has 
empowered the other.  
 
All the above elements of authenticity were established by the reader. 
Ontological and educative authenticity were related to theory whereas catalytic 
and tactical authenticity were related to action.  Ontological and educative 
authenticity were related to the skill of the research to describe, analyze and 
explain the constructs in the research. Whereas catalytic and tactical authenticity 
related to how the research impacted on the reader.  For research to be 
authentic it had to be transformative.  .  The aim of authenticity was to engage 
the reader in action  and self development. This suggested that research could 
be part of the technologies of self formation, discipline and control (Foucault, 
1988a).  Morse et al. (2002) were critical of both trustworthiness and authenticity 
and suggested that   they were post hoc strategies for evaluating research rather 
than concurrent with the research. This meant that rigour was something that 
could be imposed after rather than during the research.   
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Credibility refers to processes to establish whether the results of the qualitative 
research are credible from the perspectives of the research participants.  That 
was, whether the statements, views, feelings and meanings inferred by the 
researcher were recognized by the research participants.  This was typically 
achieved by sharing the results with the participants so that they could confirm, 
approve or validate them. Credibility was perhaps analogous to internal validity.  
 
Could validation of this thesis results been achieved by sharing data, and results 
with participants?  As part of the research process M and his mother were both 
shown the account of the original meeting I had with M and their views on it 
sought. The account of the meeting with M was also shared with my EP 
colleagues in the Service. A transcript of the focus group meeting was emailed to 
all of the EPs who took part and their comments sought. I also have had 
discussion with colleagues, who were interested in the services about my 
interpretations of the transcripts of our focus group discussion. Sharing 
transcripts and description was done because it was respectful.   
 
Although, participant checking cannot ensure authenticity it could privilege 
individual accounts of truth.  This was because asking the speaker if a particular 
interpretation was what they meant when they said something assumed that 
there was a fixed, modernist self that had unproblematic access and insight into 
their motives, action and attitudes.  Tobin & Begley (2004) also noted that asking 
participants to check the data or results did not address the problem of multiple 
realities.   
 
Asking the participants to check the results could also have been an example of 
a type of ontological realism.  Ontological realism when combined with 
epistemological post-structuralism could be problematic and lead to criticism that 
the study was self-refuting (Aamodt, 1982).  
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Lincoln & Guba (1985) suggested that credibility could be demonstrated through 
peer debriefing, and prolonged engagement. As common with most self-study 
this thesis’ research had involved detailed discussion with peers about the nature 
of the research and the meanings generated.  Notes of these discussions have 
been kept in the research dairy. The research has occurred over two years and 
during this time I have remained involved with M and his family  
 
Dependability was concerned with the rigour by which the data was interpreted 
by the researcher. Dependable implies that the interpretation made and 
conclusions drawn were permissible and could have been legitimately inferred 
and extrapolated from the data. This was a type of epistemological discipline as it 
was concerned with the limits of what could be said. Dependability therefore 
involved a type of truth game that was concerned with fidelity (being true to).  
This depended both on the quality of the description of the data analysis methods 
and the richness of the data presented (Nikander, 2008).  Dependability was 
therefore analogous to reliability.  
 
In the thesis, the transcript of the Focus Group and the account of the meeting 
with M both provide rich descriptions of the data and are available in Appendices 
2 and 4.  In the literature on validity and reliability in qualitative research there is 
still a strong desire for authenticity (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 
1981).  For example to verify that the research actually took place and that the 
participants really said what they were transcribed as having had said. The 
reader had a strong desire to feel that what they were reading happened, that the 
research occurred and that the account was not a fiction. This thesis contained 
information on methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. This, in 
theory, enabled reader to establish if the results and interpretation of results were 
dependable (Flick, 2002). Although, it would be possible for the reader to audit 
the interpretations and conclusions in this way it would require a significant 
amount of work by the reader to do this. The arduousness of auditing for 
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dependability perhaps means that it was only exercised by a limited number of 
readers.  
 
Arimino & Hultgren (2002) have suggested a more totalising approach to rigour in 
qualitative research by suggesting that rigour should apply to all of the research 
and not just the methodological section.  This included providing rich, detailed or 
thick descriptions of: the epistemology that underpinned the research; the 
methodological approach; the data collection methods; the reflexive position of 
the researcher. In this thesis I have attempted to delineate the post-structural 
epistemology undertaken, provided guidance on how text was selected and 
interpreted.    
 
Confirmability attempts to evaluate research in relation to external sources to 
establish the “trustworthiness” of the research (Flick, 2002). Confirmability was 
therefore analogous to triangulation. The interpretation and conclusions made in 
the thesis were located in the reviewed literature.  While offering some 
triangulation this tended to privilege what has already been said over the 
possibility of saying something which has not been said before.  Triangulation 
was further attempted by juxtaposing the findings from the Focus group with 
those from the meeting with M.  
 
Haryana (1979) suggested that the validity of data could be assessed by 
“assessing the characteristics, interests, and origin of the person who did the 
fieldwork” (Haryana, 1979, pages 99-100).  This was akin to a medieval exegesis 
that validates the test based on who is speaking (Foucault 1969/2003) 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) used the word Transferability to mean how far the 
results could be generalized or transferred to other studies or contexts. This was 
perhaps most analogous to external validity.   While holding that it was not 
possible to generalize from a case study in the “traditional sense”, Flyvbjerg 
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(2006) seemed to suggest that a case-study 76could be used rhetorically to 
persuade the reader of a more general theme and could be used to argue that a 
statement was not universally true (e.g. there was a poverty of aspiration in the 
working class). This was because case-studies could find exceptions (falsify) and 
therefore promotes complexity, ambiguity, particularism and contingency.  
Flyvbjerg (2006) would also want there to be room for a “purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalise” (ibid page 227).  
Case-studies can be used both to test and develop theory (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Flyvbjerg (2006) challenged the tendency towards verifaction in case studies, 
which was the tendency for the research to work towards confirming their 
“preconceived notions” in two moves (ibid page 234). The first move was to 
suggest that verifaction was inherent in all research. In the second move, 
Flyvbjerg (2006) challenged verifaction by listing research where the researcher 
found that their preconceived ideas were incorrect.  Flyvbjerg (2006) second 
move was perhaps too close to the analogy of the null-hypothesis; that was if you 
can disprove the null-hypothesis then the hypothesis can stand.  
 
Zeicher (2007), also concerned about transferability in participant research,  
identified problems with making connections between studies including 
inconsistencies in how researchers defining concepts (e.g. Professional 
development), different data collection methods and research instruments 
employed.  In addition, researchers tended to undertake unique research with 
personal research questions rather than attempting to build on the research of 
others.   However, Zeicher (2007) laments the failure of Self-Study to be used in 
policy reviews or to inform policy debates. Zeicher made a plea for research to 
attempt to establish more consistent definition of concepts and descriptions of 
method, using instruments from previous research and attempts to build on the 
research of others. Zeicher (2007) suggested concerns could just reflect the 
relative newness of self-study as a method.  Zeicher (2007) also recognised that 
                                                 
76
  Flyvjerb (2006) was writing specifically about case studies but I think  that his arguments also applied to 
other types of  small scale and naturalist research (including this thesis). .  
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“introspective self-studies focusing on ones own growth… may be difficult to link 
to other work because of its focus on the self” (Ibid page 41).  
 
This section of the appendix critically examined the constructed used to evaluate 
qualitative research. It was argued that the concepts used in qualitative research 
were problematic and frequently analogous to the evaluative constructs used in 
quantitative research.  Although, the evaluative strategies employed in qualitative 
research might not guarantee high quality research they at least represent a 
desire to produce quality research.  With in mind this section also outlined the 
steps taken by this thesis to produce quality research.  Finally, it was argued that 
the small scale nature thesis and the focus on self-developing made generalising 
the results problematic.  This issue was further explored in the ‘Implication for 




























Appendix 7. Reflexivity 
 
Researching oneself as a practitioner was inexorably linked to the processes of 
reflexivity, which had been a theme in education research since, at least, the 
publication of Schön’s (1983) influential book “The Reflective Practitioner”.  
Reflexivity was also a defining aspect of qualitative research (Banister et al., 
2002; Bourdieu, 1999; Willig, 2001). In qualitative research reflexivity was 
perceived as a way of ensuring rigor (Finlay, 1998; Koch & Harrington, 1998; 
Rice & Ezzy, 1999). Reflexivity involved critical reflection on how the researcher 
constructs knowledge from the research process, what sorts of factors influence 
the researcher’s construction of knowledge and how these influences are 
revealed in the planning, conduct, and writing up of the research (Willig, 2001).  
This section of the appendix further critically examined aspects of the construct 
of reflexivity relevant to this thesis. This was achieved by (1) identifying the 
tensions between modern and post-structuralist approaches to reflexivity, (2) 
critically examining the function of reflection in post-structuralist research and (3) 
examining the strategies used to establish reflexivity.  The overall aim of this 
section of the appendix was to make the concept of reflexivity problematic. This 
was part of the, self-imposed, ongoing task of challenging and testing constructs 
that I predisposed towards.  Testing reflexivity was also believed to be a 
necessary step in developing a critical disposition because of the core role of 
reflexivity in the research methodologies. 
 
There was a well recognized tension in reflexive practices between post-
structuralist and modernist agendas (Ellwood, 2006; Machbeth, 2001; Pillow, 
2003; Usher, 1996).  This tension was derived from the desire for the researcher 
to identify/and name their biases, positions, construction in relation to the 
research and the post-structuralist problematization of modernist concepts such 
as self-knowledge, transparency and the capacity of the subject to name  their 
discourses (Ellwood, 2006;  Machbeth, 2001; Pillow, 2003; Usher, 1996).  Pillow 
(2003) warned against the allure of reflexivity as a means to reduce anxiety 
about the ethnocentric or voyeuristic nature of research. Ellwood (2006) 
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suggested that rather than attempting the impossible of “knowing and naming” 
her subjectivity as researcher that she would “forego instead what I did not, nor 
could not, know at the time” (Ellwood, 2006, page 69). This move reminded the 
reader of the complexities of undertaking qualitative research. A post-structuralist 
approach to reflexivity  was therefore an examination of memories, which are 
always partial and selective; influenced by values, attitudes and beliefs; rewritten 
by experience; and constructed by language (Bonjione, 2001; Conway, 1990;).  
 
Reflexivity has been argued as a necessary condition for ethical research 
(Bourdieu, 1999; Guillemin & Gillam, 2004; McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker, 
2000). McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker (2000), in the quote below, suggested 
that reflexivity facilitated ethical research through: 
 
“… a process whereby researchers place themselves and their practices under 
scrutiny, acknowledging the ethical dilemmas that permeate the research 
process and impinge on the creation of knowledge”. (ibid, page 68) 
 
McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker (2000) suggested that researchers, by making 
their practices and knowledge generation visible, were able to be held to account 
by enabling self-monitoring, self-evaluation and self-regulation processes 
(Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). The psychology of self-awareness and self-focused 
attention was extensively investigated during the 1970s and 1980s (Beaman et 
al., 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1978; Hull 
et al., 1983; Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973; and Scheier & Carver, 1983). These 
studies suggested that the consequence of induced self-awareness was an 
increased awareness of any discrepancies between what they were doing at the 
moment and their idealised view of how they should be acting.  This suggested 
that self-awareness promotes self-consistency.  Reflexivity was therefore a tool 
to ameliorate the power of and objectify the researcher Bourdieu (1999). 
Habermas (1970) claimed that reflexivity being social remained ideological and 
therefore entangled with power.   
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Frosh & Baraitser (2008) where also interested this transformative potential of 
reflexivity and argued that research transformed both the researcher and the 
researched. For example in interviews, what a subject `knows’ shifted as a result 
of the co-constructed interchanges with the researcher. This thesis was 
interested in the shifts in what the researcher knew as they interacted with the 
research subjects.  The implication for Frost and Baraitser (2008) was that all 
knowledge was therefore temporally and interpersonally positioned which made 
knowledge (and truth) contingent, strategic and provisional. The reflexive 
researcher did not merely report the “facts” of the research but also actively 
constructed interpretations (“What do I know?”), while at the same time 
questioning how those interpretations came about (“How do I know what I 
know?”) (Bourdieu, 1999; Hertz, 1997).  
 
Brookfield (1995) suggested that a dialogueic reflexive practice could be 
achieved through encouraging the use of four complementary activities which 
would function as lenses through which to view practice.   These lenses were: 
• Practitioners autobiography;  
• Professional colleagues; 
• Clients; 
• Literature and theory. 
 
The thesis made use of all of the above lenses while appropriating Van Manen’s 
(1977), three distinct and hierarchical stages of the reflective process;  
• Analyzing and reflecting on  the impact of technical aspects of practice; 
• Reflecting on actions and beliefs of the  practitioner; 
• Questioning the moral and ethical dimension of practice.  
 
However, the thesis applied Van Manen’s (1997) stages as constructs rather 
than hierarchies. This was informed by a personal ambiguity towards the utility of 
hieratical systems.    
 
The different levels of hierarchies/categories/constructs of reflectivity outlined 
above can be considered as belonging to two different but overlapping 
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dimensions of reflexivity which can be characterized as “personal reflexivity” and 
“epistemological reflexivity” (Willig, 2001).   
 
Personal reflexivity was a personal reflection on the researcher’s stake in the 
topic being researched. “It involves  reflecting upon the ways our own values, 
experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and 
social identities have shaped the research” (Willig, 2001, p. 10). Hepburn (2003) 
has called this type of reflexivity “confessional”.  
 
Epistemological reflexivity was a reflection on how “what can be known” was 
produced by the practices and processes of the chosen research methodology. 
Banister et al. (2002) preferred the term “functional reflexivity” to epistemological 
reflexivity and argued that the researcher was continuously present in 
epistemological processes. 
 
Reflectivity revealed the doxological values of the researcher but did not provide 
an escape from the power relations that the practitioners work between and 
construct and may further entangle the practitioner in relations of power (Butler, 
2003; Foucault, 2003; Habermas, 1970; Maton, 2003; McNiff, 2000). Reflexivity 
was understood as a positioning practice that made the researcher apparently 
visible; however this visibility can be very localised and managed by the 
researcher.  Foucault (2003) argued that directed self-reflection within an 
organisation, rather than being an act of resistance and liberation was necessary 
for the operation of regimes of power, in the organisation. The assumption that 
problematic visibility ceased when the researched and the researcher were the 
same person/people was also problematic. It made the positivist assumption that 
the “I” that undertook the research was the same “I” that interpreted, analyzed 
and wrote up the research, rather than acknowledging a more contingent and 
partial view of the self.   
 
 318
Maton (2003) challenged the utility of reflexivity and argued that enacted 
reflectivity can be an individualistic, narcissistic and a form of authorship denial.   
Narcissism resulted from a reaction to the researchers objectifying gaze which 
reduces the researcher to speaking only about themselves. Narcissistic reflexivity 
was an individualizing, humanistic process as the researcher attempted to 
overcome their biases and transcend their own social positioning. If narcissistic 
reflexivity was at one end of a continuum, authorship denial was at the other end.  
Authorship denial occurred when the author attempted to position themselves as 
neutral and present only to give a voice to the other. Maton (2003) argued that 
researchers have to find a space between these to binary approaches.  Maton 
(2003) suggested that difficulties with reflexivity could be mediated by accepting 
that each participant only had a partial view and that their view had been shaped 
by the participant’s social position. The aim of reflexivity would therefore, not 
only, be to make the researcher’s biases visible but also to make the 
epistemological and ontological biases visible. Turning the reflexive gaze onto 
ourselves may be the lesser of two evils; doing violence onto oneself to lessen 
the violence we do to others.  However, following Derrida (1978) we have to be 
very careful about theorizing difference and systematizing statements in their 
relation to their virtue. Butler (2003) added that knowing oneself did not make 
practice ethical because complete knowledge of the self or other was impossible 
because of the intrinsic opacity of the self.   However, this opacity could however 
be a source of an ethical relation resulting from realising that neither oneself nor 
the other is completely knowable.   
 
This section of the thesis argued that reflexivity was a highly complex and 
problematic construct. Reflexivity was suggested to be both necessary, if 
insufficient, for ethical research and held the potential to discipline the 
researcher. Reflexivity was also argued to be a dynamic process that shaped 
what it found. This section provided an outline of the frameworks suggested by  
Brookfield (1995) and Van Manen’s (1977) and how these were employed and 
adapted in the this thesis.  Although, it was argued that reflexivity wove the 
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researcher into a web of power it was also suggested that employing reflexivity 
as a tool to critically examine the ontology and epistemology of this thesis could 
still be useful.  
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Appendix 8. Informed Consent 
 
 
By critically examining consent this section continued the work of making 
problematic constructs that I was predisposed towards.  The problematization of 
informed consent was undertaken by (1) considering consent as a fluid construct, 
(2) challenging the dominate narrative about origins consent, (3) arguing that 
consent could function to individualize Professional-Client relationships and 
obscure the role of the State in those relationships, and  (4) that consent 
privileged a rational, autonomous, individualistic construction of clients.    
 
Alderson and Goodey (1998) suggested that there are differences between 
positivistic, constructed, functional, critical and postmodern understandings of 
consent. See table 2 below: 
 
 Table 3. Types of Consent 
 
Type of consent Understanding of consent 
Positivistic  Consent was a real 
‘thing’ and limited only by 
the knowledge and 
cognitive skills of the 
participants 
Constructed Consent was contingent 
and specific and  
constructed through  
historical and social 
processes 
Functional Consent was a 
ceremonial ritual with the 
aim of transferring 
responsibility from 
professional to client.   
Critical  Consent was protective 
corrective to medical 
power and discusses?  
Postmodern Consent was an 
expression of 
preferences and desires 




The above suggested that rather than be a fixed construct that the understanding 
of consent was shaped by the epistemological position.  
 
The conventional narrative was that informed consent arose from the horrors of 
Nazi experimentation and that informed consent can be used as a tool to 
evaluate and make research ethical and as a corrective for informed consent was 
also argued to be a corrective for autocratic and paternalistic research practices ( 
Corrigan, 2003; Goodman, McElliot and Marks, 2003). However, Goodman, 
McElliot and Marks (2003) argued that there was concern about consent in 
experimentation since at least the 1860s that continued up until, during and after 
WWII.  In fact, Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003),    noted that human 
experimentation significantly increased after WWII.   
 
Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) argued that a focus on consent   directed 
the analytical gaze to ethics rather than practice (praxis). They were very much 
of the opinion that practice was the more appropriate level of analysis.   The 
central issue for Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) was the nature of the 
practices and the role they have in relation to the State. I am not sure that I fully 
agree with the binary of ethics or action and would want to suggest phronesis as 
a possible counter and corrective. Indeed, if I understand Aristotle in his 
discussion of continence, ethics is dependent on commitment and resistance 
(action).   
 
What I found very useful about Goodman, McElliot and Marks’s (2003) argument 
was that they inferred that the important relationship would not be between the 
EP and Client but between EP and the state. Or perhaps it was more accurate to 
say the most obscured relationship was the relationship between the EP and the 
State. The focus on informed consent points the research gaze towards the EP 
and Client relationship and away from the EP and State relationship. Informed 
consent has a secondary obscurest function in that it could disguise power as it 
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positions the client and EP as equal. The focus in research or EP practice needs 
to be more than was it ethical but also a critical examination of the practices and 
their functions.  
 
The relationship between the EP (as professional) and the State hinged around 
the concept of usefulness. Usefulness in education can be thought of as 
achievement, standards, the skills need to find employment, making students 
useful to employers (Goodman, McElliot & Marks, 2003).   The role of EPs’ in 
producing useful bodies was little explored in the literature. However I would 
argue that it was present in EP practice. For example, inclusion can be framed as 
a binary between the identified child with the ’problem’ and the rest of the 
class/school.   Usefulness was a core construct in this.  The child with SEN can 
be included so long as they do not impact on the efficacious education of their 
peers. For example the DfES (2001) stated that could not be placed in a 
mainstream school if “the child’s attendance at the school would be incompatible 
with the efficient education of other pupils or the efficient use of resources”. 
(DfES, 2001, page 10).  
 
The EP relationship with the state placed them between and betwixt the 
particular other and general pupil body, between the needs, rights, desires of a 
particular child and the efficient education of children.   The EPs were not only 
gatekeepers but also psychological/educational engineers; they had a role in 
both specifying provision but also in increasing the usefulness of particular 
pupils.  However, rather than focus on this instrumental and function role of EPs, 
the focus was on whether a consent form was signed or how we obtained 
agreement to undertake work.  This suggested a further double function of 
consent. Firstly, O’Neill (2004) argued that informed consent both held 
professionals accountable but also protected them.  The type of accountability 
was managerial accountability with its requirements of setting targets and 
measuring performance. Secondly, informed consent transfers some of the 
responsibility from the professional to the client (O’Neill, 2004) 
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In the professional/client relationship there are multiple and ill-defined 
conceptions of autonomy which seemed to make the relationship obscure. There 
was also dispute about the degree of informed consent that was necessary and 
the need for it to be explicit and specific as opposed to tacit and general (O’Neill, 
2004 ).  
 
Locating the child in an economy of usefulness made identification with children 
as individuals difficult.  This was because the individual was already presented in 
terms of utility, situated in an economy of usefulness.  The child with SEN was 
only seen when they were presented/constructed as lacking in relation to the 
general pupil body (slow progress, inappropriate behaviour etc). The EP 
encountered the child in a situation that was (pre)formed so that the child could 
become an object of intervention or assessment. Others have to be made docile 
before they can be made useful (Foucault, 1977).   The referred child has been 
(pre)categorised and constructed and therefore to see the child as otherwise 
becomes an act of resistance and required commitment. It is an act of resistance 
because it required the EP to challenge and disrupt the dominate discourse.  
 
The relationships in human subject research were ambiguous and the focus on 
informed consent was an attempt to manage this ambiguity by obfuscating the 
discursive practices that instigate and regulate it (O’Neill, 2002). Traditional 
approaches tended not to focus on the complexity of choice and the processes of 
decision-making.  (Jallinoja, 2001; O’Neill, 2002).  A dichotomy was presented 
between the paternalistic researcher and the active and autonomous decision-
making participant.  The respect for autonomy that underpinned informed 
consent developed out of bioethics which privileged individualism, self-
governance, and rational choice (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000; 
Rose, 1999; Wolpoe, 1998).  However, Corrigan (2003) argued that 
individualization “reify the process of consent by stripping it away from its context 
and reducing it to a rational choice model of action” (Ibid, page 770) and 
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obscured the role of power in the process. O’Neill (2002) added that consent had 
to be more than the option of refusing what is offered.  
 
O’Neill (2002) highlighted the irony  that consent appeared to be motivated by a 
desire to focus on public health rather than individual care  but  that  “… many 
public health measures have to be compulsory if they are to be effective, and all 
compulsion ultimately relies on sanction, hence the possible use of some sorts of 
coercion” (Ibid, page 37). In other words, informed consent was the price willing 
to be paid when the needs of the many outweighed the needs of the few.  
 
This section made the construct of informed consent problematic by first 
acknowledging that rather than being a fixed and universally understood 
construct that it was understood differently by different epistemological positions. 
After loosening up the construct of consent the origins of consent as a response 
to Nazism was then questioned.   Instead of accepting that informed consent was 
a bulwark against oppression and evil it was suggested that consent could 
obscure the problematic role of the State in Professional-Client relationships. 
However, I am not convinced that the solution would be to abandon informed 
consent. Research without the informed consent of the participant would be 
abusive and unethical.  Rather the critical examination of consent suggested  that 
although informed consent was necessary for ethical research it was not only 
insufficient  to ensure ethical research, by itself but also potentially problematic. 
This realization placed an obligation on the researcher to continue to strive to 
make the research ethical. This included not assuming that because a consent 
form had been signed or the participants’ continual involvement was sought that 
this meant that the research was ethical. It also called me not to keep the 
research gaze focused solely on Professional-Client relationships but to seek to 



















































     
 326




SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 

















Looked after child:           YES / NO 
 
Name of Social Worker (if appropriate): 
 

























Name of EP/SENSS Advisory Teacher 
who has agreed to become involved: 
 
Date School Action began: 
Date School Action Plus began: 
 
Statemented:             Yes / No                       
Date of meeting when this referral was agreed: 








Family Information  
 
Name of Parent/Carer (including 
forename) 

















FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 







CURRENT LEVELS OF ATTAINMENT (Including P Levels) 
 
Literacy:                                                                             Mathematics: 
 
 


















STEPS TAKEN TO PROMOTE INCLUSION AND PROGRESS: 




Three IEPs attached or relevant/appropriate evidence 
 
 
C&L ESBD C&I S/PN 
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WHAT ARE THE SCHOOL’S EXPECTATIONS OF SERVICE INVOLVEMENT? 











In accordance with the Data Protection Act information provided to the Service is 
used in order to assist Wakefield MDC meet the statutory responsibilities for the 
provision of education to children. This is in accordance with requirements of the 
Education Act 1996 and School Standards Framework Act 1998.  Data may be 
shared with other agencies involved in the health and welfare of school children. 
When involving any third party we will take all reasonable steps to ensure your data 
is securely and confidentially kept.  If you are worried about giving personal details 
or us sharing them with others please discuss this with the member of staff working 
with you. 
 





This form has been discussed with me. 
 


















Appendix 10. The Matrix 

































access to the 
academic 
curriculum. 





























































tactile mode of 
communication. 
 








field loss. May  
need a tactile 
mode of  
communication . 




and/or field loss   




and/or field loss   
A mild functional 
visual 
impairment 




















may use visual 
communication 
(BSL,SSE). 
16 – 27.5 hrs 
Significant 
functional 
deafness /HI  
uses 
aids/technology  




likely to  use 
aids/technology  










difficulties    Will 
Severe physical 
difficulties. Likely 




difficulties   May 












may or may not 
be able to 
communicate 
intentionally 






13 – 27 hrs 
mobility and/or 
communication 











































































social use of 
language, 
sensory triggers 













social use of 
language, 
sensory triggers 
and  thought 
processes. 










social use of 
language, 
sensory triggers 
and  thought 
processes. 
Mild difficulty 






social use of 
language, 
sensory triggers 





























behaviour  of 
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A Cognition  B Specific Learning Difficulty C Visual Impairment  D Hearing 
Impairment   E Physical Difficulty F Language and Communication G Social 
Communication and Interaction H Behaviour I Mental Health J Medical  Red 












safety of self 
and others. 





safety and that 
of others. 













symptoms of a  
mental health 








symptoms of a  
severe mental 








difficulty.   
























e.g. Jig-saw  
A constant and 
severe medical 
condition, which 














is not yet fully 
controlled 
 















Appendix 11.  Micro Processes of Accountability 
 
1. Supervision records. After the monthly supervision EPs completed a form 
that detailed the date and topic of supervision; 
2. Monthly audits were undertaken by administrators on the training 
provided/received, annual reviews ,children seen from the waiting list and 
the date and colleague with whom peer supervision took place;  
3. TME form (to be completed with a teacher, recording agreed outcome and 
evaluation of EPs’ work);  
4. Flexi time card (recording of weekly hours worked during the week). 
5. Signing in/out book; 
6. Record of visit (Record of  EP’s work retained by the school); 
7. Time in school sheet (Weekly account of time spent in a  named school); 
8. Electronic diaries (Completed in advance so that Managers and 
colleagues can know the location of an EP); 
9. School signing in/out books recording the time  EPs arrived and left a 
school;  
10. File audits (Every 6 months a sample of each EPs’ files were audited with 
the Senior Management Team  (SMT) to ensure quality); 
11. Specialism audit goals (Each EP has a specialism. Every 6 months the 
progress towards achieving the specialist goals of the EP are reviewed by 
a member of the SMT); 
12. HPC record of Continuing Professional Development  (CPD) identifying 
the training  and professional development undertaken;  
13. Performance reviews held ever 6 months with a member of SMT; 
14.  All statutory Advice77 was read and authorized by a senior manager; 
15. Leave cards; 
16. Mileage forms recording the school attended, distance travelled, reason 
for the journey and how long the business took;  
17. Deadlines for Statutory Advice; 
18. At weekly team meetings EPs were given a piece of paper that reminded 
them of the deadline for Statutory Advice and asked if there are any 
problems with the deadlines; 
19. Peer discussion records; recording discussions between EPs and 
colleagues. The nature of the concern and the agreed action was noted 
and filed appropriately; 
20. Three supervisions with SMT during the year; 
21. Team and cluster meeting minutes; 
22. Fire registers signed when arriving and leaving the building; 
23. Internet use book; a record was made of the site visited, length of time at 
site and  reason site was  accessed; 
                                                 
77
 Statutory Advice as a substantial report written by EPs at the request of the Local Authority. The aim of 
the Statutory Advice is to identify the special educational needs of a Client and to make recommendations 
about modification, accommodation, structure of the school day, teaching approaches and resources 
required to meet the Client’s special educational needs.  
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24. Internet usage tracking nature and frequency by the Local Authorities’ ICT 
team; 













































Appendix 12. Participant Consent Forms 
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Title of Project:    A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which 
Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals:  
To be what I am not. 
 
Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin                  Contact number:  01924 307403 
 
 
       Please initial box 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter 
     dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask  
     questions. 
 
• I understand that my child’s participation is voluntary and that they are free  
      to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  
  
• I understand that what my child’s responses will be recorded and will  
     be anonymised before analysis.  
 
     This means that when the recordings of the child’s responses are written down, 
     no names of children will be used. Examples of what my child has said may be  
     used in the write up of the research, however my child name will not be  
     written instead it will may say “Here are examples of pupils views which  
     were sought from a secondary school in West Yorkshire.   
     
 




________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Parental Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 





Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated 





Title of Project:   A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which 
Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals:  
To be what I am not. 
 
Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin                  Contact number:  01924 307403 
 
 
       Please initial box 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter 
     dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask  
     questions. 
 
• I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I am free  
      to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  . 
  
• I understand that what I say will be recorded and will be anonymised before  
      analysis.  
     
     This means that when the recordings of my responses are written down, 
     no names will be used. Examples of what I have said may be used in the  
     write up of the research, however my name will not be written instead it will  
     may say “Here are examples of pupils views from a secondary school  
     in West Yorkshire”.   
     




________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Pupil Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 





Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated 





Title of Project:   A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which 
Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals:  
To be what I am not. 
  
Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin Contact number:  01924 307403 
 
 
       Please initial box 
 
• I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter 
     dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask  
     questions. 
 
• I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free  
      to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.  . 
  
• I understand that what I say will be recorded and will be anonymised before  
      analysis.  
     
     This means that when the recordings of my responses are written down, 
     no names will be used. Examples of what I have said may be  
     used in the write up of the research, however my name will not be  
     written instead it will may say “Here are examples of staff views which  
     were sought from a secondary school in West Yorkshire.   
     




________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Staff Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
 
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 




Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated 
consent form will be placed in the project’s main record, which is  kept in a secure location.  
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Appendix 13. Analysis of the HPC-SCPE 
 
13.1. The problematic relationships with the client 
 
13.1.1 Anxiety about the EP-Client asymmetry 
 
A defining aspect of the HPC-SCPE was anxiety about the professional-SU’s 
asymmetrical relationship. This was evident in the frequency of the words 
‘protect’ and ‘care; in the document. The words ‘protect’ or protecting appeared 
at least ten times and the word ‘care’ was used about nine times. The HPC-







Respect was rationalized as being necessary for the protection of SUs, which 
was clear stated below: 
 
 
The above suggested that there was potential for danger in the Professional-SU 
relationship.  
 
13.1.2 Managing and Regulating the EP-Client asymmetry 
 
The HPC SCPE regulated the Professional-SU relationship through requiring the 






“You must protect service users if you believe that any situation puts them in 
danger.” (Ibid, page 8)  




The professional, while monitoring themselves in their institution also had to be 
mindful of their behaviour outside that institution: 
 
 
This extension of regulation outside the institution further privileged the 
personage of the professional (Foucault, 1989). The professional’s moral 
authority had to be beyond challenge.   This moralistic view of the professional 
echoed the portrayal of professional proposed by Arnold (2002).  The above 
quote explicitly linked the profession’s and professional’s authority through 
rationalizing the professional’s regulation as a means to maintain SU’s 
confidence in the profession.  The professional was invited to recognize their 
ethical obligations both as the correct way to behave in order to be considered 
professional and for the good of the profession.  The professional consequently 
had authority over Others because they  had authority over themselves 
(Foucault, 1990). The regulation of the EP both legitimized and warranted their 
authority in the EP-Client relation. Characteristically of pastoral power, the 
professional was both a subject that exercised power and an object of power; 
“one is always the ruler and the ruled” (Foucault, 1990 page 87). This privileging 
of the moral authority partially answers an EP’s question about the source of their 
power to “make so may judgments” (FG line 380). Explicitly, Foucault (1990, 
1989) might have suggested that the EP, as a professional, was made available 
as an object of admiration through constructing the professional as being morally 
“As soon as you become aware of a situation that puts a service user in 
danger, you should discuss the matter with a senior colleague or another 
appropriate person.” (Ibid, page 8) 
“You must keep high standards of personal conduct, as well as professional 
conduct. You should be aware that poor conduct outside of your professional 
life may still affect someone’s confidence in you and your profession.” (Ibid, 
page 9) 
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superior. In addition, the EP had authority to make judgments about others 
because of the same moral authority.  
 
Following Foucault (1979) it would be difficult to present the HPC-SCPE as 
strictly repressive. However, the Professional-SU was highly codified and policed 
the possibility of a relationship with the SU-as-Other (as opposed to just another 
other). The SU-as-Other was present as the relationship to be worked against. 
Therefore SU-as-Other was not strictly silenced; rather they were present in the 
multiple attempts to direct the professional gaze otherwise and the need to be 
constantly aware of the disruptive demand of the Other. If the SU-as-Other had 
been silenced I would have been unable to point to him/her. The SU-as-Other 
was not outside of discourse but entangled in double discourse (Foucault, 1979). 
A secret to be discovered, “a thing abusively reduced to silence, and at the same 
time difficult and necessary, dangerous and precious to divulge” (Foucault, 1979, 
page 35).  
 
The conclusion was that Professionals had to be on their guard against the 
demand of the SU-as-Other to be engaged with uniquely. Professionals had, 
therefore, to locate themselves and their colleagues within a web of examination, 
observation and obligation. The professional had to observe and examine their 
own and colleagues’ behaviour and then confess any infringements.  The 
boundary was therefore not between what could and could not be said but how 
things should be said, who could say them and how it was 
authorized/rationalized (Foucault, 1979).    
 
 
13.1.3 Objectification of the client 
 
The HPC-SCPE’s use of the term “SU” reinforced these alienations by 
suggesting that the professional was not accountable to a particular immanent 
Other (SU-as-Other) but a universal transcendent SU (client-as-function).  For 
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example, the professional was instructed not to take account of the SUs’ race, 
age, gender etc:   
 
 
The above suggested, in the meeting with SU, by taking account of their 
particularity, that professionals would either give a SU preferential or 
unfavourable treatment.  The tension was caused by the possibility of an 
engagement with the other as Other and not just another other. There appeared 
to be concerns that being in proximity with Clients that the dispassionate, neutral, 
distant, coldly rational scientific practitioner was challenged. This pointed to, 
although indirectly, the emotional work undertaken by professionals (Critchley & 
Bernosconi, 2002; Water, 2008). This emotional entanglement perhaps was an 
example of a void (that which was not counted) and functioned as a continual 
potential of creative instability (Badiou, 2005). The analysis suggested that the 
HPC-SCPE was, therefore, directly concerned with regulating professionals’ 
relations with SU’s to sanitise and neutralize them (Rose, 1999). The above  
quote also suggested that it was the role and function of the SU that the 
professional was accountable to rather than SU-as-person/non-SU identity 
(Benjamin 2004, 2009).  
 
The use of the word “views”, above,  (with its subjective connotations) made a 
distinction between attitude/bias and objective knowledge while privileging 
objectivity. The word “view” also worked to include the possibility that some 
“treatments” could be gender, race, disability, lifestyle, age, etc. sensitive. This 
type of individuation would be based on objective knowledge (evidence based 
research) on which type of treatments was most appropriate for a category of 
client. The above statement, therefore, simultaneously enabled the SU to be both 
made transcendent and individualized in relation to pre-established categories.  
“You must not allow your views about a service user’s sex, age, colour, race, 
disability, sexuality, social or economic status, lifestyle, culture, religion or 
beliefs to affect the way you treat them or the professional advice you give.” 
(Ibid, page 8) 
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This was achieved while presenting professionalism as neutral to and distant 
from the Client.  
 
13.1.4 Categorizing and Presenting the Client 
 
The HPC-SCPE located the SU in the Professional-SU’s asymmetrical 
relationship, for example on pages 2-12, professionals: 
• provided and the SUs received  care  
• provided services and SUs  used services  
• provided protection and SUs required protection  
• respected and the SUs were respected  
• kept confidentialities and SUs had sensitive histories  
• obtained  consent and SUs gave consent  
• explained and SUs received information4 
The above therefore simultaneously presented and positioned the professional 
and SU in dominant and submissive roles.   
 
13.1.5 Responsibilization of the EP and Client 
 
Although, the HPC-SCPE did not explicitly state the responsibilities of the SU it 
located the Professional-SU relation in a web of responsibilities.  There were 
seven sentences in the HPS-SCPE that identify the responsibility of the 
professional towards the SU and eight sentences where the professional was 
asked to be accountable  to, or “ take account” of, the needs of the SU or 
legislation.  The HPC-SCPE was very clear on the responsibility of the 




“You are personally responsible for making sure that you promote and protect 
the best interests of your SUs” (Ibid, page 8). 
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The above quote suggested that the HPC-SCPE demanded that the professional 
took responsibility for things that they did and things that they failed to do. This 
demand was therefore totalizing.  Asking professionals to be able to justify their 
decisions to others was asking the professional to locate themselves in the (all-
be-it imagined) normalizing and evaluative gaze of others (Foucault, 1977).  





Professionals were therefore asked to be able to give an account of themselves 
(Butler, 2005). The professional was unable to delegate their responsibility by 
delegating work and was required to “effectively supervise tasks” they “have 
asked other people to carry out” (HPC-SCPE page 12). Professionals were also 
required to “keep”, “update” and make “easy to read” prompt “accurate records” 
that were signed with dates (HPC-SCPE, page 12). The processes of 
professional accountable/responsibilization and clienthood visibility were 
therefore also entangled. Finally, the HPC-SCPE demanded that professionals 
“must get informed consent” for the SU’s treatment (HPC-SCPE, page 12).  The 
rhetorical use of consent to obligate and make the SU complicit in their treatment 
had already been discussed (Foucault, 1980; Tong, 1998; Rose, 1999; 




“You are responsible for your professional conduct, any care or advice you 
provide, and any failure to act. You are responsible for the appropriateness of 
your decision to delegate a task. You must be able to justify your decisions if 
asked to” (Ibid, page 8). 
 
“As soon as you become aware of a situation that puts a service user in 
danger, you should discuss the matter with a senior colleague or another 
appropriate person.” (ibid page 8) 
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The HPC-SCPE was overtly underpinned by biomedical ethics. This was evident 
in the references to best interests, confidentiality, informed consent, respect and 
instructions not to cause harm (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001).  The HPC-
SCPE’s medical bias could be seen in the instruction that the professional 
“…must deal fairly with the risk of infection” (ibid page 3).   The HPC-SCPE 
acknowledged that the standards were written in “broad terms and designed to 
apply to all registrants as far as possible” (ibid page 4). Furthermore, it 
acknowledges that not all standards apply directly to all registrants and make 
particular reference to the standard on medical infections. The HPC-SCPE, see 
below, only indirectly and briefly alluded to contexts, how the principles should be 
tempered by specific situations and what to do if the principles are in conflict: 
 
  
The above guidance while attempting to be clear left a great deal of ambiguity. 
For example phrase such as “best interests”, “reasonable”, “sensible” and 
“relevant” were all subjective. However, the instruction to take account of “all 
relevant information and the best interests of the people who use or are affected 
by your services” (ibid, page 6)  was the closest the HPC-SCPE came to 
recognizing that  context and the particularities of a SU had a role in shaping 
ethical decisions. The HPC-SCPE’s emphasis on decisions based on enough 
information suggested a rational and cognitive approach that did not recognize 
the role of emotions in ethical decisions (Haidt, 2001).  The words “sensible” and 
If you make informed, reasonable and professional judgements about your 
practice, with the best interests of your service users as your prime concern, 
and you can justify your decisions if you are asked to, it is very unlikely that 
you will not meet our standards. By ‘informed’, we mean that you have enough 
information to make a decision. This would include reading these standards 
and taking account of any other relevant guidance or laws. By ‘reasonable’, we 
mean that you need to make sensible, practical decisions about your practice, 
taking account of all relevant information and the best interests of the people 
who use or are affected by your services.” (Ibid, pages 5-6) 
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“practical” in the above quote further suggested a privileging of pragmatic (non-
political) approaches to decision making. The regulatory gaze in the HPC-SPCE 
was exclusively targeted at the professional-SU relationship rather than the 
Professional-State relationships and specifically, professional’s role in the 
allocation or distribution of resources or enacting government policy (Goodman, 
McElliot and Marks, 2003). This was surprising given that the majority of 
professionals in the HPC would work for State funded institutions where there 
might have been a tension between acting in the best interest of clients and 
demands placed on the professional to manage (ration) resources.  
 
The HPC-SCPE also employed deontological and consequential ethics that 
underpinned traditional bioethics (Rowson, 2001). The deontological 
underpinning was evident from the title pages which included the phrase; “your 
duties as a registrant”.  The influence of consequential ethics could be seen 
using the best interests of the SU as the benchmark for all decisions/actions.  
However, this was not unfettered consequentialism because the Professional 
was required to take account of “relevant guidance or laws” when making 
decisions (HPC-SCPE, 2008, page 6) 
 
 
13.2.2 Virtue Ethics and Care 
 
HPC-SCPE also pointed to virtue ethics. This was evident in the guidance on the 
expected character of the professional. The professional not only had to fulfill 
their duty to the SU they also had to be of good character.   For example section 




This connection between personal character and the governance of others has a 
long history (Foucault, 1989).  An analysis of the function and role of the 





13.3 Presentation of the EP 
 
13.3.1The Professional Rationalization of EP practice 
 
The HPC-SCPE referenced not only the performance, behaviour and decisions 
of the practitioner but also the character of the professional. The behaviour of the 
individual EP was not, just to protect the practicing EP but to protect the 
profession of Educational Psychology.  For example: 
 
 
This statement works to entangle ethics and professionalism and to further the 
apotheosis of the professional (Foucault, 1989).  The inclusion of character 
suggested that the HPC-SCPE had a totalizing and normalizing aim where the 




“You must behave with honesty and integrity and make sure that your 
behaviour does not damage the public’s confidence in you or your profession. 
 
You must justify the trust that other people place in you by acting with honesty 
and integrity at all times. You must not get involved in any behaviour or activity 
which is likely to damage the public’s confidence in you or your profession.” 
(HPC-SCPE page 14) 
“… you must behave with honesty and integrity and make sure that your 





The above quote suggested that the ethical substance to be worked on included 
“skills, knowledge, character and health.  The professional is not only responsible 
for their conduct while at work but at all times: 
 
 
In making the above demand HPC-SCPE was perhaps mindful of the criticism of 
professionals as “self interested monopolies” (Evetts, 2003, page 401).  This 
suggested that both the idealized and cynical approaches to understanding 
professionalism suggested by Macdonald (1995) were present in the HPC 
guidance.  This is what Billig (1988) referred to as an ‘ideological dilemma’. 
These inconsistencies enabled the HPC-SCPE to achieve different tasks (the 
apotheoses and regulation of health professionals) simultaneously. 
 
Meeting the ethical standards was rationalized as means to establish public 
confidence and protect the profession; 
 
 
The above quote was clear that it was the profession and not the professional 
that HPC-SCPE was designed to protect. 
“When we say someone is ‘fit to practice’, we mean that they have the skills, 
knowledge, character and health to practice their profession safely and 
effectively.” (Ibid,  page 15) 
 
“You must keep high standards of personal conduct, as well as professional 
conduct. You should be aware that poor conduct outside of your professional 
life may still affect someone’s confidence in you and your profession.” (Ibid, 
page 9) 
“We also want to make sure that you maintain high standards of personal 
conduct and do not do anything which might affect the public’s confidence in 
you or your profession. However, we do not dictate how you should meet our 
standards.” (Ibid page 5) 
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The appropriation of bioethics to achieve a managerial and disciplinary function 
was suggested in the HPC-SCPE.  This was made explicit in the title of the 
document “Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics”. There was a 
conflation between ethics and performance where inefficiency, not engaging with 
professional development, meeting targets are presented as moral failures rather 
than managerial issues. The code of ethics was not just about providing a 
framework for thinking through ethical dilemmas, not just an addendum to the 
role to be applied at particular times but also a micro management tool.  
 
13.3.2 Betwixt and Between 
 
The HPC-SCPE established a set of binaries and hence located the professional 
between universal principles:  
• Autonomy and accountability 
• Deontological (personal duties) and utilitarian (universal responsibilities) 
ethics  
 
However, HPC-SCPE was not explicit about how these binaries should be 
negotiated. The HPC-SCPE (page 8) states that the professional has fourteen 
personal duties. These included duties to: 
• Service users 
• Relevant regulators including the HPC 
• Professional colleagues 
• Their profession 
• Those that the professional supervised 
• Their professional knowledge (developing and acting within the limits of) 
• Themselves in relation to there professional and non-professional life. This 
included the professional’s health and moral character 
 
However the HPC-SCPE only identified two possible tensions; 
• Between the professional’s  duty to a colleague and a SU (page 8) 
• Between the professional’s personal views and the clients best interest 
(page 8) 
 
In both of the above examples the protection and best interest of the SU must 
come first. It is interesting to note that the HPC-SCPE did not explicitly speak of 
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the professional’s duties to their employer or the function they provide for the 
State. Employers were referred to as a source of information for professionals 
(Ibid, page 5), a possible restrictor of practice (Ibid, page 9), a  provider of 
additional procedures (Ibid, page 13) and a source of complaint to the HPC (Ibid, 
page 15).   
 
13.3.3 Apotheosis of the Psychologist 
In the HPC-SCPE the professional was simultaneously autonomous, 
independent, responsible and accountable because they were professional. 
Accountability and autonomy defined what it was to be professional:  
 
 
The juxtaposition of “autonomous” and “accountable” seemed oxymoronic. After 
all, how could one be simultaneously autonomous from accountability and be 
accountable. However, the inherent contradictions between autonomous and 
accountable could be functional if considered as another example of an 
“ideological dilemma” (Billig et al., 1988). The presence of multiple discourses 
provided professionals with a range of rhetorical resources that they could use 
strategically.   The dilemma also articulated the space in which practitioners had 
to navigate, that is, a subject that knows and an object that is known or doer and 
done to (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).  
 
Professionals were only autonomous if they made reasonable decisions. The 




“As an autonomous and accountable professional, you need to make informed 
and reasonable decisions about your practice to make sure that you meet the 
standards that are relevant to your practice. This might include getting advice 
and support from education providers, employers, professional bodies, 
colleagues and other people to make sure that you protect the wellbeing of 




References to “informed” and “reasonable” above,   called the practitioner to a 
rational practice. The next line of the above quote, further limited the autonomy of 
the EP (see below): 
 
 
The above suggested that the autonomous professional was located in a 
community with whom they have an accountable relationship. The professional 
was individualized to make them accountable. The quote below makes it very 




Having the test of a decision being one that the professional could defend to 
another placed the professional in a social context within an imagined set of 
surveillances.  This call only to do actions that could not be justified to an unseen 
other established a relationship between the practitioner and a transcendent 
examining, judging and normalizing context.  The professional was therefore 
called in to being (made visible) as a rational practitioner within a normalizing 
context (Foucault, 2003). The professional was simultaneously assigned their 
“If you make informed, reasonable and professional judgements about your 
practice, with the best interests of your service users as your prime concern, 
and you can justify your decisions if you are asked to, it is very unlikely that 
you will not meet our standards” (Ibid, page 5). 
“You must not do anything, or allow someone else to do anything that you 
have good reason to believe will put the health or safety of a service user in 
danger… You must tell us (and any other relevant regulators) if you have 
important information about your conduct or competence, or about other 
registrants and health professionals you work with.” (Ibid, pages 8 - 9)  
“This might include getting advice and support from education providers, 
employers, professional bodies, colleagues and other people to make sure 
that you protect the wellbeing of service users at all times.” (Ibid, page 5)  
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autonomy, given their duties and made aware that they were accountable (Rose, 
1999).   
 
The HPC-SCPE standards were “written in broad terms” and required the 
professional to make “informed and reasonable decisions” as an “autonomous 
and accountable professional” (HPC-SCPE, page 4-5). Reason therefore 
disciplined the professional and hence regulated the Professional-Client 
relationship. Whether a decision was informed and reasonable was within the 
professional’s ability to “justify” if asked (ibid page 6). A professional must be 
prepared to give an account of themselves to others by first establishing if they 
can give an account to themselves. This call for a retreat inside the self rather 
than set of professional techniques established the regulation of the 
Professional-SU relationship as ethical work.   Although the retreat within oneself 
was individualistic it was also had a social dimension (Foucault, 1986). In the 
Educational Psychology Service the social dimension arose from the self-
examination occurring in a institution that hierarchically formalized supervision. 
Educational Psychologists had to have supervision at least once a month with six 
of these sessions being with a senior member of the management team. The 
retreat within oneself could also establish conducive working relationships as 
EPs were encouraged to have peer supervision where colleagues supported 
each other.  
 
The HPC-SCPE did not explicitly articulate a negative portrayal of professionals. 
However, recognizing that professionals needed to be regulated suggested that 
SUs needed protecting from professionals. For example, the HPC-SCPE stated 
“we set these standards at a level we think is necessary to protect members of 
the public” (Ibid page 4).  This suggested that, although not bad, Professional-







The HPC-SCPE did not refer to resistance but made reference to the SU’s right 
to refuse treatment: 
 
The above suggested refusal of treatment was dependent on cognitive capacity.  
This was because a discourse based on individual rights required rational 
individuals able to make choices.  By insisting that the SU had to be made aware 
risks of refusal protected he professional by making the SU responsible for their 
fully informed decision (Rose, 1999). The quote pointed to a tension between the 
belief that professional acted in the best interest of the client and the rights of a 
capable client.  If the professional was acting in the best interest of the client then 
the Client’s refusal of treatment became irrational.  Therefore the Professional 
had to ensure the Client understood the risks (Rose, 1999). The HPC-SCPE did 
not make reference to the difficulties SU’s could have in enacting refusal in 












“A person who is capable of giving their consent has the right to refuse 
treatment You must respect this right. You must also make sure that they are 
fully aware of the risks of refusing treatment, particularly if you think that there 
is a significant or immediate risk to their life.” (HPC-SCPE page12) 
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